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As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we were doing 
essentially lawyers’ work up here—reading text and discerning our society’s 
traditional understanding of that text—the public pretty much left us alone.  
Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about.  
But if in reality our processes of constitutional adjudication consists primarily 
of making value judgments . . . then a free and intelligent people’s attitude 
towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite different.  The people 
know that their value judgments are quite as good as those taught in any law 
school—maybe better . . . confirmation hearings for new [J]ustices should 
deteriorate into question-and-answer sessions in which senators go through a 
list of their constituents’ most favored and disfavored alleged constitutional 
rights, and seek the nominee’s commitment to support or oppose them. 
—Justice Scalia 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
Talk of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is in the air.  Indeed, it is almost 
unavoidable.  Critics argue the Court is in danger of being perceived by the 
public as illegitimate.  Is that true?  If so, what consequences would likely 
follow?  This Article will address the question of the Court’s legitimacy in 
the present political context.  After a brief introduction, it will discuss the 
concept of institutional judicial legitimacy as it has come to be understood 
by political scientists.  Then, building on Justice Scalia’s dissent in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,1 it will briefly discuss those methodologies that 
Justice Scalia referred to as “lawyers’ work”—the analytical techniques that 
the Justices have traditionally relied on to interpret the Constitution.  
Further, the Article will engage in an extended review of several historical 
periods in history in which the public questioned the Court’s legitimacy.  It 
will be argued that often, though not always, the Court was able to preserve 
its legitimacy through the engagement of what Justice Scalia characterized 
 
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
2
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as “lawyer’s work.”  Finally, it will be argued that when the public seriously 
questions the Court’s legitimacy, the constitutional check provided through 
the appointment and confirmation authority has slowly but surely resolved 
the crisis.  The Article will maintain that recent changes to the Court’s 
composition are simply one more example of the political system employing 
the constitutionally based appointment and confirmation process to address 
public dissatisfaction with the Court.  The cries of illegitimacy are little more 
than an anguished response to this change. 
It is no secret that we live in politically polarized times.  The political 
polarization has enveloped every governmental institution, including the 
Supreme Court.  The bitter political struggle over the confirmation of 
Justice Brett Kavanaugh brought the political dispute over the Court into 
public focus.2  Many who bitterly opposed the replacement of 
Justice Kennedy with Justice Kavanaugh assumed the appointment would 
lead to a solid conservative majority on the Court that would overrule or 
significantly narrow decisions they prefer, or at the very least would render 
it far more difficult to persuade the Court to use constitutional 
interpretation to deliver desired political results.  Many of 
Justice Kavanaugh’s supporters hoped that was exactly what might well 
happen and had voted for President Trump in anticipation of that 
possibility.  It was a heated and bitter political battle but well within the 
boundaries set by the Constitution. 
Following the appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, both 
nominated by President Trump, editorials, op-eds, and blogs argued that 
conservative oriented decisions—especially those favoring 
President Trump and his policies—will raise serious questions as to the 
legitimacy of the Court as an institution.3  Five senators filed an amicus brief 
 
2. See generally CARL HULSE, CONFIRMATION BIAS: INSIDE WASHINGTON’S WAR OVER THE 
SUPREME COURT, FROM SCALIA’S DEATH TO JUSTICE KAVANAUGH (2020) (explaining the political 
fight involved in the appointment of Justice Kavanaugh); MOLLIE HEMINGWAY & CARRIE SEVERINO, 
JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE KAVANAUGH CONFIRMATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
(2019) (showing a detailed account of the political battles surrounding Judicial confirmations from 
Robert Bork in 1987 to Brett Kavanaugh in 2018). 
3. Joshua A. Geltzer, Will the Legitimacy of the Supreme Court Survive the Census Case?, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31/opinion/census-citizenship-question-
supreme-court-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/2RSR-FZEV]; Ronald Brownstein, Brett Kavanaugh 
is Patient Zero, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2018/10/kavanaughs-partisanship-threatens-supreme-court/571702/ [https://perma.cc/F7V3-
M95P] (“President Trump’s nominee would bring a virus of illegitimacy and partisanship to the 
Supreme Court.”); Paul Waldman, Yes the Supreme Court Is Facing a Legitimacy Crisis and We Know Exactly 
Whose Fault It Is, WASH POST. (Sept. 24, 2018, 2:06 PM CDT), https://www.washington 
3
Bloom: “Lawyers’ Work”: Does the Court Have a Legitimacy Crisis?
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021
  
288 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:285 
with the Court in a New York gun regulation case threatening the Court 
with “restructuring” if it did not dismiss the case.4  These warnings of 
potential illegitimacy may be attributable to at least four factors.   At least 
some of this onslaught is aimed at Chief Justice Roberts and is certainly 
intended to intimidate him into rejecting the conservative majority in key 
areas.5  It is widely believed that Chief Justice Roberts may have taken such 
institutional arguments seriously in his decisions to vote to reject the 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act,6 to find that the provision of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting discrimination “because of sex” 
applied to homosexuals and transgenders,7 to temporarily halt President 
 
post.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2018/09/24/yes-the-supreme-court-is-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis-and-
we-know-exactly-whose-fault-it-is/ [https://perma.cc/2JVP-5HSZ]; Ian Millhiser, Brett Kavanaugh is an 
Existential Threat to the Supreme Court, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://archive. 
thinkprogress.org/brett-kavanaugh-risks-destroying-the-supreme-courts-legitimacy-684e7627961e/ 
[https://perma.cc/9A2V-6MA9]; Amelia Thompson-DeVeaux & Oliver Roeder, Is The Supreme Court 
Facing a Legitimacy Crisis?, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirty 
eight.com/features/is-the-supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/7UPB-65PZ]; 
Richard L. Hasen, The Census Case Is Shaping Up to be the Biggest Travesty Since Bush v. Gore, SLATE 
(June 25, 2019, 6:29 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/06/census-case-john-roberts-
bush-v-gore-tragedy.html [https://perma.cc/4Z4X-H6WT]; see Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s 
Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 n.1 (2019) (citing a collection of further articles alleging 
that the Court is illegitimate). 
4. Brief of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse, Mazie Hirono, Richard Blumenthal, Richard Durbin, 
and Kirsten Gillibrand as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280); see Senators File an Enemy-of-the-Court 
Brief, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2019, 11:48 AM ET) [https://perma.cc/D6V7-BMK6] (“‘The Supreme 
Court is not well,’ they tell the Justices in what is really an enemy-of-the-Court brief.  ‘Perhaps the 
Court can heal itself before the public demands it be restructured in order to reduce the influence of 
politics.’”).  The case was dismissed as moot on April 27, 2020. 
5. The Editorial Board, The Assault on the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2019, 6:55 PM 
ET) [https://perma.cc/PDU9-DXFJ] (noting the Democratic strategy “includes regular campaigns 
lecturing Chief Justice Roberts about ‘legitimacy’ whenever a case with political implications is heard”); 
Kevin D. Williamson, John Roberts, Eternal Hostage, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 16, 2020, 6:30 AM) 
[https://perma.cc/PRZ6-ZT2L]. 
6. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597–98 (2012) (showing 
Chief Justice Roberts accepted the challenger’s argument that the individual mandate of the Act could 
not be sustained under the commerce power but then concluded that it could be sustained as a potential 
exercise of the congressional taxing power).  The Roberts decision to uphold the Affordable Care Act 
has been widely interpreted as an attempt to protect the Court’s institutional credibility during an 
election year.  JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH 283 (2012). 
7. See Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1743 (2020) (“[T]hese cases involve 
no more than the straightforward application of legal terms with plain and settled meanings.  For an 
employer to discriminate against employees for being homosexual or transgender, the employer must 
intentionally discriminate against individual men and women in part because of sex.  That has always 
4
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 2
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/2
  
2021] “LAWYERS’ WORK”: DOES THE COURT HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS? 289 
Trump’s repeal of DACA,8 and in deciding the Census Case9 as well.  It is 
understandable that those opposed to more conservative results would 
assume that in any major politically controversial case that Chief 
Justice Roberts could be swayed.10  The critics charge that if the Court 
decides cases, especially those involving the President or his policies, in a 
politically conservative manner, it will lose its legitimacy as an institution.  
As such, the charges of potential illegitimacy are designed to influence the 
Chief Justice. 
The second reason for the illegitimacy claims is to influence the public 
against the Court.11  The critics may believe that if they can succeed in 
convincing a significant portion of the public that the Court is behaving in 
a partisan and non-judicial manner, the public may rally against the Court 
politically by pressuring Senators to vote against future conservative 
 
been prohibited by Title VII’s plain terms—and that ‘should be the end of the analysis.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
8. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) 
(“[W]hen an agency rescinds a prior policy its reasoned analysis must consider the ‘alternatives’ that 
are ‘within the ambit of the existing policy’ . . . .  But the rescission memorandum contains no 
discussion of forbearance or the option of retaining forbearance without benefits. [The memorandum] 
‘entirely failed to consider [that] important aspect of the problem.’”) (citations omitted). 
9. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (“[W]e cannot ignore 
the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given.  Our review is deferential, but . . . 
not required . . . .  The reasoned explanation requirement . . . is meant to ensure that agencies offer 
genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the 
interested public.”) (citations omitted) (quotation omitted). 
10. Ilya Shapiro, How the Supreme Court Undermines Its Own Legitimacy, WASH. EXAMINER (July 18, 
2019, 11:00 PM) [https://perma.cc/7C9J-MQQN] (stating the threat to legitimacy claims will continue 
as “a cynical tactic that will continue so long as it appears to be an effective guilt trip against 
‘institutionalist’ judges such as Chief Justice John Roberts”).  By accepting the threat to legitimacy 
arguments and issuing compromise decisions to appease the critics, Shapiro argues the Court actually 
undermines its legitimacy.  Id.  See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Judicial Legitimacy Seriously, 93 CHI. 
KENT L. REV 505 (2018) (using a similar argument); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Disdain Campaign, 
12 HARV. L. REV., 1, 8 (2012) (explaining legal “intelligentsia” used threats of illegitimacy to bully Chief 
Justice Roberts to vote to uphold the Affordable Care Act); The Editorial Board, Senators File an Enemy-
of-the-Court Brief, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2019, 11:48 PM ET) [https://perma.cc/D6V7-BMK6]  (“When 
liberals worry about losing a major Supreme Court case, they usually make appeals to the Court’s 
legitimacy.”).  
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 155, 189 (2007) (noting that “meaning entrepreneurs” might use the media to rally the public 
against particular interpretations by the Court).  Sunstein notes that on difficult questions of 
constitutional interpretation, public outrage could provide the Court with useful information.  Id. 
at 176; see also MOLLIE HEMMINGWAY & CARRIE SEVERINO, JUSTICE ON TRIAL 304 (“Make no 
mistake, the smear campaigns against judicial nominees are themselves an attack on the Court’s 
legitimacy.”).  
5
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nominees.  Alternatively, the critics may hope to encourage readers to vote 
against Presidential candidates inclined to nominate conservatives to future 
vacancies or senators inclined to confirm such nominees.  Additionally, the 
critics may hope to drive down respect for the Court as an institution in 
public opinion polls causing the Justices to moderate their opinions in 
response. 
The third reason for the warnings of illegitimacy is that many of the critics 
of the Court are true believers in a “living constitution” approach to 
constitutional interpretation, under which the Court employs open ended 
phrases in the document—including equal protection and due process—to 
achieve progressive results.  These critics believe that this is the correct 
approach to constitutional interpretation and that a Supreme Court majority 
that would reject an interpretive approach, substituting instead a far more 
constraining methodology such as textualism or originalism, would indeed 
render the Court illegitimate.  Indeed, some of the claims of illegitimacy are 
based on a deep and heart-felt disagreement about the role of the Court and 
appropriate interpretive methodology. 
Finally, the critics arguing that the Court is behaving illegitimately may 
simply be venting their anger after concluding that the confirmation of 
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh significantly decreases the possibility that 
the Court can be convinced to issue decisions confirming their political 
positions.  Over the past sixty years, the Court has been amenable to 
progressive social and legal change through constitutional adjudication.  
Liberals and progressives have come to rely on the Court as a means of 
effecting political change that could not be achieved readily through the 
political process.  Those who have come to rely on the Court as an 
instrument of liberal and progressive political change have tended to view 
this type of adjudication as normal and neutral.  Hence, the potential 
diminishment of this avenue of political relief seems disconcerting causing 
some to lash out in rage. 
The question of judicial legitimacy is not new.  It is well accepted that an 
unelected, politically unaccountable court, with no direct enforcement 
power depends on public support and approval, often characterized as 
moral capital or legitimacy, to obtain compliance with its decisions, which 
very frequently dissatisfy significant segments of the public.  The issue of 
institutional legitimacy, especially judicial legitimacy, has long been of 
interest to political scientists, legal academics, philosophers, and 
6
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sociologists.12  In these disciplines, the discussion is generally arcane, 
academic, and of little interest or understanding to the general public.  
Academics have identified at least two types of legitimacy: moral and 
sociological.13  Moral legitimacy, largely of concern to philosophers, tends 
to concentrate on whether particular decisions or doctrines are morally 
proper, hence legitimate, in a jurisprudential sense.14  That sense of 
legitimacy is of slight interest to the present controversy.  Rather, the focus 
here is on sociological legitimacy, which focuses on public approval or 
disapproval of particular decisions or of the Court as an institution.15  
Sociological legitimacy is the domain of political scientists rather than moral 
philosophers and is closer to the type of legitimacy at the center of recent 
discourse.  The argument is that decisions favoring the President and his 
policies by a Supreme Court majority that he helped to create will endanger 
the Court’s legitimacy.  Is that true?  And if so, what will be the institutional 
and societal consequences? 
Justice Scalia was correct in arguing that as long as the Court engages in 
“lawyers’ work” the public will generally leave it alone.  Research confirms 
 
12. See James L. Gibson & Michael Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional 
Wisdoms, and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 1 (2014) (“Perhaps no concept 
in social science has received as much attention as the age-old concept of ‘legitimacy.’”) [hereinafter 
Gibson & Nelson, Conventional Wisdoms]; RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 2 (2018) (examining the role legal and moral legitimacy play in legal correctness and 
incorrectness from the Court’s decisions); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 775, 791 (2001) (arguing that contrary to the assertion of many legal academics, the decision in 
Bush v. Gore did not threaten the Court’s legitimacy); Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, 
On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy and the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 
185 (2013) (seeking to understand the basis for why “Americans ascribe legitimacy to the Court”); 
Dino P. Christenson & David M. Glick, Chief Justice Roberts Health Care Decision Disrobed: The 
Microfoundations of the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 403, 403 (2015) (delving into the 
things that change the public’s perception of the Court’s legitimacy); James L. Gibson & Michael J. 
Nelson, Change in Institutional Support for the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court’s Legitimacy Imperiled by the 
Decision’s It Makes?, 80 PUB. OP. Q. 622, 623–24 (2016) [hereinafter Gibson & Nelson, Change in 
Institutional Support] (attempting to explore competing theories that only blockbuster-type cases may 
withdraw public diffuse from a theory that every “run-of-the-mill decision . . . is potentially dangerous 
to the institution’s health”); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the 
Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 198 (2011) (providing insight into why 
those who know and acknowledge Justices’ application of personal values also extend the most support 
to the institution).  
13. FALLON, supra note 12, at 21. 
14. Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 116 (2003) (focusing 
on the moral duty to obey as opposed to sociological or descriptive legitimacy).  
15. Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 NW. U.L. 
REV. 985, 989 (1990). 
7
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that the public understands that the Court is different from the Executive 
and Legislative branches of the government and expects the Court to 
resolve difficult legal questions through the application of legal tools, 
analytical tools, or both.  As long as the public believes that the Court is 
proceeding in such a manner, it respects the Court and is willing to accept 
decisions with which large segments of the public, often a majority, disagree.  
In such instances, the Court’s legitimacy is not endangered.  However, that 
is not always the case.  There are certain questions that are simply too big 
and too controversial for the Court to resolve even through the application 
of “lawyer’s work.”  That may have been the case with the appropriate 
balance of federal and state authority in the early half of the nineteenth 
century: the legal ability of Congress to regulate slavery in the territories and 
whether a woman has a constitutional right to obtain an abortion.  Thus, 
Justice Scalia was essentially, though not entirely, correct. 
Suppose the Court does lose public approval and hence a degree of 
legitimacy—what then?  Does a decline or loss of legitimacy mean the rule 
of law collapses followed by massive defiance of judicial decisions?  History 
suggests otherwise.  Rather, on several occasions, the Court has gotten out 
of step with the public, arguably suffering a crisis of legitimacy.  On each 
such occasion, the disjunction between the public and the Court has been 
corrected through the replacement of dying or retiring Justices, pursuant to 
the constitutional check of nomination and confirmation of replacements, 
and to a lesser extent by Justices themselves changing their approaches to 
interpretation and adjudication.16  In other words, maintaining public 
respect and legitimacy has been a concern for the Court throughout its two 
hundred-year-plus history.  To the extent a judicial legitimacy crisis arises, 
the political system provided by the Constitution has provided a remedy; 
although, it often takes an extended period of time and gives rise to 
significant partisan political fury.  This is especially true today with longer 
life expectancies, longer tenures of service on the Court, as well as a 
reluctance of Justices to permit a President of a different political ideology 
to appoint a successor.  If the Court is presently in the midst of a legitimacy 
crisis—and it is difficult to determine whether that is the case—there is 
every reason to believe, both on the basis of history as well he empirical 
 
16. FALLON, supra note 12, at 118 (“If large political majorities dislike the course that the 
Supreme Court has charted, electorally accountable presidents will use their powers of appointment to 
install Justices who will chart a new course, much as Roosevelt and Nixon did.”). 
8
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research of political scientists, that it will be resolved over time as it has been 
in the past. 
Crises of legitimacy for the Court are nothing new.  Throughout much of 
its history, the Court has been at the center of political controversy and yet 
it has managed to survive.  If anything, the respect for the Court has 
increased over time.  As Professor Alexander Bickel wrote in the very first 
sentence of his classic book The Least Dangerous Branch: “The least dangerous 
branch of the American government is the most extraordinarily powerful 
court of law the world has ever known.”17  As Bickel explained, it hasn’t 
always been that way.  Rather, the Court has acquired its prestige and public 
support over a lengthy period of time.  Throughout much of American 
history, the Court’s legitimacy has not been in question; however, on 
occasion it has.  When that has occurred, the Court has been saved as an 
institution by the political check of the appointment and confirmation 
process.  That is, when the Court has gotten sufficiently out of step with the 
public, retirements have led to the appointment of new Justices who have 
either reversed course or have at least engaged in sufficient retrenchment to 
defuse any threat to the Court’s legitimacy. 
Throughout much of its history, the Supreme Court has been a subject 
of controversy and public and political backlash.  Within the very first 
decade of the republic, the Constitution was amended to overrule the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,18 permitting a private 
citizen to sue a state for money damages absent the consent of the state.19  
The Marshall Court’s decision in M’Culloch v. Maryland,20 holding Congress 
possessed the authority to charter the Bank of the United States and that a 
state could not impose a targeted tax on the Bank’s assets, led to perhaps 
the most vigorous political backlash against the Court in the nation’s 
history.21  In 1857, the Dred Scott 22 decision, holding that a slave or 
descendant of a slave could never be a citizen of the United States or of a 
 
17. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962). 
18. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
19. See generally id. at 424 (“[I]f it be allowed, that a State may be sued by a foreigner, why, in the 
scale of reason, may not the measure be the same, when the citizen of another State is the 
complainant?”). 
20. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
21. See generally id. at 408 (“[A] government, intrusted with such ample powers, on the due 
execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be intrusted 
with ample means for their execution.”). 
22. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
9
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state, and that Congress lacked power to prohibit slavery in the territories, 
inflamed a national controversy that culminated in secession and the Civil 
War.23 
The approximately forty-year period from the 1890s to 1937, often 
characterized as the Lochner era, ended in a political revolt against the 
Court, the introduction of President Roosevelt’s Court packing plan, and an 
abrupt change in the Court’s interpretive approach.  This is often cited as a 
stunning example of the Court eventually bowing to political backlash. 
The Warren Court engaged in aggressive judicial review attacking school 
desegregation, mandating reapportionment of state legislatures, expanding 
the rights of the accused, prohibiting prayer in schools, and so much more.  
Eventually, the unpopularity of many of these decisions led to a political 
backlash which helped propel Richard Nixon to the presidency resulting in 
a fairly abrupt change in the composition of the Court. 
No decision in history has led to a longer and more sustained challenge 
to the Court than the Burger Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade.24  Due to the 
very nature of the issue of abortion, as well as the Court’s inability to justify 
the decision in a legally acceptable manner, five decades after the case was 
decided, Roe still remains a flashpoint of controversy looming over the 
Court.  In deciding Roe, the Court seemed to descend into a maelstrom from 
which escape is difficult if not impossible.  Arguably, the continuing 
controversy surrounding Roe contributed in a significant way to recent 
changes in the composition of the Court. 
A series of decisions by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, including Bush 
v. Gore,25 District of Columbia v. Heller,26 and Citizens United v. FEC,27 have 
led to extended grumbling by critics, but have not resulted in sustained 
political backlash against the Court.  Empirical research suggests that as of 
2013, self-identified conservatives held the Court in lower esteem than 
liberals despite the fact Republican presidents have appointed a majority of 
the Justices.28  This may be attributable to the disappointment of 
 
23. See generally id. at 427 (“The principle of law is too well settled . . . that a court can give no 
judgment . . . where it has no jurisdiction; and if . . . it appeared that he was still a slave, the case ought 
to have been dismissed.”). 
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
25. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
26. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
27. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
28. Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court 
Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 194 (2013).  
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conservatives in the apparent inability of Republican presidents to alter the 
ideological direction of the Court,29 or perhaps to the perception that the 
Court is an elite institution aligned against more traditional values held by 
the public at large. 
Arguably, recent changes in the Court’s composition, and potentially its 
interpretive direction, are yet the most recent example of the exercise of a 
constitutionally based political check on the Court.  This is especially true 
given that, as a candidate, Donald Trump made Supreme Court 
appointments a crucial issue in his campaign and voters responded 
favorably.  Consequently, any crisis of legitimacy, if there was one, occurred 
prior to the election, not afterwards.  In the long run, nothing disturbing has 
occurred.  History and political science indicate that the Court has a deep 
reservoir of public support that it can draw on when it is challenged by those 
disappointed with its decisions.  Rarely, if ever, do claims of illegitimacy lead 
to defiance of or a restructuring of the Court.  The general public almost 
always continues to respect and support the Court even when it disagrees 
with its approach and decisions.  Even so, the Court stretches its goodwill 
with the public past the breaking point, the constitutionally based political 
process exercised through the appointment and confirmation process will 
succeed in redirecting the Court. 
II.    THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY 
To begin, it is worthwhile to ask why the Supreme Court and its decisions 
matter.  Over time, the Court has utilized judicial review, especially through 
constitutional interpretation, to resolve many difficult legal, political, and 
social issues.  Arguably, judicial review, at least as contemplated by the 
Marshall Court, was never intended to extend as widely and deeply as it has 
in the twentieth and twenty-first century America.30  However, that is water 
under the bridge.  The Court has employed judicial review broadly and the 
public, by and large, has accepted it.  For most people, it seems sensible to 
have a body that can settle difficult and troubling legal questions.  But why 
does the public acquiesce to the decision of five Justices even when a large 
segment of that public, very often a majority, disagrees with the result?  
 
29. Id. 
30. WILLIAM NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 8, 63 (2000); see Michael Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions, 87 VA. 
L. REV. 1111, 1121 (2003) (“Marshall simply was evincing his commitment to the prevalent 
understanding that judicial review authorized invalidation of only obviously unconstitutional laws.”). 
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Discussions of judicial legitimacy usually start by quoting Alexander 
Hamilton’s famous remark in Federalist No. 78 that, “[t]he judiciary . . . has 
no influence over the purse or the sword . . . [i]t may truly be said to have 
neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”31  Why then does the 
public accept and obey judicial decisions with which it disagrees?  The 
answer supplied by generations of political scientists and legal scholars is 
that the Court relies on its accumulated “moral capital” to ensure 
obedience.32  This constitutes the Court’s legitimacy.  In other words, to be 
effective, at least in a democracy, a governmental institution, including the 
Supreme Court, must be perceived by the public as legitimate.33  Otherwise, 
it would be ignored.  This is especially true with respect to the courts which, 
as Hamilton noted, have no direct enforcement power.34  As political 
scientists have declared: “Legitimacy is for losers, since winners ordinarily 
accept decisions with which they agree . . . .”35  Interviews with Supreme 
Court Justices indicate that many are concerned with maintaining public 
support and, hence, legitimacy.36  Arguably, at least some Justices are more 
influenced by elite opinion than the opinion of the public at large.37 




31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 291 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. M’Lean 1788). 
32. James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Is the U.S. Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Grounded in 
Performance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 59 AM. J. POLITICAL SCIENCE 162, 173 (2014) (“[B]ecause the Court 
currently attracts legitimacy from the majority, its ability to rule against the people’s preferences, even 
up to one-half or so of the time, is secure.”); Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, supra note 15, 
at 992 (1990) (“In a political system ostensibly based on consent, the Court’s legitimacy—indeed the 
Constitution’s—must ultimately spring from public acceptance, even approval, of its various roles.”); 
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 127–28 (1980). 
33. Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 15, at 992 (1990) (“In a political system ostensibly based 
on consent, the Court’s legitimacy—indeed the Constitution’s—must ultimately spring from public 
acceptance, even approval, of its various roles.”).  The perception of the legitimacy of the Court as an 
institution by the public also helps to legitimize the policies which the Court approves.  Jeffery J. 
Mondak, Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts of Legitimation, 47 POL. RES. Q. 
675, 677 (1994). 
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 291 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. M’Lean 1788) (“The 
judiciary . . . has no influence over either sword or the purse.”). 
35. James L. Gibson et al., Losing but Accepting: Legitimacy, Positivity Theory and the Symbols of Judicial 
Authority, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837, 839 (2014). 
36. Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
971, 973 (2009) (quoting interviews with several unnamed Justices). 
37. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares More About Elites, Not the 
American People, 98 GEO. L. REV. 1515, 1528 (2010). 
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into diffuse support and specific support.38  Diffuse support focuses on 
public approval of the Court as an institution.39  Specific support tends to 
focus on whether the public approves or disapproves of a particular decision 
or doctrine of the Court, i.e., judicial performance.40  Of the two, diffuse 
support is more important since the Court needs to rely on it when specific 
support declines.  If the Court has sufficient diffuse support it can render 
decisions unpopular with a majority of the public without threatening its 
legitimacy as an institution.41  Indeed, a study conducted in 2005, by 
arguably the preeminent expert on public opinion and the Court, concluded 
that the extremely partisan political climate that exists in the country has no 
discernable impact on public support for the Court and hence its 
legitimacy.42  Research tends to show that the impact of disapproval on 
specific decisions may have a short term negative impact on diffuse support 
for the Court; however, that effect will dissipate rapidly.43  Yet, a recent 
 
38. Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 
36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 637 (1992) (“The distinction between diffuse and specific support strikes us 
as conceptually sound and intuitively pleasing.”). 
39. Id. 
40. Id.  
41. See Gibson & Nelson, supra note 32, at 171 (“[T]he Court enjoys a wide and deep ‘reservoir 
of goodwill,’ and its supply of institutional support is not overly dependent upon pleasing people on a 
day-to-day basis with its decisions.”); Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 38, at 636 (showing the general 
public support for the Court is unaffected by the results of particular decisions, however the opinion 
of elites is); id., at 643 (“[W]e find no evidence to buttress the argument for a connection between 
partisanship and institutional support for the Court.”).  But see Bartels & Johnston, supra note 12, at 192 
(explaining the conclusion that although there is substantial diffuse support for the Court, persons on 
the ideological extremes tend to base their support for the Court on whether they approve of the 
Court’s decisions).  See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Explaining Diffuse Support for the United 
States Supreme Court: An Assessment of Four Models, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 1037, 1042 (1974) (showing 
the argument that learning to respect institutions in childhood offers the best explanation for diffuse 
support for the Court). 
42. See James L. Gibson & Michael Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized 
Polity, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL. STUD. 507, 533 (2007) (concluding the legitimacy of the Court survives 
even with vast differences in public opinion over decisions); Gibson & Calderia, supra note 12, at 211 
(explaining the public appreciates that the Court exercises discretion in a principled manner); Baum & 
Devins, supra note 37, at 1548 (“That evidence shows that the Justices have little to fear from a public 
that disagrees with its decisions, because its legitimacy is largely impervious to such disagreement.”).  
But see David Fontana, How Do People Think About the Supreme Court When They Care, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 50, 51 (2018) (explaining the argument that much of the diffuse support for the Court 
accumulates when the public is unconcerned about the Court and its decisions). 
43. See Gibson & Nelson, Conventional Wisdoms, supra note 12, at 8–9 (noting one decision will 
not have a lasting impact on the public perception of the Court).  In a polarized nation, specific 
disapproval of decisions tends to be cancelled out by approval by others.  Christenson & Glick, supra 
note 12, at 416.  This suggests that the Court’s legitimacy can best be protected by the practice of 
13
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empirical study found the Court’s “overly liberal” decisions has had a 
negative effect on the its overall approval rating.44  The recent dispute over 
the Court’s legitimacy discussed herein will focus largely on diffuse support 
since that is what the Court must rely on when it renders unpopular 
decisions. 
Presumably, the Court has accumulated a high level of diffuse support 
over its two hundred-year-plus history.  The Court is not the untested and 
possibly feared institution that it was when Hamilton wrote Federalist No. 78.  
Political scientists have argued that an important source of the Court’s 
diffuse support is the public’s perception that the Court is different from 
other institutions of government such as Congress and the President.45  The 
Court purports to decide cases, and generally does, through the application 
of law as opposed to reaching decisions solely on the basis of policy or value 
preference.46  Political scientists refer to this as the “myth of legality,” and 
whether they believe the Court is actually making decisions on the basis of 
law or whether the Justices are simply using law as a smokescreen to conceal 
their policy based decisions, they concede that the public perception of 
“legality” provides powerful diffuse support for the Court as an 
institution.47  On the other hand, approval or disapproval of the Court 
tends to coincide with approval or disapproval of Congress and the 
President.  This suggests that public opinion of the Court tracks public 
opinion of the government in general.48  Even so, the public, while 
supporting the Court, recognizes the Justices must inevitably exercise 
discretion in deciding cases.49  More educated and informed members of 
the public are most likely to believe judicial decisions are based on legal 
 
deciding some cases in favor of each side in an opalized polity.  See Grove, supra note 3, at 2262 
(discussing this approach). 
44. Kathryn Haglin et al., Ideology and Public Support for the Supreme Court, SOCARXIV 1, 28 
(Oct. 21, 2018), https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/unbmh/ [https://perma.cc/6G2G-895H]. 
45. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 12, at 214 (asserting judges make decisions within the rule of 
law and not upon their own ideological opinions). 
46. Id.  
47. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of the Supreme 
Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928, 929 (2000) (“The myth of legality is the belief that judicial decisions are 
based on autonomous legal principles . . . [and] is deeply ingrained in American political culture.”). 
48. Sofi Sinozich, Public Opinion on the US Supreme Court, 1973–2015, 81 PUB. OP. Q. 175, 179, 
185 (2017). 
49. See Gibson & Nelson, Conventional Wisdoms, supra note 12, at 20–21 (“[W]hat distinguishes 
the judges in the minds of the American people is that the judges exercise discretion in a principled 
fashion.”). 
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principles.50  Diffuse support for the Court declines if the public concludes 
that the Justices are simply making policy or political decisions.51  
Justice Scalia recognized this in his dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
which emphasized the essential need for the Justices to decide cases by 
“lawyers’ work.”52 
That leads to the question of how the Court should respond to concerns 
of public dissatisfaction with its work.  One approach, perhaps best 
identified by the late Alexander Bickel, is that the Court always has, always 
will, and always should respond strategically.53  That is, the Court is aware 
of its need for general public approval and should and will avoid deciding 
cases that will lower its public esteem and hence its moral capital, the key to 
its legitimacy.  Such a philosophy entails taking a minimalist approach to 
constitutional decision-making and avoidance of controversy whenever 
possible.  Under this approach the Court will make liberal use of the various 
avoidance devices, which Bickel characterized as the “passive virtues.”54  
The theory is the Court should and will maintain its legitimacy by avoiding 
controversy to the extent possible.55  The theory, to a large extent, rests on 
the belief that the Court will inevitably behave in a self-protective manner 
as virtually any institution would.56  Were the theory accurate in every 
respect, the Court would never have decided cases that have resulted in 
 
50. Scheb & Lyons, supra note 47, at 930. 
51. See Michael J. Nelson & James L. Gibson, Has Trump Trumped the Courts?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
32, 35 (2018) (“But, when citizens believe that judicial behavior crosses the line from principled to 
politicized, they no longer extend high levels of support to the courts.”). 
52. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As long 
as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were doing essentially lawyers’ work 
up here—reading text and discerning our society’s traditional understanding of that text—the public 
pretty much left us alone.”). 
53. See generally BICKEL, supra note 17 (discussing the relationship between the Court, the law, 
and politics); see also Sunstein, supra note 11, at 172 (“If the Court is concerned about its own place in 
the constitutional order, and wants to maintain its legitimacy and power, it might take account of 
outrage as a method of self-preservation.”); Clark, supra note 36, at 973 (highlighting interviews with 
some Justices that suggest they do take potential public disapproval into account in rendering 
decisions). 
54. See generally BICKEL, supra note 17 (discussing a study of the formal techniques for avoidance 
of decision, termed “passive virtues”). 
55. See Micheal W. Giles et al., The Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages 
Between Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 70 J. POL. 293, 303 (2008) (“[T]he strategic behavior 
explanation which posits that justices respond strategically to public opinion to protect the Supreme 
Court’s legitimacy . . . .”). 
56. See generally id. at 303 (2008) (concluding empirical research provides no support for the 
theory that Justices engage in strategic decision-making). 
15
Bloom: “Lawyers’ Work”: Does the Court Have a Legitimacy Crisis?
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021
  
300 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:285 
intense political reaction.  At the very least, these decisions would be said to 
be a result of the Court’s gross underestimation of the strength of 
disapproval that these decisions provoked.  If the Court always behaved 
strategically, there would have been no Dred Scott, no Roe v. Wade, no Lochner 
v. New York, no Miranda v. Arizona, and no school prayer cases.  If the Court 
always behaved strategically, M’Culloch v. Maryland would not have been so 
strident and dogmatic.  The Court has not always attempted to avoid 
political controversy. 
There is a different theory of the judicial role perhaps best articulated by 
Gerald Gunther in open debate with Alexander Bickel.57  Gunther argued 
it is the Court’s duty to decide cases properly brought before it according to 
the law with no consideration of the political consequences, even to the 
Court itself.  In other words, the Court should never employ the avoidance 
devices in a manipulative manner for self-protection.  Rather, the Court 
must decide the cases as the law dictates and let the chips fall where they 
may.  According to this view, enforcement responsibility rests with the 
Executive branch and as such, should not be the Court’s concern even if 
lack of enforcement undermines respect for the Court.  Both Bickel and 
Gunther are partially correct in terms of the Court’s past behavior.  
Sometimes the Court has behaved strategically and at other times it has not.  
Empirical research suggests that the public respects the Court to a large 
extent because it believes the Court behaves more like the model presented 
by Gunther than by Bickel.58  Diffuse support for the Court tends to be 
based on the view that the Justices decide cases impartially as the law 
requires, rather than in a strategic, self-protective manner.59  If the public 
 
57. See generally Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle 
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (promulgating a new thesis of the “passive 
virtues” in preview and opposition of Bickel’s). 
58. See Scheb & Lyons, supra note 47, at 935 (“Americans are more comfortable with a Court 
that they perceive to base its decisions on original intent and precedent, rather than on ideology, 
partisanship, or pressures from other institutions.”). 
59. See id. (positing that though only a quarter of the public believes that the Justices rely 
primarily on legal principles in decision-making, this support for the Court would further decline if the 
public believed that the Court was making primarily political decisions); Vanessa A. Baird & Amy 
Gangl, Shattering the Myth of Legality: The Impact of the Media’s Framing of Supreme Court Procedures on 
Perceptions of Fairness, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 597, 603 (2006) (“[R]eceiving information that justices bargain 
and compromise produces more negative evaluations of Court procedures relative to when the process 
is portrayed as guided largely by legal factors.”); Christenson & Glick, supra note 12, at 415 (highlighting 
the perceptions of legitimacy decrease most significantly among those who learned that the Court was 
influenced by non-legal factors and did not align with their personal ideologies). 
16
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believed the Court was behaving in a manipulative manner, diffuse support 
would decline. 
Those who favor a strategic self-protective role for the Court can argue 
their authority depends on acceptance by the public and as such, the Court 
needs to conserve its moral capital for those unusual occasions when they 
need to spend it in the face of severe public opposition.  If the Court decides 
too many cases that are inconsistent with public opinion and values, it will 
eventually discover that voluntary compliance with its mandates will 
diminish.  This position assumes the diffuse support that the Court presently 
maintains can be undermined in a significant way.  The counterargument is 
the Court’s constitutional obligation is to apply the law faithfully, without 
concern for the consequences.  Alternatively, proponents of this approach 
could contend that the Court’s moral capital is great and difficult to exhaust, 
and the Justices themselves are ill equipped to estimate whether particular 
decisions, or lines of decisions, are likely to diminish the Court’s public 
support. 
There has been speculation that Chief Justice Roberts’s decisive vote to 
uphold the Affordable Care Act was a strategic decision motivated by a 
desire to protect the Court from being thrust into the 2012 presidential 
campaign.60  Research tends to show that members of the public, upon 
being informed that such considerations may have guided the decision, 
lowered their opinion of the Court.61  This would seem to present a 
paradox.  Action taken to preserve the Court’s legitimacy, if so understood 
by the public, could actually undermine the very support it is attempting to 
preserve.62  This suggests that the Court can appear to decide cases in a 
strategic, as opposed to a legalistic manner, only infrequently without 
endangering its diffuse support.  Moreover, an individual justice’s decision 
to behave strategically may turn on an assessment of the likelihood that such 
behavior will be recognized by a significant segment of the public.  An 
evaluation of the breadth and depth of diffuse support, and a calculous of 
whether more damage will be done to the Court’s reputation by deciding 
 
60. See MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 
350–51 (2013) (referencing a report by CBS correspondent Jan Crawford discussing the political 
influence of Chief Justice Roberts’s vote to uphold the ACA). 
61. Christenson & Glick, supra note 12, at 415 (“People who got bad news on both fronts—
that is, read about the non-legal influences on the Court and came to see the Court as less congruent 
with their views than they previously believed—exhibited especially large legitimacy losses.”). 
62. See Grove, supra note 3, at 2269 (discussing the possibility that actions taken to preserve 
legitimacy may in fact lead to its diminishment). 
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the case strictly according to law or by deciding it through recognizable 
strategic manipulation. 
The Court has much more room to behave strategically with respect to 
its selection of cases to review than in deciding cases on the merits.  This 
will certainly be the case given that the Court can only decide a minimal 
percentage of the cases filed on the merits, along with the fact the public 
will be less aware and less concerned with the cases the Court declines to 
hear.  Indeed, Professor Alexander Bickel who addressed the strategic 
nature of the Court’s decision-making process argued that such strategic 
considerations should predominate primarily in docket management.63 
Other factors seem to increase the Court’s diffuse support.  Some 
scholars have argued there is a positivity theory that works in the Court’s 
favor.64  Arguably, some of the Court’s diffuse support is attributable to the 
public’s belief in and support of American institutions, democracy, the rule 
of law, and the need to have an institution that can resolve hard legal 
questions.65  In addition, the Court’s symbols—the robes, the majestic 
building, the honorary titles by which the Justices are addressed, and the 
secrecy—all contribute to the public’s diffuse support.66  All of this leads 
to the Court’s legitimacy which seems to have increased over time. 
There also appears to be a negativity bias at work because decisions which 
a large segment of the public disapprove of seem to reduce support for the 
Court to a greater extent than decisions that are met with public approval 
which seem to increase public support.67  This is in line with social science 
 
63. BICKEL, supra note 17, at 127–33. 
64. Gibson & Nelson, Change in Institutional Support, supra note 12, at 626 (“The magnitude of 
the effects of democratic values typically dwarfs the predictive power of all other explanatory 
factors . . . .”). 
65. See Gibson, supra note 42, at 532–33 (“[L]oyalty toward the institution is grounded in 
broader commitments to democratic institutions and processes, and more generally in knowledge of 
the role of the judiciary in the American democratic system.”).  Even during the war on terror, the 
American public remained strongly committed to the rule of law.  See James L. Gibson, Changes in 
American Veneration for the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 593, 604 (2007) (noting the reluctance of 
the American public to allow the government to venture from the rule of law). 
66. See Gibson et al., supra note 35, at 838, 859 (positing judicial symbols do not change or 
produce attitudes toward the Court but rather activate pre-existing attitudes); Gibson & Nelson, Change 
in Institutional Support, supra note 12, at 633 (supporting the conclusion that exposure to judicial symbols 
increases acceptance of Court decisions). 
67. See Anke Grosskopf & Jeffrey J. Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme Court Decisions 
Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 51 POL. 
RSCH. Q. 633, 636 (1998), https://www.jstor.org/stable/3088042?seq=1 [https://perma.cc/84L4-
VLEP] (“[R]espondents offered approximately three times more disliked than liked cases when 
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research which indicates that negative information has a greater impact on 
the recipient than positive information.68  This suggests that the Court 
could diminish its standing with the public by issuing a serious of well 
publicized unpopular decisions.69  Research suggests that decisions 
perceived as liberal have a greater negative impact on the Court than 
decisions perceived as conservative.70  Arguably, the Court attempts to 
deflect negative bias from itself to the law on which it bases its decisions.71  
In other words, the Court seems to say “Don’t blame us.  The law made us 
do it.” 
It should be clear that the general public is not well informed as to the 
Court’s interpretive process.72  Many people judge the Court largely, if not 
exclusively, on the basis of whether they like the results of the decisions.73  
This is hardly surprising.  There is no reason to think that the lay public 
would be legally sophisticated.  Moreover, some empirical research indicates 
that legally trained media commentators have little influence whatsoever on 
public acceptance of judicial decisions.74  However, there comes a point at 
 
answering open-ended questions about the Court’s actions.”); Gibson, et al., supra note 35, at 840 n.4 
(arguing positivity theory and negativity bias are not necessarily in conflict). 
68. Grosskopf & Mondak, supra note 67, at 636 (noting that negative information is weighted 
heavier by people and that this might also apply to opinions issued by the Court); JESSE H. CHOPER, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 134 (1980) (“[N]egative opinions 
exercise disproportionate influence in political behavior.”). 
69. Grosskopf & Mondak, supra note 67, at 648. 
70. Haglin et al., supra note 44, at 28.  
71. James L. Gibson, et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 
354 (1998). 
72. Cf. Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 15, at 1019 (showing public acceptance of the Court’s 
legitimacy is not dependent on an understanding of the Court’s application of legal principles); David 
Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections and the Supreme Court, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 790, 808 (1973) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court and its decisions have such low salience as to render  improbable popular acceptance 
of governmental action because of public knowledge that the policies have been approved by the 
justices.”).  But see Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 38, at 649 (“Those who are more knowledgeable, 
more ‘elite,’ and more active in politics generally show more support for the Supreme Court . . . .”); 
James L Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, Knowing the Supreme Court?  A Reconsideration of Public Ignorance of the 
High Court, 71 J. POL. 429, 439 (2009) (arguing much of the evidence for the thesis that the public is 
ignorant of the Court is based on improper survey techniques).  Instead, they concluded that 
participants in their survey “demonstrate[d] relatively high levels of information about the Supreme 
Court.”  Id. 
73. See Bartels & Johnston, supra note 12, at 197 (“When individuals perceive that they are in 
ideological disagreement with the Court’s policymaking, they ascribe lower legitimacy to the Court 
compared to individuals who perceive that they are in agreement with the Court . . . .”). 
74. See Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, The Effect of Legal Expert Commentary on Lay Judgments of 
Judicial Decision Making, 10 J. LEGAL EMPIRICAL STUD. 797, 804 (2013) (concluding the public is 
influenced by whether respondents personally approve of the result as opposed to whether legal experts 
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which even the legally untrained will understand that the Justices have 
exceeded the boundaries of accepted legal interpretation.  When that 
happens, questions as to the legitimacy of the Court may arise. 
Apparently, the legal elite hold the Supreme Court in higher esteem than 
the public at large, almost unanimously accepting its legitimacy.75  This may 
reflect the greater familiarity of the legal elite with the Court, extended 
socialization through legal training and practice, and perhaps an aspect of 
self-protective behavior in that the legal elite, to a large extent, justifies its 
existence and status through the legitimacy of the Court.76  To the extent 
that the legal elite disagree with specific decisions of the Court, it tends to 
attribute its dissatisfaction to bad decision-making by the particular Court 
rather than disapproval of the Court as an institution.77 
Recently, as noted above, the concept of legitimacy as applied to the 
Supreme Court or to specific decisions of the Court has crept into general 
public and media discourse.  Partisan political opponents often charge that 
the Court as an institution has become “illegitimate” either based on a 
specific decision or a group of decisions.  To a large extent, the term 
illegitimate has become an epithet hurled at political opponents in the hope 
of influencing the public.  As such, these charges of illegitimacy should be 
understood for what they are, simply examples of overheated partisan 
political rhetoric which ought not be taken too seriously.  This is not the 
type of legitimacy generally studied by political scientists unless, of course, 
the rhetoric has the desired effect of actually influencing public opinion. 
Empirical research confirms that Justice Scalia was correct in recognizing 
that public acceptance of the Court and its decisions is grounded in the 
public’s understanding that the Court is attempting, in good faith, to decide 
difficult legal questions through the employment of accepted methods of 
legal interpretation,78 in the words of Justice Scalia, by doing “lawyers’ 
 
view the decision as correct).  But see Nelson & Gibson, supra note 51, at 39–40 (stating charges of 
politicization of judicial decisions by law professors can have a greater impact in lowering respect for 
the Court than similar charges by politicians). 
75. See Brandon L. Bartels et al., Lawyer’s Perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court a Political 
Institution?, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 761, 764 (2015) (“[P]erceived legitimacy among these legal elites is 
extremely high—and much higher than it is for the mass public at large.”). 
76. See id. at 765 (describing the characteristics that lead to near unanimous approval of the 
Court). 
77. See id. at 769 (“For legal elites, the core of institutional legitimacy, which they possess at near 
unanimous levels, and perceptions of the Court’s decision making may be separable constructs.”). 
78. See FALLON, supra note 12, at 11 (concluding that in order to adjudicate in a legitimate 
manner, the Justices must (1) “stay within the bounds of law,” (2) exhibit “reasonable practical and 
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work.”79  If the public concluded that the Court was simply deciding cases 
on the basis of value judgments or partisan ideology, as opposed to good 
faith efforts to apply the law, the Court would lose respect.80  The public 
assumes that the Court is not simply deciding cases on a political basis, or 
on the basis of the personal values, or on the ideology of the judges and 
then providing a legalistic veneer as cover.  Rather, it is attempting to resolve 
hard legal questions by applying reasoning from pre-existing legal 
principles.81  The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey addressed this 
explicitly.  The Court wrote: 
The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and 
perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit 
to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.  
The underlying source of this legitimacy is the warrant for the Court’s 
decisions in the Constitution and lesser sources of legal principle on which 
the Court draws.  That substance is expressed in the Court’s opinions, and 
our contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled 
justification would be no judicial act at all.  But even when justification is 
furnished by apposite legal principle, something more is required.  Because 
not every conscientious claim of principled justification will be accepted as 
such, the justification claimed must be beyond dispute.  The Court must take 
care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the 
terms that the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as 
compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing 
on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.  Thus, the Court’s 
legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under 
 
moral judgment” and (3) “support their judgments with arguments they advance in good faith”).  All 
of these conditions would satisfy Justice Scalia’s criteria of “lawyers’ work.”  See Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the 
public does not negatively view Court decisions when they are perceived to be removed from political 
influence); see also Bartels & Johnston, supra note 12, at 194 (“Moderates who perceive the Court as 
taking a case-by-case approach to its rulings maintain the highest degree of legitimacy among the 
groups examined . . . .”). 
79. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 1000 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the public does not negatively view 
Court decisions when they are perceived to be removed from political influence). 
80. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and Empowerment of Discretionary Legal 
Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 705, 783 (1994) (“The data 
presented extend this conclusion to the Supreme Court: how decisions are made tends to be more 
important to Court legitimacy than what decisions are made.”). 
81. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 12 (2d ed. 1994) (“The 
Court’s claim on the American mind derives from the myth of an impartial, judicious tribunal whose 
duty it is to preserve our sense of continuity with the fundamental law.”).  
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circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be 
accepted by the Nation.82 
The joint opinion stated the case for judicial legitimacy more explicitly than 
had ever been done before by the Supreme Court.  The irony is that the very 
arguments that the joint opinion made for sustaining at least the core of Roe 
v. Wade are the exact arguments raised by its critics to argue it was in fact an 
unprincipled and hence illegitimate decision.83 
However, if the concept is to have any meaning, it must be defined with 
greater precision.  What if the Court is deemed to be illegitimate?  What 
then?  Does it really matter?  To be a meaningful concept, illegitimacy must 
mean something more than general disapproval.  The Court often decides 
difficult questions of great interest to the public, often by a 5–4 vote.  
Whether the subject is abortion rights, racial preferences in education, 
prohibition of school prayer or same sex marriage, a significant segment of 
society will be pleased with the result in these cases and a significant segment 
of society will be displeased.  To some extent, the pleased and displeased 
will cancel each other out.84  That is always the case and the very fact that 
many dislike a particular decision or doctrine hardly means that there is a 
legitimacy crisis.  Rather, for the Court to be considered illegitimate, a 
substantial majority of the public must conclude that the Court is so 
thoroughly off base, it should be significantly restructured or even 
abolished.  Otherwise, illegitimacy simply becomes an epithet of strong 
disapproval, often grounded in political disagreement.  The mere desire to 
reshape it when possible through the appointment process, as has been done 
 
82. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865–66.  Based on a detailed empirical study, Tyler and Mitchell concluded 
“the findings support the Court’s argument that the willingness of the public to empower the Court to 
make controversial decisions such as Casey is related to public perceptions of how Court decisions are 
made.”  Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 80, at 772.  As Robert McCloskey observed, “[t]he judges have 
usually known what students have sometimes not known—that their tribunal must be a court, as well 
as seem one, if it is to retain its power.”  MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 13. 
83. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE. L. REV. 
920, 936, 943, 947 (1973) (discussing the unconstitutionality of the decision in Roe v. Wade); ROBERT 
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 112 (1990) (“Unfortunately, in the entire opinion there is not 
one line of explanation, not one sentence that qualifies as legal argument.”). 
84. See MICHAEL J. NELSON & PATRICK D. TUCKER, THE STABILITY AND DURABILITY OF 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S LEGITIMACY 8 (2017) (on file with author) (“[B]ecause the number of 
individuals who are pleased with the decision and the number of individuals who are disappointed in 
the decision are approximately equal in number, thereby canceling each other out in the aggregate.”); 
Herbert M. Kritzer, Into Electoral Waters: The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of 
the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 36 (2001) (stating the effect of those who approved of the 
decision in Bush v. Gore and those who disapproved cancelled each other out). 
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throughout history does not necessarily mean that the Court is illegitimate.  
Rather, this suggests the Court has simply grown out of synch with the 
public and needs to be redirected.  Research shows that despite some 
dissatisfaction from time to time with the Court, an overwhelming majority 
rejects restructuring, packing, or abolishing.85  There is also the thought that 
if the Court were to lose substantial public support, defiance of its mandates 
might become routine.  The risk that the public might ignore judicial decrees 
may have been a viable threat in the first third of the nineteenth century, 
before the Court had established its role in the constitutional system and 
won the respect of the public.  The threat of widespread defiance is now 
minimal.  The Court simply has too deep of a reservoir of diffuse support 
grounded in respect for the rule of law. 
By definition, the type of hard questions that come before the Court do 
not have obvious legal answers.  Justices operating in complete good faith 
may reach opposite conclusions through accepted legal analysis.  That 
should not and generally does not undermine the respect for the law and for 
the Court.  Nor should it undermine the Court’s legitimacy that a particular 
Supreme Court is guided by a particular vision of its role in constitutional 
interpretation.86  That has always been the case.  The Marshall Court sought 
to strengthen the federal government with respect to state authority, to 
establish and secure its own role in the constitutional system, and to 
encourage business and investment.87  The Taney Court attempted to 
consolidate judicial power and preserve the Union.88  The Lochner-era 
Court sought to protect private property and business against undue 
governmental regulation.89  The Warren Court was interested in expanding 
the protection of individual rights as well as the role of the Court.  The 
Rehnquist Court was dedicated to restoring the concept of federalism.  The 
Roberts Court may be concerned with minimizing the role of the Court in 
policy making.  The fact that at any given time, the Court has had a 
discernable agenda or bias does not necessarily threaten its legitimacy as a 
 
85. See David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence from a 
National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 782 (2012) (“[M]any studies have shown that even in 
the face of unhappiness with the Court there is very little support for ‘fundamental structural changes’ 
to the Court.”). 
86. See Nelson & Gibson, supra note 51, at 35 (distinguishing between principled ideologically 
based decisions which the public accepts and political decisions which it does not). 
87. Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 801 
(1975). 
88. Id. at 801–02. 
89. Id. 
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judicial institution as long as it is able to achieve its results through the 
application of accepted legal reasoning. 
At the outset, the joint opinion in Casey recognized that the public 
acceptance of the Court’s decisions and thus its legitimacy is dependent on 
the belief that it interprets the nation’s laws in a principled manner.90  How 
does the Court do that?  In his dissenting opinion in the very same case, 
Justice Scalia provided the answer arguing that to accept the Court’s 
decisions, the public must believe that the Court is doing “lawyers’ work.”91  
But that begs the question of what is “lawyer’s work?”  Which methods of 
analysis are legitimate for judges to employ and which are not?  That raises 
the question of why we ask judges to resolve legal questions.  Presumably, 
the answer lies in the assumption that law has meaning which is discoverable 
through accepted methods of legal analysis.92  Otherwise, why are judges 
any more capable of resolving legal questions than politicians, fortune 
tellers, or the public at large. 
In Marbury v. Madison,93 the case that gave rise to the principle of judicial 
review, at least with respect to acts of a coordinate branch of government, 
Chief Justice Marshall endorsed the principle that judges are only authorized 
to proceed through the application of legal principles.94  Marshall justified 
the exercise of judicial review over acts of Congress as subsidiary to courts’ 
obligation to decide cases between the parties to litigation through 
application of the law.  As he noted: “It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”95  According to 
Marshall, resolving conflicts through interpretation and application of the 
law was “the very essence of judicial duty.”96  Marbury—and consequently 
the entire theory of American judicial review—was explicitly based on 
courts doing “lawyers’ work,” that is attempting to apply pre-existing legal 
 
90. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992) 
(“[C]onsidering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional 
integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade 
should be retained.”). 
91. Id. at 1000 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
92. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Underlying this legal system is the key premise that words, including written laws, are capable of 
objective ascertainable meaning.”). 
93. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
94. See id. at 177–78 (proclaiming the judicial department’s duty is to state what the law is and 
as part of their duty to “apply the rule to particular cases”). 
95. Id. at 177. 
96. Id. at 178. 
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principles to resolve legal disputes.  It was clearly not based on a conception 
of the judge identifying and applying unenumerated values or an emerging 
consensus.  Thus, the conclusion that judicial review in a democracy is 
justified at all is based on the assumption, from the very outset, that judges 
are resolving the cases before them through the application of legal 
principles derived through well-accepted methods of interpretation.  Any 
other approach would threaten the legitimacy of the Court. 
III.    WHAT IS LAWYER’S WORK AND 
WHY SHOULD THE COURT ENGAGE IN IT? 
If the accepted conception of judicial review, which in turn supports the 
Court’s legitimacy as an institution, is based on the assumption that the 
Court will decide legal disputes through the application of the law, that is, 
by doing lawyers’ work, the question then becomes what lawyers’ work is 
and what are its proper boundaries. 
So, what is lawyers’ work?  What are the accepted methods of legal 
analysis?  What is it that lawyers have been trained to do and how have 
judges interpreted the Constitution over the past two centuries?97 
A. Textualism 
First among these methods is textual analysis.  Much of the time, the 
Court is attempting to discern the meaning of a written text.  Indeed, 
Marshall based his case for judicial review in Marbury on the premise that 
the framers established a written constitution in order to provide clear 
limitations on power and that the written constraints contained in the text 
were discoverable by judges through the adjudication of disputes.98  As 
such, Marshall privileged textualism as a method of interpretation.99  
Indeed, the Marshall Court produced several of the finest examples of 
textual analysis including Chief Justice Marshall’s exposition of the 
 
97. See generally LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE 
SUPREME COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (providing an analysis of the interpretive 
techniques the Court has relied on throughout its history). 
98. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176 (“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that 
those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written.”). 
99. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1127, 1136 (1998) (“When a judge goes beyond the meaning of the words that were enacted—to the 
unexpressed intentions of the legislature, or to what the courts think would meet the needs and goals 
of society—the judge has no democratic warrant.  The constitutional text is therefore, the first and 
foremost consideration in judging.”). 
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Necessary and Proper Clause in M’Culloch v. Maryland,100 his interpretation 
of the Interstate Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden,101 as well as 
Justice Story’s analysis of Article III in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.102  The 
assumption is that words have meaning and the text’s legitimate authors 
intended to convey such meaning.  However, texts can be ambiguous, and 
it is often unclear how the text should apply to uncontemplated 
circumstances.  There will be room for disagreement among those legally 
trained operating in good faith.  To aid in the interpretation of a legal text—
be it a constitution, statute, contract, or deed—the courts over time have 
adopted various canons of construction to provide guidance.103  The 
canons will not resolve every issue but at the least, they will often narrow 
the possibilities.  When judges engage in good faith textual analysis, they are 
doing what lawyers are trained to do.  Obviously, well trained judges acting 
in good faith can interpret a text and reach different conclusions.  That has 
happened often in our constitutional history.  That does not mean that the 
judges are not engaged in lawyers’ work and hence are acting illegitimately.  
Rather, it suggests the types of hard cases that the Court often attempts to 
resolve do not have easy answers. 
An excellent example of two superb Justices reaching different 
conclusions as to the meaning of constitutional text is found in District of 
Columbia v. Heller.104  There, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
interpreted the text of the Second Amendment as recognizing an individual 
right to possess firearms for purposes of self-defense.105  Justice Stevens 
dissented, interpreting the text as recognizing only a collective right tied to 
service in the now defunct state militias.106  Each justice marshaled 
extensive legal support for his respective position.  The acceptance of either 
position would not have presented a challenge to the legitimacy of the Court 
as an institution.  Rather, it was an example of the Court, at its finest, simply 
doing lawyers’ work in a challenging case.  While most cases the Court 
decides today do not involve close interpretation of constitutional text, there 
are many examples of careful textual analysis throughout the Court’s 
 
100. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
101. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
102. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
103. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (discussing the legal canons of interpretation in depth). 
104. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
105. Id. at 627–29. 
106. Id. at 636–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
26
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 2
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/2
  
2021] “LAWYERS’ WORK”: DOES THE COURT HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS? 311 
history.107  For instance, in The Pocket Veto Case,108 the Court interpreted 
the word “days” in Article I Section 7 to mean legislative days and the word 
“adjournment” as not limited to final adjournments.  In Hawke v. Smith,109 
the Court interpreted the word “legislature” in Article 5 to mean a 
representative body of the people authorized to make laws as opposed to a 
popular referendum.  In City of Boerne v. Flores,110 the Court read the word 
“enforc[ing]” in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to effectuate the 
substantive provisions of the Amendment rather than change its 
meaning.111  In Plyler v. Doe,112 the Court understood the phrase “persons 
within its jurisdiction” in the Fourteenth Amendment to mean, as it seemed, 
physically as opposed to legally present.113  These are all examples of judges 
interpreting a legal text, the Constitution, as lawyers are trained to do.  Texts 
often are subject to alternative interpretations.  The majority may not always 
reach the correct result.  But as long as it proceeds in a careful, lawyerly 
interpretive manner, erroneous conclusions do not threaten the Court’s 
legitimacy.  However, textual analysis can cross the line if the judge is acting 
disingenuously and construing the text to mean something it clearly couldn’t 
mean.  If carried on repeatedly, this might cast doubt on the Court’s 
legitimacy.  Or it might also suggest that certain judges were simply bad 
lawyers.  
B. Original Understanding 
One significant related aspect of textual interpretation is original 
understanding.  Assuming that words have meaning, one method of 
resolving that meaning is to attempt to learn what the public understood the 
words to mean at the time of their adoption.  Sometimes, it will not be 
possible to discover the original understanding of the text.  Sometimes that 
understanding will not resolve contemporary legal issues.  But sometimes it 
will be very helpful.  And if the original understanding of text is clear, it 
provides a powerful interpretive argument.  At the very least it may eliminate 
certain interpretations that are clearly inconsistent with the original 
 
107. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 287 (1866) (reading the phrase “bill of attainder” in 
Article I broadly). 
108. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 679–80 (1929). 
109. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920). 
110. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
111. Id. at 519–20. 
112. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
113. Id. at 211–15. 
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understanding.114  Just as Heller was an excellent example of textual analysis, 
it was also one of the finest examples of an attempt to discover the original 
understanding in the United States Reports by both Justice Scalia and 
Justice Stevens.  Original understanding is a powerful legal argument.  It 
makes sense.115  No competent lawyer or judge would ignore it if it would 
aid their position.  Likewise, to the extent it undermines their position, it 
would be a great mistake to simply ignore it.  There has been a revival of 
interest in original understanding methodology since Judge Bork, and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas began to emphasize it over the past forty 
years.116  More historical material shedding light on the original 
understanding of constitutional language is available to lawyers and judges 
than has ever before.  More lawyers and judges have been trained in the 
competent understanding and usage of this material.  There is every reason 
to believe that serious originalism-based arguments will increase in the 
future. 
C. Precedent and Doctrine 
Our legal system has developed along a common-law path, meaning 
precedent and doctrine play a major role.117  Reliance on precedent furthers 
legal efficiency by keeping courts from continually needing to reinvent the 
wheel.  Over time, precedent becomes almost as authoritative as statutory 
or constitutional text.118  However, courts recognize that they sometimes 
decide incorrectly, so there is room for the overruling of precedent.  But this 
is very much the exception.  There is a strong presumption in favor of 
precedent.  Precedent may be interpreted broadly or narrowly and there is 
room to argue it is inapplicable to the present controversy.  Arguing about 
the applicability of precedent is quintessential lawyers’ work. 
 
114. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 U. VA. L. REV. 659, 661 (1987) (noting the 
first step that is often ignored by originalists is to see the clear original understanding). 
115. See FALLON, supra note 12, at 48 (“[E]veryone agrees that original meaning matters 
sometimes.”). 
116. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (emphasizing 
the role originalism has played in constitutional interpretation). 
117. See generally BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT (Brian Garner 
ed. 2016) (providing pertinent information on the role precedent plays in the United States’ legal 
system); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2008) (discussing how precedent is 
used as persuasion in arguing cases). 
118. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1980 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing 
precedent should never be equated with the status of the text and that the Court should be prepared 
to overrule clearly erroneous precedent). 
28
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 2
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/2
  
2021] “LAWYERS’ WORK”: DOES THE COURT HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS? 313 
Quite apart from precedent, there is doctrine.  In areas in which cases 
arise with frequency, the Court creates legal doctrine to provide guidance 
both to itself and to lower courts and primary decision-makers.  Some 
doctrine sets forth rules of analysis such as standards of review in particular 
areas.  Other doctrine embodies substantive rules of law.  Doctrine plays the 
important role of injecting a degree of consistency and predictability into 
the law.  Doctrine helps to render legal decision-making law-like rather than 
wholly ad hoc.  By providing a degree of clarity to the law, doctrine avoids 
the litigation of every case by informing parties and counsel in advance of 
the likely results if litigation proceeds.  The creation of doctrine is necessary 
to the efficient operation of a precedent-based legal system; however, it 
always raises the concern that doctrine will assume a life of its own and stray 
from the primary sources of text, original understanding, and precedent 
from which it is derived.  Engaging in doctrinal analysis is at the very heart 
of modern constitutional decision-making.  It is what judges and lawyers do, 
what they are expected to do, and what they are trained to do.  It is at the 
very core of “lawyers’ work.”  As with the other methods of analysis, there 
is much room for plausible disagreement over how doctrine should be 
interpreted. 
D. Structure 
Yet another accepted method for gleaning constitutional meaning is 
structural analysis.  That is, attempting to derive constitutional principles 
from the structure of the Constitution and the nature of the government it 
creates.  Structural analysis played a very important role in early Marshall 
Court decisions, at a time when the Court was writing on a relatively blank 
slate.  M’Culloch v. Maryland has been justly cited as the case that embodies 
structural analysis at its finest and which has since justified structural analysis 
as a legitimate method of constitutional interpretation.119  In M’Culloch, 
Marshall relied on constitutional structure to establish broad powers of 
Congress to choose appropriate means to execute its great enumerated 
powers and to establish that a state could not constitutionally impose a 
targeted tax on a federal instrumentality.120  However, structural analysis is 
 
119. See CHARLES J. BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 
(1969) (using M’Culloch as the paradigm example of the legitimacy and power of structural argument). 
120. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 406, 411–16 (1819) (concluding the word 
necessary in the phrase “laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the 
foregoing powers” as being intended to “insure, as far as human prudence could insure, [such powers] 
beneficial execution”). 
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not simply a remnant of the Marshall Court.  More recently, the Court has 
relied on constitutional structure in cases involving questions of 
federalism.121  As with other accepted methods of interpretation, structure 
is subject to very different visions and hence results.  Indeed, in M’Culloch v. 
Maryland itself, the challengers propounded a very different conception of 
constitutional structure than did Chief Justice Marshall writing for a 
unanimous court.122  As with the other accepted methods of interpretation, 
the very fact of disagreement, especially in hard cases, does not undermine 
the legitimacy of the methodology.  In hard cases by definition, the law is 
unclear and good lawyers, doing lawyers’ work, will make divergent 
arguments, and the courts, hopefully in good faith, will draw conclusions 
and resolve the disputes.  That is how the legal system proceeds. 
E. Tradition and History 
There are certain areas in which the Court has placed reliance on tradition 
and history as a method for discovering constitutional meaning.  This is 
particularly true in the area of separation of powers, where alternative modes 
of analysis may provide little guidance.  Perhaps the most noted example of 
this is Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. 
Sawyer123 where he wrote “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long 
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned, 
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
making it as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our 
government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power . . . .’”124  
Tradition and history has also played a role in the Establishment Clause area, 
where the longstanding recognition and support for a practice, such as 
legislative prayer, has been a factor—though generally not the exclusive or 
definitive factor—establishing its constitutionality.125 
 
121. See generally, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (interpreting the 
Constitution by using its structure to determine the legal questions presented). 
122. Maryland’s conception of constitutional structure gave precedence to the states over the 
federal government contrary to Marshall’s vision. 
123. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
124. Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
125. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (“From colonial times through the 
founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the 
principles of disestablishment and religious freedom.  In the very courtrooms in which the United 
States District Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard and decided this case, the proceedings opened 
with an announcement that concluded, ‘God save the United States and this Honorable Court.’  The 
same invocation occurs at all sessions of this Court.”). 
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Reliance on tradition and history is well accepted in constitutional 
interpretation; however, it is a slippery methodology easily subject to 
manipulation.126  It may be difficult to establish a particular practice or 
tradition.  There may be room for a choice between competing traditions.  
There will be questions as to whether a particular historical tradition is 
sufficiently analogous to the question at hand.  There may be questions as 
to whether the tradition is sufficiently worthy of being sustained.  There is 
also a question as to the level of abstraction at which a tradition should be 
defined, which in a particular case may be outcome determinative.127  Still, 
a careful and discerning Justice may draw useful constitutional meaning 
from a longstanding tradition as Justice Scalia noted in his Planned Parenthood 
dissent, interpreting constitutional traditions is well recognized lawyers’ 
work. 
F. The Tools of the Lawyer’s Trade 
Text, original understanding, precedent, doctrine, constitutional 
structure, and tradition and history have been identified as legitimate means 
of constitutional interpretation.  Why are these methodologies preferred?  
The answer is because they are the tools of the legal trade and because they 
have been accepted as legitimate throughout most of our constitutional 
history.  The trust in the Supreme Court (and lower courts) to resolve 
constitutional disputes is based on the expectation that it will do so through 
the application of the law in good faith.  In applying the law, it is assumed 
by the public, the legal community, and the Justices themselves that they are 
in fact resolving disputes according to law and they are deriving that law 
through accepted interpretive methodologies, as opposed to simply deciding 
cases based on their own ideologies, value preferences, or their conception 
of society’s emerging consensus.  As long as Justices employ these well-
accepted methodologies, the Court as an institution will continue to retain 
respect even though large segments of the public disagree intensely with 
particular decisions derived through lawyerly analysis.  Rather, it is when the 
Court clearly departs from accepted methods of analysis and decides 
significant issues based on no discernable form of legal analysis that the 
Court’s institutional reputation is endangered. 
 
126. See generally BLOOM, supra note 97, at 133–67. 
127. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (showcasing debate between 
Justices Scalia and Brennan). 
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A response to this argument is that perhaps over time, more ad hoc non-
legalistic interpretation, sometimes characterized as “non-interpretivism,” 
has gained favor with some of the Justices and the public and has come to 
be accepted.128  Sometimes this is characterized as a “living Constitution” 
approach.129  As such, if free form, result-oriented judging was not initially 
accepted, perhaps it has become accepted over time.  To a large extent, legal 
academics, well aware of the inherent weakness of certain decisions that they 
revere, especially Roe v. Wade, have attempted to justify such non-legalistic, 
value-based, result-oriented judging.130  In its simplest form, this is an ends 
justifies the means argument. 
There are at least three answers to this claim.  First, with only a few 
prominent counterexamples such as abortion rights and same-sex marriage, 
the Court tries very hard to justify its decisions with traditionally accepted 
interpretative methodologies.  The cases in which the Court is unable to 
offer such justification are clearly the exceptions or outliers, though they are 
significant.  Both through their decisions and through their statements 
pertaining to the nature of their work, the Justices themselves purport to 
believe that they are deciding cases by doing lawyers’ work and should be 
doing just that. 
Second, quite apart from judicial behavior, reliance on the well-accepted 
tools of the legal and judicial craft is the only approach that squares with the 
very justification for judicial review—the reason why legally trained judges 
are entrusted with interpreting the law and most particularly the 
Constitution.  As Justice Scalia was known to believe, if the Court cannot 
resolve a case through the application of interpretive methods designed to 
clarify pre-existing legal principles, it has no business proceeding.  Diffuse 
public support for the Court, hence its legitimacy, is largely based on the 
public’s perception that the Court is different from the political branches 
 
128. Cf. FALLON, supra note 12, at 88 (“American constitutional law is a practice in this sense, 
constituted by the shared understandings, expectations, and intentions of those who accept the 
constitutional order and participate in constitutional argument and adjudicative practices.”).  In other 
words, the participants in the game make the rules as they proceed.  See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 39 (1991) (“[W]hat counts as a plausible legal argument does indeed 
change, and change profoundly, over time.”). 
129. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (arguing against 
Justice Scalia’s method of interpreting the Constitutions as the framers would have understood it). 
130. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703 
(1975) (examining the controversial assertion that Justices might should apply “principles of liberty and 
justice when” reviewing laws for constitutionality); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
(1975) (noting the Court is deviating from an Originalist application when making its decision). 
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because it attempts to decide cases in good faith through application of law 
rather than values, ideology, or policy preferences.  
Third, acceptance of unconstrained judging becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  If it is appropriate for the Court to ignore accepted methods of 
legal interpretation in one case, both the Justices and the informed public 
will assume that it will be appropriate as well in the next case that presents 
a desired result with no accepted legal basis.  This has the potential to lead 
the Court away from constrained decision-making in a vast array of cases, 
endangering the Court’s legitimacy and its role in the constitutional system.  
Under such an approach, the Court would be especially subject to political 
manipulation.  As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, judicial confirmation hearings would degenerate into inquisitions 
focused on potential substantive results rather than the limits of 
interpretation.131 
There is no question that the public at large is uninformed about judicial 
methodology and either approves or disapproves of decisions based 
primarily on the result.132  Nevertheless, there are limits to public ignorance 
or apathy with regard to the Court’s interpretive approach.  At least a 
significant segment of the public will lose respect for the judiciary when the 
issue in question really matters (as abortion does), and the Court’s decision 
is transparently devoid of adequate legal support.  At that point, many will 
conclude that the Court has strayed well beyond its legitimate boundaries 
and entered the world of partisan politics.  In that event, a segment of the 
public would support the decisions because they are deeply committed to 
the result and assume that it is the duty of the Court to deliver results that 
they consider fair and just, at least on matters that they really care about.  
However, another significant segment of the public will cling to the 
assumption that it is the proper role of the Court only to decide cases on 
the basis of law and if the law fails to support a decision, then it is not the 
Court’s business to decide.  Consequently, non-legalistic or non-
interpretivist judging will all but inevitably lead to political controversy with 
respect to the Court. 
Even when the Court applies these time-honored methodologies of 
interpretation, there will be room for much play in the joints and in 
 
131. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
132. See Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 15, at 990 (“[W]e suspected—correctly, it turned 
out—that only a small portion of the general public would have a sophisticated understanding of the 
Court.”). 
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politically controversial cases including Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,133 and District of Columbia v. Heller,134 as well as cases involving 
hot-button issues such as racial preferences in college admissions135 or 
public school graduation prayer.136  Plausible arguments can be made in 
favor of one result or the opposite.  The very fact that hard legal questions 
are difficult and fail to yield a unanimous conclusion should not undermine 
the Court’s legitimacy as long as the Justices are attempting to decide the 
questions through a good faith attempt to apply the law using well-accepted 
interpretive techniques. 
In addition to proceeding in a more lawyer-like manner, the Court should, 
and hopefully will, be more cautious in determining what type of cases it can 
resolve in a principled manner—perhaps reinvigorating the political 
question doctrine as a protective device.  The Court must ensure that its 
interpretation and decision-making does no more than professionally 
trained lawyers are capable of doing.  If the Court follows that approach, 
will everyone be happy and rally to the Court’s defense?  Of course not.  
There is a significant constituency that has urged the Court to do justice 
regardless of the law and applauded the Court when it has complied.  As 
noted above, this can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  If there is a segment 
of the population that expects the Court to resolve controversial political 
issues in a manner which that segment favors with little if any legal support 
and the Court does so, an even greater segment of the public will come to 
accept such judicial over-reaching as the Court’s proper role.  It is only by 
pursuing a more restrained approach over a lengthy period of time (perhaps 
 
133. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
134. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008) (“The two sides in this case have set 
out very different interpretations of the Amendment.  Petitioners and today’s dissenting Justices believe 
that it protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service.  
Respondent argues that it protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in 
a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
135. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205 (2016) (upholding the University of Texas 
at Austin’s admissions policy based in a limited manner on race for the purpose of increasing racial and 
ethnic diversity); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 310–11 (2013) (clarifying no deference is owed 
when determining whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve a university’s permissible 
goals); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (deciding a school’s use of race as a factor among 
many other factors is constitutional); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249–51 (2003) (holding 
application of race in mechanical manner such as through an admissions equation is unconstitutional). 
136. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) (deciding whether “clerical members who 
offer prayers” during a “graduation ceremony is consistent with the . . . First Amendment” and 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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decades) that the Court can reestablish—both for the Justices themselves 
and hopefully a majority of the public—the appropriate role of the Court in 
the constitutional system.  But there will be a segment of the public, 
especially among legal academics, who will never be convinced and who will 
continue to rail for a return to the days when the Court could be expected 
to come to the rescue and deliver otherwise unachievable political 
victories.137  For these critics, the Court’s return to a lawyers’ work judicial 
system will evoke cries of illegitimacy. 
IV.    IS THE SUPREME COURT ALWAYS INVOLVED IN A 
CONTINUING CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY? 
Arguments have been raised that the Supreme Court is facing a crisis of 
legitimacy capable of destroying the Court as a credible institution.  These 
claims come from opposite directions.  Some, including certain Justices on 
the Court,138 have claimed over the past several decades that the 
substantive due-process-based decision in Roe v. Wade—together with the 
Court’s vigorous defense of the decision—has threatened the Court’s 
legitimacy because the decision has never been adequately defended or 
justified by accepted legal principles or interpretive methods.  On the other 
hand, defenders of Roe and the ad hoc value-oriented approach that it 
represents, faced with the possibility of serious judicial retrenchment have 
argued that any movement away from Roe and its jurisprudential approach 
will threaten the Court’s legitimacy with the public.  Thus, the Court finds 
itself at the center of a fierce partisan political battle over its role in our 
constitutional system with each side predicting doom should the other side 
prevail.  Is this unusual?  Is there a basis for serious concern? 
In fact, the Court has been at the center of political controversy from 
time to time throughout constitutional history.  Even when the public and 
political backlash against the Court has been most severe, the Court as an 
institution has managed to survive and retrieve public support through the 
constitutionally based political checks on the Court.  The President has 
appointed, and the Senate has confirmed, new Justices to replace those who 
have died or retired.  The newly appointed Justices change the direction of 
 
137. BORK, supra note 83, at 252 (noting “professors . . . state a preference for talented and 
benevolent autocrats [federal judges] over the self-government of ordinary folk.”). 
138. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“I am appalled by[] the Court’s suggestion that the decision whether to stand by an 
erroneous constitutional decision must be strongly influenced—against overruling, no less—by the 
substantial and continuing public opposition the decision has generated.”). 
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the Court by pulling back from decisions that led to the crisis.  Over time, 
the Court recovers its “moral capital” with the public.  Often, the crisis was 
prompted by the perception that the Court had decided or was deciding 
cases that were beyond its legitimate capacity to decide at least on a legally 
principled basis.  In other instances, the crisis was prompted by severe 
disagreement with decisions that were justified by accepted methods of 
analysis.  In either case, when the Court gets too far out of step with public 
perceptions giving rise to a crisis of legitimacy, it will retreat to save itself.  
That seems to be happening in the present instance as well.  But in order to 
evaluate the current crisis, it is useful to look to the past. 
A. Chisholm v. Georgia—The Court’s First Big Misstep 
The history of the Court is that it has frequently been at the center of a 
political storm.  In the earliest days of the nation, the Court in Chisholm v. 
Georgia139 created a political controversy by deciding that states were not 
immune from damage suits in federal courts by a citizen of another state.  
Traditional legal arguments were raised both in support of and in opposition 
to the decision.140  The decision was met with “a gale of opposition from 
all sides”141 leading to the prompt enactment of the Eleventh Amendment 
reversing the decision in record time.  This occurred at a time when the 
federal court system, especially the Supreme Court, was viewed with great 
skepticism.  It was prior to the time when Chief Justice Marshall succeeded 
in earning respect for the Court as an institution.  There is no possibility that 
an unpopular constitutional decision could be reversed by constitutional 
amendment with this alacrity in the present time.  No matter what the 
current Court might do, it would have its defenders who would fight for it 
in the political process.  Still, it is a reminder that the Court found itself in a 
state of crisis from the very outset.  However, at the time of Chisholm—only 
five years after the Constitution had been ratified—the Court was a fledgling 
institution still feeling its way.  
 
139. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. 
140. At the time, the Court delivered its decisions seriatim rather than with a single Justice writing 
for the majority.  Justices Blair and Cushing supported the decision with textual arguments.  Justices Jay 
and Wilson also joined the majority placing primary reliance on policy and history.  Justice Irdell 
dissenting argued that Article III was not self-executing and Congress had not provided jurisdiction 
for a damage action against a state by a non-citizen.  See generally id. (providing diverging opinions on 
the Constitution’s restrictions). 
141. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 22. 
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B. McCulloch v. Maryland—The Great Backlash 
Chief Justice Marshall, generally considered the greatest of all Justices, 
began his lengthy term as Chief Justice with the important opinion in 
Marbury v. Madison.142  Marbury is heralded today as the case which first 
recognized judicial review over acts of Congress.  This aspect of the case 
was not particularly controversial even at the time.  Instead, it was Marshall’s 
assumption that the Court had the authority, at least in limited 
circumstances, to oversee decisions of the Executive branch that so 
disturbed President Jefferson.143  This complaint may have bothered the 
political elites but did not resonate with the general public. 
Rather, it was M’Culloch v. Maryland,144 sometimes described as the 
Supreme Court’s greatest decision,145 that set off one of the most severe 
firestorms that the Court has ever weathered.  In his classic opinion in 
M’Culloch, Marshall upheld the authority of Congress to create and re-
authorize the Bank of the United States and to establish a constitutional 
principle prohibiting targeted taxation of a federal instrumentality.  M’Culloch 
strengthened the authority of the federal government at the expense of the 
states.  Along the way, Marshall endorsed the popular sovereignty theory of 
constitutional origin over the compact theory favored by advocates of state 
sovereignty.146  M’Culloch led to perhaps the most ferocious political 
backlash that the Court has ever faced.147  As one commentator has noted, 
 
142. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
143. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 264–65 (rev. 
ed. 1922). 
144. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 402–05 (1819). 
145. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 122 (1996) (stating “MCulloch ranks among the greatest of Marshall’s opinions”); MCCLOSKEY, 
supra note 81, at 53 (notating how M’Culloch was “the greatest decision John Marshall ever handed 
down”); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL DEFINER OF A NATION 441 (1996) (expressing 
“MCulloch v. Maryland may be the most important case in the history of the Supreme Court”). 
146. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 402–05. 
147. See ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 78 (1st ed.1987) (stating “[i]n 
the South and old Northwest the Court’s opinion evoked violent criticism”); RICHARD E. ELLIS, 
AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM 10–11 (2007) (asserting M’Culloch led to a reaction against both the Bank 
and the Court which were considered “aggressive, intrusive and coercive”); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE 
WILL OF THE PEOPLE 83 (2009) (“From the time of [M’Culloch] forward the Court was under almost 
constant fire.”); HOBSON, supra note 145, at 117 (acknowledging the decision “provoked harsh public 
censure in the months following its announcement”); MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND SECURING A NATION 141–58 (2006) (detailing a discussion of the reaction against 
M’Culloch recognizing that the reaction was “indeed different” from the negative reaction against other 
nationalist-oriented Marshall Court decisions); R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 
HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 299 (2000) (noting how M’Culloch unleashed a “no holds 
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“[f]or perhaps most of the public, the Court’s decision appeared 
revolutionary.”148  Part of the backlash against the Court is attributable to 
the result of the case that upheld the wildly unpopular Bank of the United 
States which was widely blamed for credit policies that contributed to the 
recession existing at the time.149  Beyond that however, M’Culloch was quite 
correctly understood as the Court entering the continuing and often vitriolic 
argument over the proper relationship between the national government 
and the states with the Court clearly throwing its weight behind the national 
government.150  Justice Story’s opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee151 prior 
to M’Culloch and Marshall’s opinion in Cohens v. Virginia152 subsequent to 
M’Culloch both of which endorsed Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the 
highest court of a state (in both instances Virginia) also fueled the fire of 
backlash against the Court.153 
Marshall’s opponents in Virginia, especially Judge Spencer Roane of the 
Virginia Court of Appeals, launched an attack on M’Culloch through a series 
of essays published in newspapers.154  This attack alarmed Marshall to the 
extent of causing him to respond in a series of pseudonymous essays 
published under the name “A Friend of the Constitution.”  The reaction to 
M’Culloch was not limited to a debate in the press, however.  Over the next 
decade in response to M’Culloch, Congress seriously considered limiting the 
 
barred debate on the Court, the Constitution, and the Union”).  Id. at 332 (stating “Marshall was caught 
off balance by the vehemence of the attack on his opinion and on him personally”); WARREN, supra 
note 143, at 504, 514 (explaining how the decision in M’Culloch was met with an outburst of indignation 
and even actual defiance though disapproval of the decision was largely in the South and West).  Id. 
at 504–525 (identifying quotations from the press condemning and sometimes praising the decision); 
see also JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS; VINDICATED (1820) 
(arguing against Marshall’s analysis in M’Culloch). 
148. BRAY HAMMOND, QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 39 (John A. 
Garraty ed., 1st ed. 1987). 
149. Id. at 518–19. 
150. NEWMYER, supra note 147, at 335 (M’Culloch became the “cause celebre” of the defenders 
of state rights). 
151. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
152. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). 
153. See Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. at 380–81 (noting there is an “absolute necessity . . . for . . . a 
revising power over cases and parties in the state courts . . . .”); Cohens, 19 U.S. at 416–17 
(emphasizing the framers’ intent to “strengthen[] the confederation by enlarging the powers of the 
government, and by giving efficacy to those which it before possessed, but could not exercise”). 
154. See GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND 
1–21 (1969) (collecting historic essays attacking M’Culloch and the Court as well as Marshall’s replies); 
see also ELLIS, supra note 147, at 381 (documenting the discussion of the exchange).  At least in private 
correspondence, Thomas Jefferson was also a severe critic of the Court in the wake of M’Culloch. 
SMITH, supra note 145, at 155–56. 
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Court’s jurisdiction.155  The Virginia legislature passed a resolution 
condemning the decision.156  State officials blatantly defied the decision 
forcing the Court to reaffirm it in Osborne v. United States.157  As one 
historian has noted, “M’Culloch set in motion the forces of state rights that 
charted the direction of antebellum history.”158  Andrew Jackson 
successfully ran for President in large part in opposition to the Bank and the 
Marshall Court.159  He vetoed the re-authorization of the Bank, in part 
based on his constitutional disagreement with M’Culloch.160  Eventually, he 
abolished the Bank by ordering his Secretary of the Treasury to remove all 
deposits by the United States from it.161  A movement arose to bring a case 
before the Court in an attempt to persuade it to overrule M’Culloch; however 
it did not materialize.162  Marshall’s endorsement of the popular sovereignly 
theory of constitutional origin over the competing compact theory may have 
prevailed in the courts as of M’Culloch, but it took a civil war for that theory 
to become truly embodied in the public conception of constitutional 
origin.163  Moreover, M’Culloch’s conclusions as to the expansive breadth of 
 
155. NEWMYER, supra note 147, at 381 (indicating how M’Culloch and the ensuing debate in the 
press gave rise to an “outpouring of measures for curbing judicial power” and among the measures 
debated in Congress were proposals to give the Senate final authority over all constitutional cases 
involving the issue of federalism or to create a court of the Chief Justices of all of the states to resolve 
such issues).  The attack on the Court culminated in John Calhoun’s nullification proposal.  See id. 
at 382–84 (providing an overview of the legislative backlash from M’Culloch).  The Court’s defenders 
in New England, especially through Joseph Storey’s Commentaries on the Constitution, defended the Court 
against the assault.  Id. at 384. 
156. WARREN, supra note 143, at 518–19.  
157. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 867–68 (1824), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1332 (“[T]he Court adheres to its decision in the case of [M’Culloch] against The State of 
Maryland, and is of opinion, that the act of the State of Ohio, which is certainly much more 
objectionable than that of the State of Maryland, is repugnant to a law of the United States, made in 
pursuance of the [C]onstitution, and, therefore, void.”). 
158. NEWMYER, supra note 147, at 375. 
159. KILLENBECK, supra note 147, at 167–68. 
160. ELLIS, supra note 147, at 214–15; KILLENBECK, supra note 147, at  177–79 (“[T]he heart 
of Jackson’s veto was clearly his attempt to minimize the role and influence of the Court, and his 
position represented a stark challenge to its authority.”). 
161. ELLIS, supra note 147, at  214–15. 
162. KILLENBECK, supra note 147, at 177–79. 
163. The South seceded on the basis of the compact theory.  Lincoln fought the war under the 
mantle of popular sovereignty, i.e., the Union was formed by the people, not the states, and thus the 
states could not secede.  Following the war, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed Marshall’s popular 
sovereignty theory.  See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 726–27 (1869), overruled by Morgan v. United States, 
113 U.S. 476 (1855) (stating actions ratified by the Legislature and citizens of Texas, such as the 
ordinance of secession, “were absolutely null” as the war was fought “for the suppression of rebellion” 
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congressional power eventually prevailed as well, but only after both the 
Civil War and the New Deal Crisis of 1937. 
M’Culloch, as well as some of the Marshall Court’s other decisions favoring 
the national government over the states, created a political reaction against 
the courts.  Five of the seven Justices who joined the unanimous opinion in 
M’Culloch had been appointed by either President Jefferson or 
President Madison—the political opponents of Chief Justice Marshall 
nationalist-oriented approach.164  However, as has often been the case, 
when the Court got out of step with public opinion, the political process—
gradually through the appointment and confirmation power, especially the 
six Supreme Court appointments by President Jackson which included the 
replacement of Marshall as Chief Justice with Roger Taney—ultimately 
altered the direction of the Court, especially with respect to questions of 
federalism.165  The new majority on the Court was appointed for the 
purpose of changing the Court’s direction and did just that.166  One of 
Marshall’s last major decisions, Worcester v. Georgia,167 was effectively 
ignored by President Jackson, Congress, and the State of Georgia.168  The 
popular tide had clearly turned against the Court. 
The crisis provoked by M’Culloch is distinguishable from subsequent 
crises surrounding the Court.  Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in 
M’Culloch is an extraordinary example of traditional legal analysis at its 
finest.169  Indeed, it provides one of the Court’s most compelling models 
of a great justice doing “lawyers’ work.”  Nevertheless, the Court provoked 
 
rather than that of conquest; that their obligation and allegiance to the Constitution remained whether 
faithful or unfaithful). 
164. NEWMYER, supra note 147, at 385 (indicating the Court survived “the anti-Court 
movement of the 1820s and early 1830s” by trimming its sails and by the fact that its opponents 
eventually gained control through the appointment and confirmation process).  Id. at 412 (reporting 
the Marshall Court began a political retrenchment of its more controversial decisions prior to the Taney 
Court). 
165. R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 92–93 (2d 
ed. 2006) (“President Jackson brought the Supreme Court into harmony with Jacksonian Democracy 
by virtue of six appointments.”). 
166. NEWMYER, supra note 147, at 377. 
167. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
168. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 83–95 (describing the conflicts related to some of the 
Court’s decisions, and that during this period, state officials often defied the Court). 
169. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 22 (2012) (“To read 
[M’Culloch] is to behold the art of constitutional interpretation at its acme.”).  However, critics of 
Marshall and M’Culloch have argued the decision was more political than legal.  See HOBSON, supra 
note 145, at 115 (noting the criticism).  But see id. at 116 (illustrating Hobson himself rejects the critics 
take on M’Culluch). 
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a crisis of legitimacy by attempting to authoritatively resolve by judicial edict 
the most volatile political issue of the day.  No matter how persuasive 
Marshall’s legal reasoning might have appeared either at the time or at 
present when his vision has largely prevailed, he was attempting to resolve 
a controversy that could ultimately only be resolved politically, not judicially.  
As such, Marshall’s opinion in M’Culloch provoked extreme political 
backlash against the Court, not because Marshall lacked solid legal support 
for his decision but rather because the issue was simply too big and too 
controversial for the Court to resolve, no matter how skilled its 
Chief Justice. 
Some have argued that M’Culloch established “the Court’s legitimacy as a 
final arbiter of constitutional questions,” though others have disagreed 
vigorously.170  The controversy provoked by M’Culloch was created not by 
Marshall’s interpretive methods but rather by the result he reached and to 
some extent by the unnecessarily provocative and dogmatic tone of the 
opinion.  Not far from the surface was the fear of critics in the South that 
Marshall’s deference to a sweeping view of congressional power would 
eventually be employed to challenge slavery or at least its expansion.171  In 
the context existing at the time, virtually any judicial attempt to define the 
appropriate boundaries between federal and state power, a legitimate 
question for the Court to address both then and now was likely to result in 
public controversy and perhaps political challenge to the Court.  Marshall 
simply went too far, too fast, and too stridently on an issue of which the 
nation was deeply divided, subjecting the Court to a severe but legitimate 
constitutional check. 
C. The Taney Court and the Dred Scott Debacle 
When Taney replaced Marshall as Chief Justice in 1835, the supporters of 
the nationalist-oriented Marshall Court concluded both the Court and the 
Constitution were doomed.172  For two decades, however, the post-
Marshall Taney Court maintained a low profile and avoided public 
controversy, but that changed with the overheated debate concerning 
congressional authority over slavery in the territories preceding the Civil 
 
170. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815–1835, 
at 749 (1991) (asserting M’Culluch helped the perception of the Court’s importance).  
171. LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 604 (1974); PETER CHARLES 
HOFFER ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY 70 (2007). 
172. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 53. 
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War.173  The understanding was if a territory was authorized to permit 
slavery, it would probably enter the Union as a slave state and vice versa.  It 
was crucial to the South to maintain somewhat of a balance between slave 
and free states to avoid creating a supermajority of free states capable of 
amending the Constitution to prohibit slavery.  By the 1850s, this issue was 
tearing the nation apart.  In the Dred Scott case, widely considered the Court’s 
gravest error, the Court attempted to provide a constitutionally based 
judicial resolution to the question.174  In that case, Scott, a slave, sued for 
his freedom because he had lived with his master, an army physician, in the 
free state of Illinois and the free territory of Upper Louisiana before being 
returned to slavery in Missouri.  The Court attempted the impossible.  By 
throwing its weight and prestige behind the slave-holding South in a 
disingenuous and poorly reasoned opinion, the Court only made matters 
worse, damaging its own reputation in the process.  The Dred Scott case did 
not cause the Civil War; it almost certainly would have occurred in any 
event.175  However, it did make a very bad situation even worse. 
There were two holdings in Dred Scott.  First, a three Justice plurality held 
that a slave or a descendant of a slave could be neither a citizen of a state 
nor the United States.176  As a result, Scott could not sue in federal court 
under diversity of citizenship, and the Court dismissed his lawsuit for lack 
of jurisdiction.  Perhaps even more provocative, a six-Justice majority held 
that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories because it would 
violate the (substantive) due process rights of the slave owner by effectively 
depriving him of his property on venturing into congressionally declared 
free territory.177  Essentially the Court declared the Missouri Compromise 
of 1820—which had been repealed by the Kansas Nebraska Act of 1854—
unconstitutional.178  This was the first instance in which the Supreme Court 
 
173. As of 1850, the Court had achieved an extremely high degree of public support.  Id. at 63. 
174. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1857). 
175. The dispute over the LeCompton Constitution in Kansas and the election of Lincoln as 
President, pushed the nation closer to Civil War than the Dred Scott decision.  DON E. FEHRENBACHER, 
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 561–67 (1978); EARL 
M. MALTZ, DRED SCOTT AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY 154 (2007) (“Modern historians generally 
do not view Dred Scott as a major cause of the Civil War . . . .”). 
176. Sandford, 60 U.S. at 427. 
177. Id. at 450.  
178. Although the Missouri Compromise has been repealed by the time of the Dred Scott 
decision, it had been the law at the time that Scott had been taken into the Upper Louisiana Territory.  
Id. at 519 (addressing Scott’s argument that the Missouri Compromise granted his freedom at the time 
he entered free territory). 
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evoked the concept of substantive due process, although it did so without 
careful analysis.  As with subsequent use of substantive due process in the 
Lochner era and again with the contemporary right to privacy, the theory as 
utilized in Dred Scott would only thinly cover a judicial value judgment. 
The majority in Dred Scott decided the case on the broadest and most 
politically explosive grounds when there were several less controversial 
means for disposing of the case.179  In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney 
attempted to dress his obvious political opinion in legalistic analysis; 
however, his arguments were highly selective and disingenuous and failed to 
persuade the persuadable.180  Apparently, the Court did not realize how 
controversial its opinion would be.181  Dred Scott is quite properly 
condemned for reaching morally and legally indefensible results on the 
issues that the Court addressed.182  Beyond that, the most serious failing of 
Dred Scott is that the Court vainly attempted to resolve by judicial decree a 
political issue that was far beyond judicial resolution.183  As 
Professor McCloskey noted, the Court should “leave alone” questions that 
“profoundly engage the emotions of the whole people.”184  In the Court’s 
defense, the political branches had invited the Court to resolve the 
 
179. The narrowest resolution would have been that proposed by Justice Nelson recognizing 
that Missouri had declared Scott a slave, in litigation in state court, and that decision was controlling as 
a matter of law.  See LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., DO GREAT CASES MAKE BAD LAW? 88–89 (2014) 
(discussing potential alternative grounds for the decision). 
180. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 122–23 (1993) (criticizing 
both the Taney opinion for the Court and the Curtis dissent as “result-oriented” opinions intended to 
foster their authors “social vision”). 
181. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 24 (1937); 
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 62 (“The tempest of malediction that burst over the judges seems to 
have stunned them . . . .”). 
182. See HOFFER, supra note 171, at 100 (“Taney’s interpretation of the Constitution was 
certainly arguable.”).  But see MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 28–30 (2006) (arguing Taney’s arguments though morally wrong were legally 
plausible). 
183. WARREN, supra note 181, at 24 (attempting to settle the controversy over slavery in the 
territories by judicial decree “would only serve to enflame rather than to extinguish”).  Many of the 
critics of the decision at the time made this very argument.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 114. 
184. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 60 (“They should have realized that their power was built 
on a lively sense of its own limitations . . . .”).  Id. at 63 (stating the Court’s greatest mistake was “to 
imagine that a flaming political issue could be quenched by calling it a ‘legal’ issue and deciding it 
judicially”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 180, at 124 (“[T]he Court was stretching judicial power to the 
breaking point.”); MALTZ, supra note 175, at 156 (“[T]he story of Dred Scott is a story of judicial 
hubris.”); NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 138 (“When the Court decided Dred Scott, it put itself on trial.”); 
Maurice Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HARV. L. REV. 221, 243 (1925)  
(“A question which involved a Civil War can hardly be proper material for the wrangling of lawyers.”). 
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troublesome issue of slavery in the territories.185  Perhaps to a large extent, 
the Dred Scott Court was a victim of its own prior success.  Under Taney, the 
Court had achieved great public support, arguably causing both the Justices 
and political actors to assume that it could resolve a wrenching and divisive 
political issue through constitutional adjudication.186  From a moral and 
legal standpoint, the Court threw its weight behind the wrong result both 
then and now.  The opponents of the decision responded with fury.187  The 
defenders of the decision relied on “rule of law” arguments.188  The critics 
dismissed the controversial holding, invalidating the Missouri Compromise 
as dicta, which it clearly was not.189  The decision became a central issue in 
the famous Lincoln Douglas debates the following year.190  Several 
northern state legislatures passed resolutions condemning the decision,191 
much like the Virginia legislature’s resolution condemning McCulloch.  
 
185. SCHWARTZ, supra note 180, at 110–11; LUCAS A. POWE, JR. & L.A. SCOT POWE,  
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at 105–06 (2009).  Even Lincoln 
urged the Court to resolve the issue of slavery in the territories.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 111. 
186. SCHWARTZ, supra note 180, at 106 (“The Dred Scott Court fell victim to its own success as 
a governmental institution.”).  
187. WARREN, supra note 181, at 24–25 (A “whirlwind of abuse . . . swept upon the 
Court . . . .”); see id. at 26–38 (quoting press critiques of the Dred Scott decision); FEHRENBACHER, supra 
note 175, at 417 (discussing how the decision was denounced in the press as “atrocious,” “wicked,” 
and “abominable”). 
188. Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Political Speeches and Debates of Abraham 
Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas in Chicago, Illinois (July 9, 1858) (“[T]he decision of the highest 
tribunal known to the Constitution of the country must be final till it has been reversed by an equally 
high authority.”); Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Political Speeches and Debates of Abraham 
Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas in Jonesboro, Illinois (Sept. 15, 1858) (“[T]hat decision becomes the 
law of the land, binding on you, on me . . . .”). 
189. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 114.  The dicta argument was based on the assertion that it 
was inappropriate for the Court to reach the Missouri Compromise question after having concluded 
that Scott was not a citizen and hence there was no jurisdiction under the diversity of citizenship clause.  
The problem with this argument is that only three Justices joined the former holding while six joined 
that latter.  See BLOOM, JR., supra note 179, at 88 (“And yet the latter can hardly be dismissed as dicta 
as it often has been, given that it had the support of six [J]ustices while the former position seemed to 
have only three.”). 
190. See generally Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, The Lincoln-Douglas Debates in 
Ottawa, Illinois (Aug. 21, 1858); Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, The Lincoln-Douglas 
Debates in Freeport, Illinois (Aug. 27, 1858); Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Political 
Speeches and Debates of Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas in Jonesboro, Illinois (Sept. 15, 
1858); Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Political Speeches and Debates of Abraham Lincoln 
and Stephen A. Douglas in Charleston, Illinois (Sept. 18, 1858); Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. 
Douglas, The Lincoln-Douglas Debates in Galesburg, Illinois (Oct. 7, 1858); HARRY V. JAFFA & 
ROBERT W. JOHANNSEN, IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE 40 (1959). 
191. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 175, at 432. 
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However, the decision would have been as divisive had the Court reached 
the opposite result.  The question of the legality of congressional regulation 
of slavery in the territories had become so inflammatory that it was well 
beyond judicial resolution.  Perhaps it was beyond political resolution as 
well.  Certainly, Congress and the President had been unable to settle it up 
to that point.  Maybe it could only be resolved through secession and the 
violence of the Civil War.  In any event, the Court, and much of the political 
establishment, that pressed for a judicial solution were deluded.  No case 
has attested to the limits of judicial power more than Dred Scott.  Despite the 
controversial nature of the Dred Scott opinion, its critics, unlike the critics of 
M’Culloch v. Maryland, did not urge outright defiance but rather reversal 
through the legal process, especially through the appointment of Justices 
with a different point of view.192 
Critics argue the Court’s Scott v. Sanford decision wounded the Court’s 
reputation for decades to come.193  However, that probably is not so.194  
First, the Civil War diverted attention from the Court for  
the first part of the next decade, even though Chief Justice Taney continued 
to tussle with President Lincoln.195  Second, Lincoln replaced many of the 
Justices who decided the Dred Scott case, molding the Court into a more 
nationalistic institution.196  Third, the Court did not behave as if its prestige 
 
192. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 119; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 175, at 454 (noting how 
Dred Scott did not cause its critics to attempt to constrain the Court’s authority but rather to win the 
next election and alter the Court’s membership).  That was the position that Lincoln took.  POWE, JR. 
& POWE, supra note 185, at 105. 
193. Edwin S. Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision, in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrine, 27 AM. 
HIST. REV. 69 (1911) (discussing the “shattered reputation” of the Court after the Dred Scott decision); 
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 63 (recounting how the Court’s near unanimous support was destroyed 
by the Dred Scott decision).  Charles Warren argued it was biased reporting of the decision in part, as 
much as the decision itself that wounded the Court’s reputation.  WARREN, supra note 181, at 39. 
194. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 175, at 454 (“The extent to which the [Dred Scott] decision 
undermined the Court as an institution has in fact been greatly exaggerated.”); FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 147, at 137 (“The Supreme Court experienced a remarkable rise in respect and importance during 
the generation following the Civil War.”). 
195. Sitting as a circuit judge, Taney ordered Lincoln to release John Merryman, who had been 
arrested in Maryland for secessionist activities, from custody.  The commanding officer on whom 
Taney’s order was delivered refused.  Taney then issued an opinion criticizing Lincoln’s suspension of 
habeas corpus as well as the arrest of Merryman.  Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (1861).  
Despite Taney’s opinion, Lincoln did not comply.  But see Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex Parte Merryman: 
Myth, History and Scholarship, 224 MIL. L. REV. 481, 501–06 (2016) (offering a different interpretation of 
the incident, arguing there was no defiance by anyone). 
196. Lincoln appointed five Justices to the Court, including Samuel Chase as Chief Justice on 
Taney’s death. 
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had suffered.  Rather, it invalidated more federal laws in the decade and one-
half following Dred Scott than it had in the preceding seventy years.197  
Except for the Legal Tender Cases198 in which the Court initially invalidated 
paper money as legal tender, and then with the addition of two new Justices 
changed its mind, the Court managed to land on its feet following the 
debacle of Dred Scott.  The initial decision invalidating paper currency as legal 
tender indicated that a majority of the Court did not feel at all intimidated 
by the negative reaction to the Dred Scott case twelve years earlier.  Again, 
the Court as an institution was saved by the President and Senate’s ability to 
change its composition to some extent because several southern Justices 
resigned with the advent of the Civil War.  The Dred Scott debacle could have 
seriously threatened the Court’s legitimacy as a constitutional interpreter had 
it not been for the war. 
D. The Rise and Fall of the Lochner Era 
For the most part, the Court, with the aid of highly capable Justices, 
managed to avoid public controversy for the next two and one-half decades 
until 1895, when it decided three cases that once again placed it very much 
in the public limelight.  Within a short period of time, the Court invalidated 
the income tax,199 struck down the government’s attempt to apply the 
Sherman Antitrust Act to a massive monopoly in the sugar industry,200 and 
sustained an injunction against a labor strike involving the Pullman 
company.201  The following year, William Jennings Bryan ran for the 
presidency to some extent on an anti-Supreme Court platform but was 
defeated by William McKinley.202  With the emergence of the progressive 
movement, these decisions cast the Court as the defender of wealth and 
 
197. SCHWARTZ, supra note 180, at 154.  Despite Lincoln’s appointments, the Court continued 
to battle the radical Republican Congress.  Adamany, supra note 72, at 834–35 (discussing the cases that 
the Supreme Court decided after Lincoln’s appointment). 
198. In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 626 (1869), the Court ruled that paper money could 
not qualify as legal tender under the Constitution.  The following year in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 
457, 586 (1870), with the addition of two new Justices to the Court, it reached the opposite result.  See 
BLOOM, JR., supra, note 179, at 97–113 (discussing these decisions).  This may or may not have been 
an example of the appointment power being employed to modify the direction of the Court depending 
on one’s view of the underlying facts.  See id. (discussing these decisions). 
199. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co.,157 U.S. 429, 625, 675 (1895); see also BLOOM, JR., 
supra, note 179, at 151–65 (discussing the three cases). 
200. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 12–13 (1895). 
201. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599–600 (1895). 
202. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 
384 (1992). 
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power against the emerging reform movement.  These cases, though 
controversial, did not imperil the Court’s legitimacy.  At the same time, the 
Court began its four-decade-long venture against economic reform 
legislation prompted by the problems triggered by the industrial revolution.  
Concerning federal reform legislation, the Court applied the concept of dual 
sovereignty to sharply limit the federal government’s power to address 
economic issues at the local level.203  At the same time, the Court developed 
the economic substantive due process liberty-of-contract doctrine, 
characterized by its decision in Lochner v. New York,204 to invalidate much 
state-level economic and social welfare legislation as well.  The Court’s 
employment of constitutional doctrines to flout the will of legislative 
majorities in the areas of economic and social legislation continued for the 
better part of four decades. 
One might have thought that the doctrine of substantive due process, 
first articulated by the Court in Dred Scott, had perished with the rejection of 
most of that opinion following the Civil War.  However, the Court had other 
plans.  In the case of Munn v. Illinois205 in 1877, the Court acknowledged 
that substantive due process liberty of contract was a valid legal theory but 
did not yet employ it to invalidate state legislation.  Within two decades, 
however, the Court began relying on the doctrine to invalidate state 
economic regulation.  Although the Court employed substantive due 
process to invalidate hundreds of state laws for over forty years, the period 
has become known as the Lochner era on account of the decision in the 1905 
case of Lochner v. New York.  In a five-to-four ruling, the Court invalidated a 
New York law that limited a baker’s workweek to sixty hours.  Lochner 
emerged as the case which characterized this era due in part to the Court’s 
detailed explication of the doctrine along with the famous dissent by 
Justice Holmes.  The Court rejected the state’s health justification as 
unsupported by evidence and declared that regulating labor relations 
exceeded the boundaries of the police power.206 As such, the regulation 
infringed a baker’s substantive due process liberty of contract to agree to 
work as many hours as the parties desire. 
Justice Holmes wrote a short but classic dissent, forever upstaging the 
majority opinion.  He rejected the liberty-of-contract doctrine, arguing that 
 
203. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 12–13 (providing an excellent early example of the dual 
federalism approach). 
204. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
205. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
206. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. 
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no particular aspect of liberty is more highly protected than any other.207  
He maintained the state had the right to regulate any exercise of liberty if it 
had a legitimate police power rationale for doing so and that regulating labor 
relations was such a justification.  Perhaps the most significant aspect of the 
Holmes dissent was his declaration that the Constitution did not “embody 
a particular economic theory.”208  By implication, he alleged that the 
majority was reading its favored laissez-faire theory into the Constitution—
that is, substituting its own particular value preferences for constitutional 
law.  This is the classic critique of substantive due process, whether 
employed in Dred Scott, Lochner, or Roe v. Wade.  The doctrine allows the 
Court to prefer those aspects of liberty, whether slave ownership, freedom 
of contract, or the right to obtain an abortion over state regulation to the 
contrary.  As contemporary commentators have argued, the Lochner Court 
may have had more legal support for its liberty-of-contract doctrine than 
Holmes assumed.209  Nevertheless, Holmes’s critique rang true.  Lochner 
became a bad word in constitutional jurisprudence.210  Certainly, after its 
rejection, the Lochner era came to represent a Court determined to impose 
its own preferred values through its decisions in constitutional cases. 
During this period, the Court faced vigorous public and professional 
criticism, and pointed internal criticism through the dissents of 
Justice Holmes.211  Amidst the Great Depression, matters came to a head 
when the Court struck down several measures passed at the behest of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt as part of his New Deal and struck down 
the state regulations of economic matters.212  The following year, perhaps 
influenced by the President’s court packing threats or public 
 
207. Id. at 75.  
208. Id. at 75–76.  
209. David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the Growth of the 
Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325, 327 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (“Virtually 
no serious scholar of the Lochner era believes any longer that the Lochner Court simply tried to impose 
laissez-faire or was influenced much by Social Darwinism.”).  The legal principles guiding the Lochner 
Court are grounded in a combination of Jacksonian anti-class bias along with the free labor ideology 
of the abolitionist movement. 
210. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14–15 
(1980). 
211. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 178 (“In the aftermath of Lochner, prominent lawyers began 
to attack not just judicial decisions but the institution of judicial review itself.”). 
212. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550–51 (1935) (limiting 
the reach of the National Industrial Recovery Act through a narrow construction of the commerce 
clause); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (invalidating a state minimum 
wage law on the ground that it violated the substantive due process liberty of contract). 
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dissatisfaction,213 the Court radically changed directions rejecting dual 
federalism at the national level214 and substantive due process at the state 
level.215  In rejecting substantive due process methodology, the Court 
embraced the critique set forth by Holmes in Lochner v. New York.216  As a 
result, the Court changed directions before the President had the 
opportunity to alter its composition through the appointment process.217  
To a large extent, the Court may have been responding to widespread public 
disagreement with the substance of its decisions—that is, with respect to 
the results rather than the interpretive methodology.218  Amid the 
Depression, the public preferred government intervention in economic 
affairs.  President Roosevelt, along with other critics of the Court, had 
effectively characterized the Court as an obstacle to such policies.219  Times 
were hard, the Court was perceived as blocking the way to economic 
recovery, and as such, the Court had lost critical public support.  Whether 
its legal doctrines and reasoning were correct or at least reasonably plausible 
was beside the point.  The severity of the economic circumstances, the 
popular President’s persuasiveness, and the accumulation of decades of 
questionable precedent combined to seriously undermine diffuse support 
for the Court.  Under these circumstances, a majority of the Court self-
corrected before external correction could occur.  Nevertheless, the Court’s 
withdrawal from the economic sphere was cemented by the eventual 
replacement of Justices who had stood as an obstacle to economic reform 
 
213. See generally JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME 
COURT (2010) (remaining disputed as to the extent to which the Justices may have been aware of the 
yet publicly announced court packing proposal). 
214. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (expanding Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause by upholding the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935). 
215. See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (rejecting substantive due process 
liberty of contract analysis and upholding state minimum wage legislation). 
216. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I think that 
the word ‘liberty’ in the 14th Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome 
of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that 
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the 
traditions of our people and our law.  It does not need research to show that no such sweeping 
condemnation can be passed upon the statute before us.”). 
217. See SHESOL, supra note 213, at 2–3 (detailing the account of the battle between 
President Roosevelt and the Supreme Court). 
218. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 4 (“In effect, a tacit deal was reached: the American 
people would grant the [J]ustices their power, so long as the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution did not stray too far from what a majority of the people believed it should be.”). 
219. SHESOL, supra note 213, at 148–50. 
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legislation.  The judicial revolution of 1937 is yet a further example of an 
overreaching Court eventually succumbing to a combination of public 
pressure and appointment power. 
E. The Warren Court—Many Bridges Too Far 
For the next two decades, the Court largely avoided public controversy 
by slowly shifting its focus from constitutional challenges of economic 
regulation to questions involving civil rights and liberties.220  Under the 
Warren Court, the public perceptions of the Court changed significantly.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Court engaged in aggressive constitutional 
decision-making by challenging racial segregation in public schools, ordering 
reapportionment of state legislatures based on population equality, banning 
prayer in public schools, making it more difficult for states to provide 
financial aid to religious schools, protecting the rights of criminal 
defendants, and recognizing a constitutionally based right to privacy.221  In 
achieving these substantive results, the Court often played fast and loose 
with existing judicial precedent.  The public accepted many of these 
decisions in their own right.  However, the aggregation of these decisions 
gave rise to the perception that a group of unelected Justices of the Supreme 
Court had embarked on an undemocratic attempt to alter the very basis of 
American society.  Brown v. Board of Education222 is the cornerstone of 
Warren Court jurisprudence.  Arguably, it the most significant decision in 
Supreme Court history.  Brown was pending before the Court when Earl 
Warren was nominated as Chief Justice.223  Brown’s legal correctness is now 
beyond dispute.  And yet, that has not always been the case.  Respected 
members of the Brown Court, most particularly, Justices Frankfurter and 
Jackson, worried that a decision in favor of the plaintiffs was legally 
insupportable, and most of the two-year process of reaching a decision was 
necessary to convince them otherwise.224  Moreover, Professor Wechsler, 
 
220. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting the shift in 
emphasis that was telegraphed shortly after the judicial revolution of 1937 in the now famous footnote 
4 of Justice Stone’s opinion for the Court). 
221. See Baum & Devins, supra note 37, at 1565 (explaining the Warren Court may have 
perceived support and encouragement from left-leaning academics and the media elite). 
222. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
223. Warren joined the Court with a recess appointment.  The Senate would not confirm 
Warren until he had begun writing the opinion in Brown. 
224. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) (detailing the history and 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD 
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perhaps the most prominent law professor of his era, delivered an address 
at Harvard Law School in 1959, arguing Brown failed the test of justification 
by neutral and general principles.225  Despite these criticisms, Brown was 
clearly defensible.  The defendants in Brown argued that a decision in favor 
of desegregation was inconsistent with the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson.226  
However, the Court was able to honestly deflect each argument.  First, based 
on the uncited memoranda of Justice Frankfurter’s law clerk, Alexander 
Bickel,227 the Court held that the original understanding was 
inconclusive.228  Furthermore, based on precedent, the Court demonstrated 
that Plessy had in fact been undermined by the series of graduate school cases 
decided by the Court in the interim.229 
Thus, neither the original understanding nor precedent provided an 
insurmountable obstacle to a decision in favor of the plaintiffs.  The 
plaintiffs needed a legal rationale to decide in their favor, and 
Chief Justice Warren clearly had one.  The problem, however, was that he 
could not explicitly rely on it.  At the first conference over which 
Chief Justice Warren presided, following the second round of arguments in 
Brown, Justice Warren began by declaring that racial segregation in schools 
was based on the constitutionally illegitimate purpose of racism.230  As 
such, segregation was constitutionally invalid.  The problem was that 
 
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1956–1961 (1994) (“The way the [J]ustices responded to each 
case the NAACP presented affected what Marshall and his colleagues could do in the next case.”). 
225. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 
(1959) (“The problem inheres strictly in the reasoning of the opinion, an opinion which is often read 
with less fidelity by those who praise it than by those by whom it is condemned.”). 
226. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (holding separate but equal racial 
segregation on a train was constitutional, essentially endorsing Jim Crowe segregation laws throughout 
the South), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
227. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 64–65 (1955) (expressing the essence of Alexander Bickel’s memo when he was a law clerk for 
Justice Frankfurter). 
228. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (“[T]he inconclusive nature of the 
Amendment’s history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that 
time.”). 
229. See id. at 491–92 (1954) (“In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality 
was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the 
same educational qualifications.”).  
230. See Brown v. Board of Education & Bolling v. Sharpe, in THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 
(1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS  
654–55 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (“At present, my instincts and tentative feelings would lead me to say 
that in these cases we should abolish, in a tolerant way, the practice of segregation in public schools.”). 
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Warren acknowledged that he could not use that as the rationale for his 
opinion because he wanted to avoid blaming and, hence, provoking the 
segregated South, given he understood that its cooperation was essential to 
the effective implementation of the decision.231  Justice Warren was forced 
to rely on a more problematic explanation of the decision based on the 
stigmatic impact of segregation.232  As a result, Brown was a great decision 
that was quite clearly legally justified but not necessarily by the Court’s own 
explanation. 
Nevertheless, Brown contributed to the present troubles of the Court.  
First, opponents of originalism have often attempted to use Brown as a 
means of discrediting originalism as a valid interpretive methodology.  
Opponents argue Brown is inconsistent with the original understanding, and 
Brown is a great decision; thus, originalism must be wrong.233  As noted 
above, the argument that Brown is inconsistent with the original 
understanding is a gross overstatement often made disingenuously.234  
However, to the extent that people believe Brown was legally insupportable 
but correctly decided can lead to the belief that it is generally appropriate 
for courts to reach a morally just decision regardless of whether it is legally 
supported or not.  This is clearly an incorrect understanding of Brown.  Still, 
some believe that Brown established the dawn of the “living Constitution 
era” and from 1954 on anything goes. 
Even assuming merely for the sake of argument that Brown was legally 
insupportable, the fact that the decision was correctly decided should not be 
taken to mean that traditional methods of constitutional analysis have been 
or should be rejected in all contexts.  After all, the Fourteenth Amendment 
was concerned with the prohibition of racial discrimination, at least in 
certain contexts.  It was not as if the Brown Court attempted to address an 
issue of no constitutional concern whatsoever.  There was at least some 
textual, originalist grounding for the decision.  Second, even if accepted legal 
methods did not lead to the decision in Brown, the moral evil of racial 
 
231. See KLUGER, supra note 224, at 696 (stating Warren circulated his draft opinion in Brown 
with a cover memo indicating that the opinion needed to be “short, readable by the lay public, non-
rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-accusatory”). 
232. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
233. See STRAUSS, supra note 129, at 12, 78, 85. 
234. See BORK, supra note 83, at 82 (siding with the argument Brown was consistent with the 
original understanding). 
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segregation was such that it demanded judicial action.  As such, Brown was 
legitimately a one-off type decision.  It was correct whether or not easily 
justified, but that in itself should not throw the door open to unjustifiable 
decisions in other areas as well.  Hence, even if Brown was legally 
insupportable, which it was not, it should not be viewed as creating a 
battering ram to justify other insupportable decisions. 
There is another way in which Brown may have created the perception that 
the Court should be aggressive in the pursuit of justice and fairness, 
regardless of the law.  One valid criticism of Brown is that for a lengthy period 
of time, ten to fifteen years, the Court failed to provide support and 
guidance to lower court judges struggling with the difficult task of molding 
desegregation decrees in the midst of massive, often violent, resistance.  
Many lower court judges performed heroically under very challenging 
circumstances.235  These judges are worthy of the praise they have received.  
However, an unfortunate byproduct of these efforts was to create, at least 
for some, a mythology of the judge as a hero.  From this perspective, the 
federal district judge was perceived as a knight in armor authorized to do 
battle with corruption, unfairness, and injustice whenever identified in 
litigation.  This is an improper conception of the role of the federal judge; 
however, it would seem to be the self-perception that at least some federal 
district judges have taken from the attempt of many courageous district 
judges struggling to apply Brown’s mandate in very difficult circumstances. 
A related problem raised by the enforcement issues created by Brown was 
the growth of institutional reform litigation and structural injunction as an 
enforcement tool.236  In fashioning desegregation orders, district judges 
turned to the continuing injunction by which a school district was placed 
under judicial control until it satisfied the district judge that it had fully 
complied with the desegregation decree.237  The continuing injunction was 
not created in the context of school desegregation.  Rather, it was borrowed 
from the antitrust field.238  However, in law, arguments made by analogy 
 
235. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 14 (1981) (“None acted with greater impact—
on the region and ultimately on the nation—than the heroic band of [lower court] judges . . . .”). 
236. See generally Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 51 (1982) (“[A]s in the school cases, the precise level of remedial action and the components 
of a remedial prescription will reflect a range of factors—including, I believe, availability of resources—
that are unrelated to liability.”). 
237. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (“During this period of transition, the 
courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases.”). 
238. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 137 (1948) (affirming the 
district court ruling of an injunction against Paramount Pictures). 
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often prevail, that is, one thing frequently leads to another.  Accordingly, the 
continuing injunction came from litigation for institutional reform but 
placed in the context of desegregation.  If federal district courts could 
employ the continuing injunction as a means of desegregating the schools, 
why not also employ it to right constitutional wrongs in prisons,239 and 
state hospitals240 and other state-run institutions?  Granted, federal judges 
generally did not embark on these crusades uninvited.  Rather, they were 
urged to employ the tools developed in the desegregation area to other state 
institutions by civil rights attorneys.  The judges often complied.  Over time, 
several district judges became deeply involved in the judicial reform of 
various state institutions generally based on the predicate of unremedied 
constitutional violations.  The growth of institutional reform litigation also 
supported the assumption that it was the job of federal judges to right legal 
and constitutional wrongs wherever they appeared, even if that led to 
judicial control over an entire state institution and bureaucracy. 
Brown v. Board of Education was one of the Supreme Court’s greatest 
decisions.  The case needed to be decided in favor of the plaintiffs.  
However, it did produce some unhealthy consequences for the judicial 
system, some of which could have been avoided and others which probably 
could not. 
In the wake of Brown, in 1957, the Court decided several cases making it 
difficult, if not impossible, to successfully prosecute leaders of the 
American Communist Party or to investigate membership in the party.  The 
simultaneous release of four of these decisions was characterized as “Red 
Monday.”241  Six years earlier, the Court upheld the convictions of the 
leaders of the American Communist Party under the Smith Act in Dennis v. 
 
239. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1391 (S.D. Tex. 1980) aff'd in part and vacated in part, 
679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1982) (asserting judicial control over the Texas 
prison system). 
240. See Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding structural injunction 
against state institution for civilly committed sexually violent predators); see also Wyatt v. Aderholt, 
503 F.2d 1305, 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding structural injunction against a state school designed to 
help the civilly committed mentally handicapped). 
241. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 215 (1957) (“It is only those investigations that 
are conducted by use of compulsory process that give rise to a need to protect the rights of individuals 
against illegal encroachment.”); see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266–67 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (concluding the decision was based on “the right to political privacy, as 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right of the State to self-protection”); see also Yates 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (using 
the First Amendment to provide constitutional protection to the members of the Party). 
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United States.242 The abrupt change of direction with respect to the 
investigation and prosecution of members of the American 
Communist Party led to a vigorous political reaction against the Court in 
Congress, the Bar, and the Academy.243  In view of this reaction, the Court 
backed off in subsequent cases.244 
Perhaps the most visible and criticized line of decisions from the Warren 
Court were the cases in which the Court attempted to reform the criminal 
process during the 1960s.  This was a major project of the Warren Court 
and, with modifications by subsequent courts, was largely successful.  The 
decisions are too numerous to consider individually.  However, the 
highlights include Gideon v. Wainwright,245 which extended appointed 
counsel to all indigent felony defendants, Mapp v. Ohio,246 which required 
that illegally seized evidence be excluded in state criminal trials, Miranda v. 
Arizona,247 which established that the police officers must administer the 
infamous Miranda warnings before obtaining a confession that could be 
admissible in evidence, and United States v. Wade,248 which required the 
presence of an attorney for the accused must be present before the police 
could place the suspect in a lineup. 
These cases were controversial, especially Mapp and Miranda, which were 
portrayed as leading to the release of dangerous criminals, including 
murderers and rapists.  The public became familiar with these decisions 
through movies and television shows, where these cases were frequently 
portrayed in a bad light.249  Reporter Fred Graham wrote a book on the 
 
242. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951) (convicting members of the 
American Communist Party under the Smith Act to assist in stopping the spread of communism in the 
U.S.). 
243. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 253–58. 
244. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 274 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“When belief 
in an idea is punished as it is today, we sacrifice those ideals and substitute an alien, totalitarian 
philosophy in their stead.”); see also Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 
169 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I would reverse this case and leave the Communists free to advocate 
their beliefs in proletarian dictatorship publicly . . . .”). 
245. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).  Gideon was better received in part because 
of Henry Fonda’s sympathetic portrayal of Gideon in a made-for-TV movie, almost twenty years later 
and partially due to the fact that Florida, the state defendant in the case, was a rather extreme outlier, 
given that most states already provided indigent defendants with counsel in felony cases.  GIDEON’S 
TRUMPET (Hallmark Hall of Fame 1980). 
246. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
247. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
248. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
249. See, e.g., DIRTY HARRY (The Malpaso Company 1971) (providing a prominent example of 
negative results occurring from Supreme Court rulings). 
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political impact of the Court’s criminal procedure cases, appropriately titled 
“The Self-Inflicted Wound.”250  President Nixon based his successful 1968 
campaign on a law-and-order theme at least partially aimed at the Court’s 
criminal procedure decisions.  Despite the fact that this series of cases was 
publicly visible and politically controversial at the time, they are not 
responsible for the perception that the Court had abandoned its role of 
applying the law to decide cases based on traditionally accepted methods of 
interpretation and analysis.   
First, every criminal procedure case started out with explicit textual 
provisions such as the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
search and seizures, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel.  
Interpreting these textually based rights is what the Court is expected to do.  
In that sense, the Court hardly wandered outside of its legitimate domain in 
adjudicating these cases.  Even so, the Court can readily start out with an 
explicit provision of constitutional text and then reason its way to an 
incorrect decision, as the Court arguably did in Miranda.  This is 
troublesome, but should not raise significant doubts as to the legitimacy of 
the Court as an institution as long as it is able to make plausible legal 
arguments in support of its decision.  It is understood that the type of 
cutting-edge cases that the Supreme Court tends to decide are capable of 
producing plausible opposing arguments, each based on accepted 
interpretive methodology.  That occurred in the Court’s significant 
constitutional criminal procedure cases during the 1960s.  The fact that the 
Court may have been agenda driven and that it may have misinterpreted the 
constitutional provisions in issue should not raise questions as to its 
legitimacy especially since these decisions, at least as qualified by subsequent 
precedent, have become embedded in the law and have been largely 
accepted by the public. 
The Warren Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, especially its 
school prayer cases,251 also led to significant backlash against the Court.  
Apparently, the extent and vigor of the public reaction against these 
 
250. See generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970) (noting changes in 
criminal procedure that the Supreme Court was directly responsible for). 
251. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (asserting the use of a daily morning prayer as 
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 205 (1963) (examining state action requiring the reading of Bible verses in school as 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment and Establishment Clause). 
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decisions surprised the Court.252  These cases are frequently considered the 
most publicly defied decisions of the recent Court, especially in certain areas 
of the nation.253  Because the Court ignored and disregarded lengthy public 
traditions, many viewed these decisions as illegitimate because they were 
aggressively hostile to fundamental public values.  As with the criminal 
procedure cases, the Establishment Clause cases were at least defensible as 
plausible interpretations of text based on standard interpretive technique.  
Perhaps the reason why these decisions are not as harmful to the Court’s 
credibility on a long-term basis as they once appeared, is that overtime, the 
Court recognized it had pushed its secular vision too far and has since 
moderated its former approach in the Establishment Clause context.254  
The Establishment Clause cases may be evidence of the realistic political 
check that constrains the Court.  When the Court renders unpopular and 
arguably legally incorrect decisions, over time the Court is subject to 
correction through narrowing, if not outright rejection, pursuant to the 
judicial appointment process and the emergence of subsequent cases testing 
previous assumptions. 
Some would trace the decline of the Court’s standing with at least a 
segment of the voting public to the decision of Roe v. Wade 255 in 1973 or 
perhaps its progenitor, Griswold v. Connecticut 256 in 1965.  Roe is certainly the 
flash point because of the nature of the issue itself, due in large part to the 
emotional passions evoked on both sides of the abortion debate.  However, 
the pattern of decision-making leading to Roe is best traced to a pair of earlier 
 
252. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 265. 
253. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 92 
(1970) (“There has been very little in the way of general assent to . . . [the school prayer] decisions, not 
only in a single recalcitrant region, but throughout the country . . . .”). 
254. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1983) (upholding state tax credit for educational 
expenses including expenses at a religious school); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208–09 
(1997) (validating a program sending public school teachers into parochial schools to teach remedial 
subjects and overruling a prior decision in the same case invalidating the program); Mitchell v. Helms, 
530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (justifying a program of lending media supplies to private schools, including 
religious schools); Zelmon v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (approving a school 
voucher program although an overwhelming percentage of the vouchers were used at religious 
schools). 
255. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (Stewart, J., concurring) (1973) (holding 
abortion was within the scope of the liberties guaranteed by the Due Process Clause).  
256. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding marriage and 
the right to use contraceptives lie “within the zones of privacy created . . . by constitutional 
guarantees”). 
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decisions, Baker v. Carr 257 and Reynolds v. Sims,258 involving the issue of the 
judicial role in curing gross malapportionment in state legislative bodies.259  
The decision in Baker v. Carr, endorsing a judicial role in curing political 
reapportionment, and the subsequent adoption of the one-person one-vote 
solution to the issue two years later in Reynolds v. Sims were popular decisions 
with the public to the extent the public was aware of them.260  These 
opinions were much less popular with the political elites who believed that 
the Court had improperly intruded into their own domain.261  Still, the cases 
are considered foundational pillars of democracy and constitutional law 
despite the fact the decisions, especially Reynolds v. Sims, flew in the face of 
text, original understanding, precedent, and constitutional structure.  As the 
critics, including Justice Harlan dissenting in Reynolds v. Sims, recognized at 
the time, the methodology and potential consequences of the decisions were 
deeply flawed and had the potential of leading to more problems in the 
future.262 
 
257. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (concluding apportionment cases pose  
“a justiciable constitutional cause of action” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause). 
258. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964) (affirming the holding in Baker 
that apportionment cases pose a justiciable constitutional cause of action under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause). 
259. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 187–88 (noting that this cause of action originated from deprivation 
of voting rights by citizens in Tennessee); see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 536–37 (indicating the case arose 
from the act of the Alabama Legislature in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
260. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 133 
(1980) (citing a poll finding 60% public approval).  Id. at 151 (indicating only three percent of the 
population knew of the decisions); see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 255 (2002) (noting an absence of public awareness of the decisions); Murphy & Tanenhaus, 
supra note 15, at 996 (“[T]he issue of reapportionment was almost invisible to the national public in 
1964 and 1966 . . . .”). 
261. See generally POWE, JR., supra note 260, at 253–553 (discussing the passage of a bill by the 
United States House of Representatives stripping federal courts of the jurisdiction for reapportionment 
cases); see also COX, supra note 147, at 301 (highlighting thirty-two states called for a constitutional 
convention to reverse Reynolds, and the call fell two states short of the necessary supermajority). 
262. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 598 (Harlan., J., dissenting) (discussing repercussions of the 
Court’s decision in the case); COX, supra note 147, at 303 (discussing Solicitor General Archibald Cox, 
who argued the cases as an amicus on behalf of the United States, later admitted that “[t]he Court went 
extraordinarily far in breaking away from established practices, with little apparent support in 
conventional sources of law” but concluded the Court “was justified by identifying deeper shared 
values.”); see also RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES 236 (1970) (discussing the 
recognition that Reynolds “was the farthest-reaching . . . [exercise of judicial review] ‘since Marbury v. 
Madison’ . . . .”); see also BICKEL, supra note 253, at 172–77 (sharing Bickel’s—one of the leading 
constitutional law scholars of his time—criticism the Reynolds decision); see also MORTON J. HOROWITZ, 
THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 85 (1998) (discussing the opinion of the author, 
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On several occasions, Chief Justice Warren declared that these were the 
most significant decisions of his tenure263—with the exception of Brown v. 
Board of Education.  The reapportionment decisions are deeply embedded in 
constitutional jurisprudence.  Contrary to predictions by leading and 
respected scholars,264 the decisions were implemented without difficulty.  
The democratic majoritarian principles animating the decisions have 
become foundational constitutional concepts.  The Court’s one-person, 
one-vote principle strikes most of the public as eminently fair.  Indeed, the 
reapportionment decisions are characterized as the success story of the 
Warren Court.265 
In view of all of this, how could such well received decisions possibly 
have led to questions as to the Court’s legitimacy?  Don’t the 
reapportionment decisions represent the Court at its finest?  The answer is 
not because of the results of these decisions, which have largely stood the 
test of time and are deeply embedded in our constitutional system.  Rather, 
the answer is the decision-making process that delivered the results.  In first 
deciding to resolve the issue at all and then selecting a particular metric, the 
Court proceeded in a defiantly non-judicial manner.  The reapportionment 
cases are among the most blatant examples of “the ends justify the means” 
methodology in the annals of the United States Reports. 
Baker v. Carr was a great case.266  Like many great cases, Baker was argued 
to the Court twice.  The question was whether a challenge to the 
malapportionment of Tennessee legislative districts could be heard by a 
federal court or whether it should be dismissed as a non-justiciable political 
question.  Fifteen years earlier in Colegrove v. Green,267 the Court dismissed a 
 
Professor Martin Horowitz, who enthusiastically approves of the decision, conceded that it could only 
be justified on “a living Constitution” theory). 
263. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHAN LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 184 (1983) 
(discussing declarations made by former Chief Justice Warren regarding the importance of the 
reapportionment decisions during an interview on June 25, 1969); see also EARL WARREN, THE 
MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 306 (1977) (“It seemed to me that accolade . . . [of] the 
most important case of my tenure on the Court . . . should go to the case of Baker v. Carr . . . .”). 
264. See BICKEL, supra note 253, at 173 (predicting that the reapportionment decisions were 
“head[ed] toward obsolescence, and . . . abandonment.”); HERBERT WECHSLER, THE 
NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 25 (1968). 
265. See ROBERT B. MCKAY, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 
223, 229 (1968) (opining the success story of the Court’s reapportionment decisions was due to lack 
of opposition from the public). 
266. See generally BLOOM, JR., supra note 179, at 235–52 (2014) (noting the weight 
Chief Justice Warren gave to Baker v. Carr in contrast to Brown v. Board of Education). 
267. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), abrogated by Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 
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constitutional challenge to the Illinois Legislature based on the Guarantee 
Clause of Article IV.268  There was no majority opinion in Colegrove, 
however, the dominant plurality opinion written by Justice Frankfurter 
argued for dismissal under the political question doctrine due to lack of 
judicially manageable standards.269  Justice Frankfurter famously warned 
that the Court should not enter the “political thicket.”270 
In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan rejected the political question argument 
(the central issue in the case) acknowledging that there were no judicially 
manageable standards under the Guarantee Clause, the basis of the Colegrove 
challenge.  However there were such standards under the 
Equal Protection Clause, the basis of the claim in Baker.271  
Justice Frankfurter wrote a lengthy, impassioned dissent arguing that 
reapportionment challenges should be dismissed under the political 
question doctrine, not due to the particular legal theory raised but rather due 
to the nature of the underlying issue.272  He asserted that this “destructively 
novel judicial power . . . may well impair the Court’s position as the ultimate 
organ of the ‘[S]upreme Law of the Land’ . . . .”273  Justice Frankfurter 
argued that the Constitution simply did not endorse a particular theory of 
representation and hence apportionment, and consequently the Court, 
would need to adopt its own theory independent of anything in the 
Constitution in order to decide the case.274  Justice Frankfurter argued that 
 
(2016). 
268. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), abrogated by Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. 
Ct. 1120 (2016) (holding a violation of the Guarantee Clause falls outside of the scope of judicial action 
and therefore cannot be handled by a court). 
269. See generally id. at 552–55 (highlighting the danger of the judiciary being involved in the 
political aspects of the government). 
270. See id. at 556 (warning of the dangers of the judiciary entering into politics and “cutting” 
into legislative territory). 
271. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226–27 (1962) (noting the principal question is not one 
that is relegated to a political branch and recognizing the Court’s competency to handle questions 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
272. See id. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is the nature of the controversies arising under 
it, nothing else, which has made it judicially unenforceable . . . .  [W]here judicial competence is 
wanting, it cannot be created by invoking one clause of the Constitution rather than another.”). 
273. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
274. See id. at 300 (“What is actually asked of the Court in this case is to choose among 
competing bases of representation . . . among competing theories of political philosophy—in order to 
establish an appropriate frame of government . . . .”).  See generally id. at 302–23 (detailing that 
reapportionment based on population equality was not the accepted basis of legislative apportionment 
in England, the colonies, the early republic, the states as of the time of ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or in contemporary America). 
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judicial intervention in legislative apportionment would threaten public 
confidence in the Court’s “moral sanction” on which its legitimacy 
depended.275  Justice Harlan’s dissent reached the same result by a 
somewhat different route, arguing that given that the Constitution did not 
endorse any particular theory of legislative representation, no right of the 
plaintiffs had been violated and thus the case should have been dismissed 
for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.276 
Justice Harlan closed his opinion by noting that the decision would please 
those who see the Court “primarily as the last refuge for the correction of 
all inequality or injustice, no matter what its nature or source . . . .”277 
Justice Brennan for the majority and Justices Frankfurter and Harlan 
dissenting wrote lengthy and scholarly opinions defending their positions.  
None of the three appeared to operate outside of the accepted legal 
analytical framework.  Yet, Baker v. Carr arguably represented one of the 
great turning points in constitutional analysis.  Justice Frankfurter, in his last 
opinion prior to retiring due to a stroke, well understood that by agreeing 
that reapportionment challenges were justiciable, the Court was necessarily 
engaging in an unwarranted judicial restructuring of the American political 
process. 
As Justice Frankfurter feared, the Court would need to select a 
benchmark among many alternatives and declare that benchmark the 
constitutionally requisite standard.  The Court did just that in Reynolds v. Sims, 
adopting “one person one vote” as the standard with which both houses of 
bicameral legislative bodies must forthwith comply.  Chief Justice Warren 
attempted to dress the opinion in equal protection garb but failed to 
persuade.  The crucial question as a matter of equal protection analysis is 
whether similarly situated persons are being treated differently.  If so, there 
will be a presumptive equal protection violation.  However, the decisive 
issue in any equal protection case will be whether persons on each side of 
the legislative classification in issue are similarly situated.  All persons are 
 
275. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  But see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Judicial 
Legitimacy Seriously, 93 CHI. KENT L. REV. 505, 522 (2018) (arguing that Frankfurter was wrong as to 
the impact of the reapportionment decisions on public perceptions of the Court and hence its 
legitimacy, despite the fact that his constitutional arguments were more solidly grounded than those of 
the majority). 
276. See id. at 331, 333 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing the case should have dismissed for failure 
to state a claim as the Court no longer “us[ed] the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws 
[simply] because they may be unwise . . . .”).   
277. Id. at 339. 
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similarly situated to other persons in some respects and yet differently 
situated in others.  From an equal protection standpoint, the question in a 
reapportionment case is whether geography matters.  Are voters in different 
geographic regions of the state differently situated—in which case, the state 
may accord greater political power to voters in more thinly populated 
regions?  Or are they similarly situated—in which case, according more 
political power to voters in thinly populated areas would violate equal 
protection?  Chief Justice Warren opted for the latter, pronouncing that “all 
voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of where 
they live.”278  This was the very crux of the case, and to use the language of 
logic, Warren simply assumed his conclusion.  The crucial question raised 
by Reynolds was how the Court knew the Constitution requires voters in 
different geographic areas of the state be similarly situated.  Warren had no 
answer to this question and did not even seem to realize that it was in fact 
the central issue in the case.  Warren’s former law clerk and sympathetic 
biographer, G. Edward White, declared that in Reynolds, “[Warren] had 
substituted homilies . . . for doctrinal analysis.”279  
Justice Harlan wrote a vigorous dissent arguing that the Court’s selection 
of one-person one-vote was clearly inconsistent with the text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (leaving control of the state electoral process to the 
states), constitutional history and tradition, as well as precedent.280  Like 
Justice Frankfurter in Baker, Justice Harlan argued that the majority was 
simply choosing one of many alternative approaches to representative 
apportionment and then embedding it in the Constitution as if it was actually 
there.  Justice Harlan concluded his opinion with the following diagnosis: 
[T]hese decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the Constitution 
and the constitutional function of this Court.  This view, in a nutshell, is that 
every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional 
‘principle,’ and that this Court should ‘take the lead’ in promoting reform 
when other branches of government fail to act.  The Constitution is not a 
panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court, 
ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform 
movements . . . .  [The] Court, limited in function . . . does not serve its high 
purpose when it exceeds its authority, even to satisfy justified impatience with 
 
278. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). 
279. G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 239 (1982). 
280. See generally Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589–614 (Harlan J., dissenting) (arguing the majority 
opinion’s use of one-person one-vote is wholly inconsistent with history, tradition, and precedent). 
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the slow workings of the political process.  For when, in the name of 
constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something to the Constitution 
that was deliberately excluded from it, the Court in reality substitutes its view 
of what should be so for the amending process.281 
“In a nutshell”—as Justice Harlan would say—he captured what was so 
fundamentally wrong with Reynolds v. Sims and the jurisprudence it 
encouraged.  Indeed, Solicitor General Cox as amicus arguing for the 
challengers to malapportionment refused to argue that one-person one-vote 
was the standard embodied in the Constitution, instead argued that the gross 
malapportionment presented by the cases was unreasonable and 
arbitrary.282 
Why beat up on Reynolds over fifty years after it was decided?  After all, as 
noted above, it has incontrovertibly carried the day, at least in terms of its 
result.  To a large extent because of Reynolds, majoritarian democracy as 
expressed through one-person one-vote has become a fundamental 
constitutional principle, though that was hardly the case either at the time 
of the founding, during the reconstruction era, or immediately prior to the 
decision in Reynolds.  The real problem with Reynolds, as Justice Harlan 
recognized, was that it was a major step toward giving rise to an erroneous 
and dangerous conception of the Court’s appropriate role in the 
constitutional system.  It was especially dangerous because the Court 
succeeded in transforming the American political system down to its roots 
with very little resistance.  The ease with which the Court was able to effect 
such a major change in the teeth of so much law to the contrary must have 
emboldened the Court to push even further.  It also must have convinced a 
segment of the public that it was completely appropriate for the Court to 
use “constitutional interpretation” to address and hopefully resolve all sorts 
of troubling political issues. 
The reapportionment decisions were especially damaging because they 
created the mindset in many Justices, often a majority, that the appropriate 
role of the Court was to resolve troubling and controversial political issues.  
All this to ensure fairness and justice when there was little if any supporting 
law or even when the existing law was very much to the contrary.  In other 
words, the reapportionment cases taught at least some of the Justices that it 
 
281. Id. at 624–25 (emphasis added). 
282. See COX, supra note 147, at 298 (describing the contents of the amicus curiae as focusing 
on an arbitrary and unreasonable departure in violation of the Equal Protection Act as opposed to 
support for one-person one-vote). 
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was their job to simply “do the right thing” as long as they could get away 
with it, and they seemed to be able to get away with a lot.283  These decisions 
were equally damaging because they convinced a significant segment of the 
public, especially through those including law professors and media 
commentators whom the public relied on to explain the decisions, to assume 
it is the proper role of the Court to resolve controversial political issues in a 
manner that promoted justice and fairness regardless of the presence or 
absence of legal support.284  As Earl Maltz noted, “[t]he experience of the 
Warren Court . . . conditioned the public to view the Court as a kind of 
ultimate substantive authority on substantive moral questions.”285  As such, 
the judicial and public mind set created by the reapportionment decisions 
created the legal environment that made Roe v. Wade possible. 
Only a year after Reynolds, the Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut 286 
beginning the inevitable march to Roe v. Wade.287  In Griswold, the Court 
invalidated what Justice Stewart’s dissent characterized as “an uncommonly 
silly law”288 of Connecticut which made it a crime for married people to 
use contraceptives.  The specific result of the case was not jarring.  However, 
the rationale was quite troublesome.  As discussed above, during the first 
third of the twentieth century, the Court had invalidated much state 
economic and social welfare legislation under the rubric of a substantive due 
process liberty right to contract.  The theory was totally discredited and 
rejected by the Court in the mid-1930s.  There was every reason to believe 
that substantive due process, under which the Court seemed to treat certain 
aspects of liberty as far more important than others, had been altogether 
discarded as a legitimate constitutional doctrine.  Justice Douglas, who 
wrote the majority opinion in Griswold, went out of his way to avoid any 
reliance on substantive due process, which he had long opposed, by basing 
 
283. BORK, supra note 83, at 77 (“The Court can do what it wishes, and there is almost no way 
to stop it, provided its result has a significant political constituency.”). 
284. See generally HOROWITZ, supra note 262 (noting the Court’s decisions are justifiable as long 
as they further democracy); ELY, supra note 210, at 12–15 (discussing that the Court’s decisions are 
justifiable as long as they further democracy); STRAUSS, supra note 129, at 1–2 (discussing the 
importance of Justices and judicial rulings in adapting the Constitution to create the common law, “the 
living Constitution”). 
285. Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution: A Comment on Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 25 (1992). 
286. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that marriage and the 
right to use contraceptives lie within the zones of privacy created by constitutional guarantees). 
287. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding abortion was within the scope of 
the liberties guaranteed by the Due Process Clause). 
288. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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the opinion on a right to privacy derived from the penumbras and 
emanations of various explicit provisions of the Bill of Rights.289  
Justice Douglas’s sleight of hand did not fool Justice Black, and in his 
dissenting opinion, he charged that the opinion indeed represented a return 
to the discredited Lochner era of substantive due process.290 
Unfortunately, less than a year after decrying the emerging use of 
constitutional interpretation to advance a political agenda in his Reynolds 
dissent, Justice Harlan readopted his prior support for a substantive due 
process liberty-based approach.291  Justice Harlan erroneously believed that 
the due process theory could be adequately constrained by careful 
consideration of the teachings of tradition and history.292  Griswold is 
stunning proof that a potentially dangerous legal theory cannot be limited 
by assurances of counsel or by explicit limitations adopted by the Court in 
its opinion.  During oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff assured the 
Court that a decision in their favor would have no application to laws 
prohibiting abortion.293  Almost every Justice who wrote either a majority 
or concurring opinion in the case limited its scope to laws affecting married 
couples.294  Most of the Justices declared it would have no impact on laws 
criminalizing homosexual conduct.295  In subsequent cases, all of these 
limitations were discarded. 
 
289. See id. at 481–86 (analyzing many of the amendments of the Bill of Rights to determine the 
penumbras emanating from those rights). 
290. See id. at 514–15 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that other Justices did not blame Lochner, 
despite the reasoning in the case being similar). 
291. In the previous case of Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), in which the Court dismissed a 
challenge to the very same Connecticut statute invalidated in Griswold, Justice Harlan had written a 
dissent arguing that the statute should be invalidated under substantive due process liberty.  Rather 
than restate his prior arguments in Griswold, Justice Harlan simply incorporated by reference his Poe 
dissent into his Griswold concurrence.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“For 
reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman . . . I believe that it does.”). 
292. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
293. Oral Argument at 1:04:11, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1964/496 [https://perma.cc/K876-V8KK] (Justice Black: “Would your 
argument concerning these things you’ve been talking about relating to privacy, invalidate all laws that 
punish people for bringing about abortions?”  Thomas Emerson: “No, I think it would not cover thee 
abortion laws or the sterilization laws, Your Honor.”).  
294. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (“[T]his law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of 
husband and wife[.]”).  Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[T]he right of privacy in the marital 
relation is fundamental and basic[.]”).  Id. at 502–03 (White, J., concurring) (“Surely the right invoked 
in this case is the right to be free of regulation of the intimacies of marriage relationship[.]”). 
295. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (suggesting “[a]dultery, homosexuality and the like are 
sexual intimacies which the state forbids” and as such are not implicated by the right to privacy) 
(quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 553) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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The specific result in Griswold was hardly controversial since the Court 
invalidated a law that had never been enforced against married couples and 
was clearly far out of step with contemporary mores.  The harm was serious, 
however, in that the Court had unleashed a doctrine that most considered 
long dead and buried, which would allow the Court under the rubric of 
privacy to invalidate laws that it disapproved of regardless of how long they 
had existed or how widely they were supported.  The rediscovery of 
substantive due process leads directly to Roe v. Wade and later to the Obergefell 
v. Hodges 296 decision.  
The cumulative impact of the Warren Court precedents in a wide variety 
of areas.  Especially, school prayer and the rights of criminal defendants 
created a widespread degree of public discontent with the Court.  Richard 
Nixon capitalized on public hostility to the Warren Court by making the 
Court an issue in the 1968 presidential campaign.297  The crime rate in the 
sixties increased, probably due to demographical reasons unconnected to 
the Court’s criminal procedure decisions.  Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with 
the Court resonated with a sufficient number of voters that Nixon 
targeted.298  Public backlash against the Warren Court was one of many 
issues that led to Nixon’s election.299  Having campaigned against the 
Court, Nixon had the unusual political fortune of four Supreme Court 
vacancies to be filled during his first presidential term, including the 
Chief Justice position following the retirement of Earl Warren.300  With 
 
296. Obergefell v. Hodges, 574 U.S. 1118 (2015). 
297. See Chris Hickman, Courting the Right: Richard Nixon’s 1968 Campaign Against the Warren Court, 
36 J. SUPREME COURT HISTORY 287, 291 (2012) (describing the evolution of candidate Nixon’s attack 
on the Warren Court during the 1968 campaign and the encouragement of that strategy by Judge, later 
Chief Justice, Warren Burger); LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME LAW AND POLITICS 211 (1983); see also 
Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 385–86 (evidencing Barry Goldwater had run against the Court in the 
1964 presidential election but lost decisively to Lyndon Johnson). 
298. See Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the 
Supreme Court, 80 AM. POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 1209, 1216–17, 1223 (1986) (noting an increase in 
media coverage of crime tends to lead to a decline in support for the Court and concluding that an 
increase in the public perception of judicial activism also resulted in a decline in public support for the 
Court). 
299. See BICKEL, supra note 253, at 93 (“[T]he election of 1968 may have been something of a 
vote of repudiation of the criminal decisions[.]”). 
300. Warren had announced his resignation prior to the 1968 election, but due to political 
difficulties, the vacancy had not been filled when President Nixon was inaugurated in January 1969.  
Justice Fortas had also resigned prior to the Nixon inauguration but once again, political problems 
prevented the nomination and confirmation of a replacement by the lame duck President Johnson.  
Following the end of the 1971 Supreme Court term, Justices Black and Harlan both retired for health 
reasons.  That gave President Nixon two further vacancies on the Court to fill during his first term. 
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four appointments to the Court, Nixon effectively turned the Court away 
from the direction it had taken under Chief Justice Warren.  Nixon’s four 
appointments to the Court during his first term was yet another example of 
how the constitutionally based appointment power can respond to public 
dissatisfaction with the Court.  Especially in the contentious area of rights 
of the accused, an issue that Nixon had campaigned on, the Burger Court 
placed constraints on many of the more expansive Warren Court 
precedents.301  However, the reconstituted Court did not entirely change 
direction, but in some areas, engaged in even more aggressive action than 
its predecessor.302  
F. The Burger Court and Roe v. Wade 
Early on the Burger Court in Furman v. Georgia 303 (with all four Nixon 
appointees dissenting) invalidated the death penalty as it then stood in all 
jurisdictions.  Justice Marshall asserted that the death penalty was out of step 
with modern sensibilities and that few if any states would reenact it.304  He 
could not have been more wrong.  Within a year of the decision, nearly half 
the states had reenacted the death penalty.305  This is a stunning example 
of how at least one justice, if not a majority of the Court, was badly out of 
step with public opinion and sensibilities.  It is also an excellent example of 
an adverse political response to an unpopular decision.  In one particular 
area, the right to privacy, the Court ventured far beyond anything that that 
the Warren Court had done to the severe detriment of its reputation.  In 
 
301. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (noting the exclusionary rule does not 
apply where the police relied in good faith on a search warrant subsequently ruled invalid); see also 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (permitting warrantless full body search pursuant 
to a custodial arrest); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) (establishing there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to number on checks provided to bank); Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (declaring statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona can be 
admitted for impeachment of a witness); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (holding a 
person invited to the police station and who was told he was suspected in a burglary was not in custody 
and thus was not entitled to Miranda warnings); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980) (ruling 
conversation between officers in a squad car with arrested subject did not constitute interrogation 
invoking Miranda warnings); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972) (limiting the right to presence 
of counsel to post-indictment lineups); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973) (ruling that right 
to counsel does not apply to photographic identification).  
302. See generally, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN’T vii 
(Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (“[W]hat has happened to those controversial Warren Court Doctrines?  They 
are more securely rooted now than they were in 1969 . . . .”). 
303. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 278 (1972). 
304. Id. at 369. 
305. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 287. 
67
Bloom: “Lawyers’ Work”: Does the Court Have a Legitimacy Crisis?
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021
  
352 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:285 
Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, the Warren Court first recognized a 
constitutional right of privacy to invalidate an archaic Connecticut law 
prohibiting married couples from using contraceptives.306  The Burger 
Court employed the right of privacy to challenge laws of far greater 
contemporary significance.  In Eisenstadt v. Baird 307 decided in 1972, the 
Court uncoupled the right to privacy from the marital relationship and 
extended it to the individual.308  In Eisenstadt, employing equal protection 
analysis, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law prohibiting the 
distribution of a contraceptive device to an unmarried person.309  Eisenstadt 
paved the way to Roe v. Wade 310 which was already on the Court’s docket. 
After two separate oral arguments, neither of which was particularly 
competent, the Court issued its opinion in Roe v. Wade, surely the most 
divisive and controversial decision of the Court since Dred Scott.  Roe, along 
with the companion case of Doe v. Bolton,311 effectively invalidated the 
abortion laws of almost all states.  Unlike Griswold, in which Justice Douglas 
had struggled mightily to avoid resting the decision on the presumptively 
discredited doctrine of substantive due process, Justice Blackmun in Roe 
embraced substantive due process liberty as the constitutional source of the 
right to privacy.312  Were it not for Roe v. Wade, there might be no present 
firestorm surrounding the Court, or at least it would be far more muted.  Roe 
created a never-ending controversy in at least three respects. 
First, by tackling the abortion issue at all, the Court entered an endless 
whirlpool of controversy from which there was no escape.  Too much was 
at stake—life or no life.  There was no room for compromise although the 
Court seemed to think it could find one.  For many persons on both sides 
of the debate, this is an issue.  For some, this is the issue that evokes extreme 
passion and a desire to fight to the bitter end.313  As William Eskridge has 
observed, “Roe was a threat to our democracy because it raised the stakes of 
 
306. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (“[Marriage] deal[s] with a right of 
privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system.”). 
307. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
308. Id. at 453. 
309. Id. (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into a matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”) (emphasis in original). 
310. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
311. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
312. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
313. Id. at 116 (acknowledging the emotion laden nature of the abortion question).  However, 
it is doubtful that Justice Blackmun understood the depth of emotion that the decision would provoke. 
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an issue where primordial loyalties ran deep.”314 He continued by saying: 
“Pro-life Americans behaved as though they had been disowned by this 
country.  And to a certain extent they had been.”315 
Second, the Court’s substantive due process theory revealed that the 
Court had no solid basis in law for its decision and that it was simply relying 
on nothing more than its own conception of sound public policy.316  As 
John Hart Ely wrote in his classic critique of the case, the opinion in Roe 
was “not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to 
try to be.”317 
Third, the Court attempted to resolve a question that even it seemed to 
recognize was incapable of judicial resolution—at least on a principled 
constitutional basis—when a fetus becomes a human being deserving legal 
if not constitutional protection.  Justice Blackmun seemed to recognize that 
this question was beyond legal competence but then purported to answer it 
by fiat, as he must, once the Court decided to address the abortion issue at 
all.  Initially, he wrote: 
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those 
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are 
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the 
development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the 
answer.318 
Surely, Justice Blackmun meant the Court could not resolve the issue of 
when a fetus becomes a constitutional person since there can be no question 
that a fetus is a form of life from conception on.  However, in this quotation, 
Justice Blackmun gave away his case, as lawyers would say, by admitting that 
the judiciary cannot resolve the central issue.  Then Texas should win since 
it had resolved the issue.  Nonetheless, Blackmun was not finished.  After 
briefly discussing the divergence of views on the question of when a fetus 
becomes a person, Blackmun declared “we do not agree that, by adopting 
one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman 
 
314. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering 
the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE. L.J. 1279, 1312 (2005). 
315. Id. 
316. See BORK, supra note 83, at 43 (“[A] judge who insists on giving the due process clause 
such content must make it up.”). 
317. Ely, supra note 83, at 947. 
318. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
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that are at stake.”319  However, he recognized that the state had a legitimate 
and important interest in protecting “potentiality of human life.”320  
Blackmun chose the line of viability (the point at which the fetus can survive 
outside of the womb) as the point at which the state’s interest in the 
protection of potential human life could override the woman’s right to an 
abortion (at least as long as giving birth did not endanger the woman’s life 
or health).321  After declaring the judiciary was unable to draw the line, 
Justice Blackmun proceeded to draw the line by substituting potential life 
for life.  No one was fooled by this clumsy maneuver.  Justice Blackmun 
had admitted that the abortion controversy could not be resolved on a 
principled basis, much less on a principled basis grounded in constitutional 
law, and then proceeded to resolve it anyway.  Quite transparently, it was 
simply not the Court’s proper role to resolve troubling social, cultural, or 
political controversies through naked interest balancing devoid of any pre-
existing legal or constitutional support.322 
Justice Rehnquist, in a short dissent, compared the Court’s decision, 
based as it was on substantive due process, to the infamous decision in 
Lochner v. New York.323  Justice White, in a dissenting opinion, characterized 
the Court’s opinion as “an exercise of raw judicial power” with “scarcely any 
reason or authority for its action . . . .”324  Following Professor Ely’s 
influential article savaging the opinion in Roe, other leading legal academics, 
including many who sympathized with the result in Roe, joined in criticism 
of the opinion.  Professor Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law School wrote 
that the decision “lacked significant support in conventional sources of 
law.”325  Gerald Gunther of the Stanford Law School, and author of the 
most widely used Constitutional Law casebook, declared, “I have not yet 
found a satisfying rationale to justify Roe v. Wade, the abortion ruling,  on the 
 
319. Id. at 162. 
320. Id. 
321. Id.; see also CLARKE FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
ROE V. WADE 127 (2013) (noting viability had not been mentioned in either the briefs, including the 
amicus briefs, or the oral arguments of Roe v. Wade). 
322. See Tom Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: 
The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 781 (1994) (illustrating, according 
to a telephone survey conducted in the San Francisco Bay area, a “majority of respondents indicated 
that the Supreme Court should have less authority to determine public policy over the abortion issue”). 
323. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174. 
324. Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting). 
325. COX, supra note 147, at 334. 
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basis of modes of constitutional interpretation I consider legitimate.”326  
Judge Bork wrote that Roe did not contain “one sentence that qualifies as 
legal argument.”327  Dean Guido Calabresi of the Yale Law School 
characterized Roe as “offensive” and a “disaster.”328  Professor Mark 
Tushnet, who had served as Justice Marshall’s law clerk when Roe was 
decided, characterized it as “a new art form,” “the totally unreasoned judicial 
opinion.”329  Professor Richard Fallon of the Harvard Law School stated 
that the Roe opinion was “puzzling, disappointing and almost embarrassing 
to read” and that it was “bereft of reasoned argument.”330  Judge Henry 
Friendly observed that the Court had failed “to articulate a defensible 
principle.”331  And there was so much more.332  The gist of the academic 
criticism made two points.  First, the opinion in Roe applied no discernable 
principles of law to defend its result.  Second, and relatedly, the Court went 
far beyond its proper role in attempting to resolve an issue that could only 
be resolved politically. 
The public reaction to Roe was perhaps slow in developing, given that 
former President Johnson died on the day the opinion was announced, 
capturing the immediate news cycle.  However, protests and counter 
protests soon materialized.  As Archibald Cox noted, “no decision other 
than Dred Scott has aroused as intense emotion.”333 
By taking one side on the abortion issue, the Court stepped into 
quicksand from which it might be impossible to extricate itself.  The Court’s 
only path to salvation would have been to avoid deciding the case on the 
 
326. Gerald Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots, and Prospects, 
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 817, 819 (1979). 
327. BORK, supra note 83, at 112. 
328. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW 
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 93–97 (1985). 
329. MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54 (1988). 
330. RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 62 (2001). 
331. Henry Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 
35 (1978). 
332. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE, ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE 
SEVENTIES 30 (1979) (“Political pragmatism, not constitutional principle, appeared to be the raison 
d’être of The Abortion Cases.”); see also CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN 
REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 81 (1991) (“Roe gave legal reasoning a bad name.”); 
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 28 (1975) (In Roe, the Court “simply asserted 
the result it reached.”); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS 
SERVE AMERICA 82 (2006) (arguing Roe “was a political and constitutional mistake” because of judicial 
“unilateralism”).  
333. COX, supra note 147, at 322. 
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merits entirely.  However, once the Court found a constitutional right to 
abortion, it created a constituency that would continue to demand 
protection of that right and would endorse the value oriented non-legalistic 
methodology that produced the decision.  Roe convinced a significant 
segment of the public that the Supreme Court’s proper role was to provide 
a trump card that could be played to invalidate any state or federal law that 
could not be repealed through the political process.334  As of Roe, at least 
for many, the Supreme Court had become Santa Claus and any vision of the 
Court or methodology that threatened the Court’s role as supreme political 
actor became threatening to “democracy.” 
Immediately after Roe, several states passed legislation testing the limits 
of the decision.  In the decade following Roe, the Court defended the 
decision vigorously, invalidating most laws that had the effect of 
undermining it with the exception of state and federal laws prohibiting 
public funding of abortion.335  Given the Court’s continued support for 
Roe, Supreme Court confirmation hearings did not for the most part turn on 
the potential for overruling Roe.  That changed near the end of the 1980s.  
Roe had been decided by a seven-to-two majority.  As new Justices were 
appointed, apparent support on the Court for Roe declined from six to three, 
then five to four, until finally the Webster case in 1989 when it appeared there 
might be a majority to overrule Roe.336 
The other event that crystalized the public controversy over the 
continued survival of Roe was the unsuccessful nomination of Judge Robert 
Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987.  As a law professor, Bork had been 
highly critical of Griswold v. Connecticut, the less controversial precursor of Roe 
 
334. FRIED, supra note 331, at 87 (“[A]bortion has distorted public attitudes and expectations 
about the Supreme Court.”). 
335. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71–75 (1976) (invalidating requirements 
of parental and spousal consent); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 
452 (1983) (invalidating requirement that post first trimester abortions be performed in a hospital), 
overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 
(1977) (upholding prohibition of public funding for medically unnecessary abortions where childbirth 
costs for indigents were paid by the state); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding a 
federal law prohibiting federal funding for some medically necessary abortions). 
336. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537–38 (1989) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (discussing how close the opinion was to overturning Roe).  Webster involved a Missouri law 
that was designed to present a direct challenge to Roe.  Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for a four-justice 
plurality was prepared to overrule Roe.  Justice O’Connor, the fifth vote, concluded that the statute 
could be upheld without reconsidering Roe.  Id. 
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v. Wade.337  The supporters of Roe recognized that Judge Bork would 
probably be the crucial fifth vote to overrule Roe.  Judge Bork’s explicit 
views on the illegitimacy of the right to privacy played a significant role in 
the defeat of his nomination.338  After the highly publicized Bork hearings, 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings—at least for nominees who might be 
inclined to vote to overrule or at least substantially narrow Roe—would 
never again be the same.  The year before the Bork hearings, Justice Antonin 
Scalia, who proved to be a vigorous opponent of Roe, had been confirmed 
by a unanimous vote of the Senate. 
One of the puzzling considerations surrounding the recent debate over 
whether Roe should or will be overruled is that it was, in fact, partially 
overruled over twenty-five years earlier in Planned Parenthood of Southern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.339  For years, the Department of Justice urged the 
Court to reconsider and overrule Roe.  Finally, in Casey, the Court agreed to 
consider and address that issue.  In order to save Roe from being completely 
overruled, the Joint Opinion of Justices Kennedy, Souter, and O’Connor, 
replaced the strict scrutiny standard of review—which would ordinarily 
apply in a case involving a fundamental right—with the undue burden test.  
In other words, a law regulating abortion would only be unconstitutional if 
it intended or had the effect of imposing an undue burden on the woman’s 
right to obtain an abortion.340  In Roe, the Court took on an issue which it 
could not adjudicate in a principled manner and in Casey, it rendered it even 
more subjective.  As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, what constituted 
an undue burden was very much in the eye of the beholder.341  Thus a judge 
sympathetic to the abortion right can find that virtually all regulation creates 
an undue burden.  A judge unsympathetic to the right will rarely find that 
good faith abortion regulation creates an undue burden.  Consequently, 
 
337. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J 1, 7–11 
(1971) (opining how the substantive due process doctrine used in Griswold has always been improper). 
338. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 511, 540–544 
(1989) (“There is no way to tell exactly how much Judge Bork's persistent attacks on Griswold 
contributed to his rejection by the Senate; however, it is fair to say that it was a significant factor.  
Griswold was a useful case for Judge Bork’s opponents because its general right to privacy . . . .  The 
opposition portrayed Judge Bork as a threat to privacy . . . .”). 
339. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
340. See id. at 874 (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability 
to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause.”). 
341. Id. at 986 (“[T]he standard is inherently manipulable and will prove hopelessly unworkable 
in practice.”). 
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Casey contained the seeds of the ultimate effective rejection of Roe by 
providing the Court with the tools to narrow and minimize Roe without 
explicitly overruling it.  At least for public relations purposes, the defenders 
of Roe proceed as if it still existed unaltered, but that has not been the case 
for over two decades.  By deciding Roe, the Court created large and active 
constituencies both favoring and opposing the continuing existence of the 
decision.  The Court has painted itself into a corner from which it cannot 
easily escape.  Whatever it does with respect to a constitutionally based 
abortion right will cause millions of Americans to rebel against the Court.  
That cannot be said of any other contemporary decision.  This is a very 
precarious position for the Court to have placed itself in. 
G. The Rehnquist Court 
Like the Burger Court before it, the Rehnquist Court was not as 
conservative in ideology as it has often been portrayed.342  Having 
rediscovered the substantive due process methodology, the Court made use 
of it in socially controversial areas, especially gay rights.  In Lawrence v. 
Texas,343 the Court employed substantive due process to invalidate a Texas 
criminal law which prohibited homosexual sodomy, even within the 
confines of the home.344  The result was not particularly controversial 
because a few states maintained such laws and those that did rarely enforced 
them.  Lawrence was troublesome in at least three respects, however.  First, 
there was a serious question whether the validity of such laws was any of 
the Court’s business, as would be the case whenever the Court relied on 
substantive due process to invalidate a law.  Second, Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, seemed to reject public morality as a legitimate 
police power interest by equating it with nothing more than prejudice.345  
For over a century, federal courts had characterized morality as one of the 
legitimate ends of the police power.346  Finally, Lawrence was seen as a 
 
342. See Bartels & Johnston, supra note 12, at 186 (reporting between 57% and 64% of the 
Rehnquist Court’s decisions are characterized as liberal). 
343. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  For an excellent discussion of the history of the 
case, see DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (1st ed. 
2012) (summarizing the specific details behind the Lawrence decision). 
344. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
345. Id. at 571. 
346. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879) (“[The police power] extends to all 
matters affecting the public health or the public morals.”); Chi., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. State of Illinois, 
200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (“We hold that the police power of a state embraces . . . regulations designed 
to promote the public health, public morals, or the public safety.”).  
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doctrinal step in the invalidation of laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.  The 
majority denied that this was where the decision would lead.347  
Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that that was exactly the intended result.348  
He proved to be correct. 
There are two Rehnquist Court decisions that critics of the conservative 
majority on the Court have assailed, neither of which have led to a legitimacy 
crisis.  The first is Bush v. Gore.349  The 2000 presidential race resolution 
turned on a recount of Florida’s votes, where George W. Bush held a slight 
lead.350  Democrat candidate Al Gore sought the aid of the Florida courts 
to alter the rules governing the recount.351  The Florida Supreme Court 
complied.352  Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States 
intervened at the behest of Bush by first halting the manual recount353 and 
then concluding that the lack of uniform standards rendered such a recount 
to violate equal protection of the laws.  Given the safe harbor deadline’s 
imminence, there simply was insufficient time to devise a standard and 
resume the recount.354  Consequently, given that Bush still held a slim lead, 
he won the Florida electoral vote and the presidency. 
The majority’s legal basis for its equal protection result was thin.  
However, the decision was best explained by Justice Stevens’s dissent, 
which contended that “[w]hat must underlie petitioners’ entire federal 
assault on the Florida election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence 
in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make the 
critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed.”355  Stevens was exactly 
correct.  Chief Justice Wells of the Florida Supreme Court, dissenting from 
the majority’s decision to change the vote count deadline, had charged that 
there was “no foundation in the law of Florida” for that decision.356  As 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer indicated after the fact, they had 
 
347. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting)). 
348. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
349. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
350. Id. at 100. 
351. Id. 
352. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, No. SC00-2346, No. SC00-2347, No. SC00-
2348, 2000 WL 1716480 (Fla. Nov. 17, 2000). 
353. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 1046, 1047 (2000). 
354. Id. at 122. 
355. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
356. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1263 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting), rev’d, 531 U.S. 
98 (2000). 
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concluded that the Florida Supreme Court could not be trusted to fairly and 
competently resolve a dispute involving the election of the next President 
of the United States.357 
Democrats, especially law professors, were furious and charged that by 
intervening and effectively deciding a presidential election, the Court had 
tarnished its image with the public irreparably.  Some portrayed Bush v. Gore 
as a fatal blow to the Court’s legitimacy as an institution.358  Law professors 
were as critical of the reasoning of Bush v. Gore as they had been of Roe v. 
Wade.359  However, these dire predictions were not realized.360  There were 
hard feelings for a short period, but these dissipated with time.   
The predicted blow to the Court’s legitimacy as an institution failed to 
materialize.361  The public was tired of the continued conflict over the 
election and accepted its resolution by the Court.  The Court’s opinion  
in Bush v. Gore could be criticized as light on legal principle and that  
the Court should have given Florida one final opportunity to complete  
the recount; however, while a 5–4 decision by a majority appointed  
by Republican presidents might appear politically partisan, the decision  
had little—if any—long-term impact on the Court’s institutional credibility 
with the general public.  Not only did the decision fail to erode public 
support for the Court,  public support for the Court reached a higher  
level in the year following the decision than recorded in the recent  
 
357. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 31–32 (2007) (noting 
Justice O’Connor remarks that the Florida Supreme Court was “off on a trip of its own”); see also id. 
at 176 (stating Justice Kennedy “would later explain that the outcome had to do with bringing a 
renegade court to heal”); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 165 (2007) (quoting how Justice Breyer “didn’t 
like what the Florida Supreme Court had done.  To him, the justices in Tallahassee looked like they 
were trying too hard to help Gore.”). 
358. See Yoo, supra note 12, at 775 (voicing claims by legal academics that the decision 
undermined the Court’s legitimacy). 
359. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1045, 1083–86 (2001) (critiquing the analysis of Bush v. Gore as political, not legal); James L. 
Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election 
of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRITISH J. OF POL. SCI. 535, 535–36 (2003) (“585 law 
professors placed an advertisement in the New York Times on 13 January 2001, condemning the 
Court’s decision as illegitimate.”). 
360. See Yoo, supra note 12, at 776–78 (explaining why the decision in Bush v. Gore did not 
threaten the Court’s legitimacy with the public).  
361. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 358 (asserting 61% of the public believed that the Court 
should have resolved the election dispute); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 177 (2007); Gibson & 
Caldeira, supra note 12, at 199; Gibson, Caldeira & Spence, supra note 358, at 546 (“Most Americans 
(62.4 percent) believe that the Court based its decision on the legal merits of the case, not on the 
[J]ustices’ desire to see Bush become president.”). 
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past.362  The election was a mess, so it needed to be resolved.  The Court’s 
intervention brought it to a quick conclusion, which is probably what the 
general public desired.  Unlike Roe, the decision resolved a once in a lifetime 
dispute unlikely to occur again.  Bush v. Gore well illustrates the strength of 
the diffuse support for the Court.  Given the onslaught of academic and 
media criticism of the decision, as Professor Fuentes-Rohwer asked: “If this 
case did not harm the Court’s legitimacy in any noticeable way, will any case 
ever will?”363 
A second hot-button case decided by the Roberts Court was District of 
Columbia v. Heller,364 where the Court comprehensively addressed the 
meaning of the Second Amendment.  The underlying issue, whether the 
Second Amendment recognized a constitutional right to possess firearms 
for self-defense, was politically controversial since such a right would render 
gun control efforts more difficult.365  However, the case was not 
controversial since its resolution was entirely dependent on lawyers’ work.  
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s majority with Justice Stevens dissenting contributed 
one of the finest examples of textual and originalist analysis.  While 
individuals may continue to disagree with Justices Scalia or Stevens, there is 
no room to argue that they or any other Justice was acting beyond the scope 
of appropriate judicial conduct.366  Rather, both were deciding a difficult 
constitutional case by applying tools that lawyers and judges had 
traditionally employed to decide such cases.  The public seemed to 
understand that even though it paid little attention to the details.  Despite 
severe political disagreement regarding gun control, there is no reason to 
believe that Heller undermined the legitimacy of the Court with the public. 
 
362. Gibson, supra note 42, at 520 (reporting, in 1995, 65% of the public believed the Court 
could be trusted, and, in 2001—the year after Bush v. Gore—public trust rose to 78%). 
363. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 10, at 511; see also Gibson, Caldeira & Spence, supra note 358, 
at 553 (“[E]ven an enormously controversial decision like Bush v. Gore has little if any influence on 
institutional loyalty.”). 
364. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).  
365. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Gun Control Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/20/washington/20cnd-scotus.html [https://perma.cc/ 
DE3V-SWBZ] (“[L]awyers on both sides of the case agreed today that a victory for the plaintiff in this 
case would amount to the opening chapter in an examination of the constitutionality of gun control 
rather than anything close to the final word.”). 
366. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Ruling 5–4, Endorse Personal Right to Own Gun, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 27, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/washington/27scotus.html [https://perma. 
cc/X66Q-9S62] (examining the strained arguments in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and 
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in that neither relied on already expounded legal principles but 
rather only their personal reading of the Second Amendment). 
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Yet another controversial case decided by the Rehnquist Court was Kelo v. 
City of New London.367  In a 5–4 decision, the Court held the city’s taking of 
private property for a private party included in a redevelopment project 
intended to benefit the economy would constitute “public use” under the 
Takings Clause.368  The decision was consistent with the precedent but 
arguably not with the text.  The case gave rise to a massive counter-reaction 
by the public, resulting in laws in most states prohibiting condemnation 
authority to transfer property from one private owner to another.369  This  
readily available political remedy for those dissatisfied with the decision is 
likely the reason the decision did not result in a loss of the Court’s legitimacy.  
Still, Kelo is a stunning example of significant political backlash against a 
Supreme Court decision in action. 
H. The Roberts Court 
Several decisions of the Roberts Court have also raised concerns with at 
least some segments of the public as to the Court’s legitimacy.  Citizens United 
v. FEC, which pitted First Amendment freedom of speech against campaign 
finance legislation, became a rallying cry for the Court’s opponents.370  Like 
gun control in Heller, this implicated a controversial partisan issue.  In 
Citizens United, the Court, by a 5–4 majority invalidated an Act of Congress 
prohibiting corporations or unions from purchasing with general funds 
campaign advertising to endorse a candidate on electronic media within 30 
days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election.371  The decision 
was politically controversial, resulting in a rebuke from President Obama 
during the State of the Union address.372  Considering that the Court relied 
on constitutionally based principles of freedom of speech, the case did not 
raise questions about the Court’s legitimacy other than with the ultra-
 
367. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
368. Id. at 479–480 (“[W]hen this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at 
the close of the 19th [C]entury, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use 
as ‘public purpose.’”). 
369. See 50 State Report Card, CASTLE COALITION, http://castlecoalition.org/50-state-report-
card [https://perma.cc/N5AV-FVFQ] (“In the two years since the U.S. Supreme Court’s now-
infamous decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 44 states have passed new laws aimed at curbing the 
abuse of eminent domain for private use.”).  
370. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010). 
371. Id. at 336–37 (“[A] statute which chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial 
invalidity has been demonstrated.”). 
372. TOOBIN, supra note 6, at 196–197. 
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partisan Democratic party elite who used opposition to Citizens United as a 
fundraising tool.373   
Critics attacked the ruling on the ground that it allowed corporate money 
to influence elections.374  This was a red herring.  Apart from the decision, 
wealthy individuals had the right to spend vast sums of money to hopefully 
influence elections.  Critics of Citizens United were motivated by its rejection 
of the theory that it was permissible for the government to level the playing 
field concerning political speech funding.375  The Citizens United Court 
made it clear that such a theory was completely inconsistent with the 
First Amendment.376  That, in a nutshell, is why Citizens United remains a 
thorn in the side of those who desire greater governmental regulation of 
electoral speech.  
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,377 the Court by a  
5–4 vote upheld the constitutionality of the mandate to purchase insurance 
as an aspect of the Affordable Care Act.378  Five Justices—including 
Chief Justice Roberts—held that Congress lacked authority to enact the 
mandate pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the primary basis for the 
legislation.379  This upset those who believed that Congress did have such 
power or that the scope of congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause was beyond the purview of judicial authority.  However, 
Chief Justice Roberts voted to uphold the mandate because Congress could 
have enacted it under the taxing power.380  That distressed those who 
believed that the mandate was beyond congressional authority and that 
 
373. Dave Levinthal, How ‘Citizens United’ is helping Hillary Clinton win the White House, CTR. FOR 
PUB. INTEGRITY [https://perma.cc/JJ5Q-CR7Z] (investigating several Democratic party leaders’, 
including then presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, stance on an election reform-centric platform 
following the Citizens United decision). 
374. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Money Is Speech: Why the Citizens United v. FEC Ruling Is Bad for 
Politics and the Market, DISSENT (Mar. 3, 2010) [https://perma.cc/7C4A-VYK9] (“If economic 
incumbents—those who were successful in the past—are able to use their current wealth to influence 
elections and indirectly buy laws that will assure them future wealth, the market will fail just as surely 
as democracy would fail if political incumbents were permitted to use their offices to control 
elections.”). 
375. Jonathan E. Skrabacz, Note, “Leveling the Playing Field”: Reconsidering Campaign Finance Reform 
in the Wake of Arizona Free Enterprise, 32 SAINT LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 487, 488 (“[C]ases [such as 
Citizens United] that have rejected the idea of leveling the playing field have been off the mark.”). 
376. Id. at 489 n.15. 
377. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
378. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575 (2012). 
379. Id. at 552, 646–47 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
380. Id. at 563. 
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Chief Justice Roberts had simply yielded to political and media pressure.  
One explanation for Chief Justice Roberts’s surprising decision to save the 
mandate is that he was attempting to preserve the Court’s institutional 
integrity by preventing it from becoming an issue in the 2012 presidential 
campaign.  If that was in fact Roberts’s goal, he clearly succeeded.  The 
Affordable Care Act’s constitutionality was an important issue for some, but 
there is no evidence Sebelius endangered the Court’s legitimacy with the 
public. 
True to Justice Scalia’s prediction in his Lawrence dissent, in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, the Court again relied primarily on substantive due process to 
invalidate state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and their refusal to 
recognize the legality of same-sex marriages performed in other states.381  
As with prior gay rights cases, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, 
which was bereft of traditional legal analysis.  Unlike Lawrence, Obergefell 
presented a much more deeply divisive cultural issue.382  At the time of the 
decision, same-sex marriage had been legislatively authorized in several 
states, although it was clear that it would be resisted in many others.  As 
with any substantive due process decision, the opponents of the result could 
ask on what basis the Court invalidated a longstanding law that had 
traditionally been deemed well within the states’ domain.  It seemed like a 
clear instance of the Court taking sides in an existing culture war as 
Justice Scalia had charged in an earlier gay rights case.383 
Like Roe, Obergefell raised serious questions concerning the Court’s 
legitimacy.  Instead of doing “lawyers’ work,” the Court appeared to be 
entering a political/cultural fray to deliver a result that was deeply desired 
by some but simply could not be readily achieved through the political 
process.  A successful appeal to the Court provided an argument ender.  
Prior to the decision, there was public debate.  After the decision, the issue 
was definitively settled, and the only debate remaining was whether it was 
proper for the Court to intervene.384  Although the recognition of same-
 
381. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675, 681 (2015). 
382. Justin McCarthy, Record-High 60% of Americans Support Same-Sex Marriage, GALLUP (May 19, 
2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/183272/record-high-americans-support-sex-marriage.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/GF6P-QTUG] (noting support of same-sex marriage is much less among 
Republicans than Democrats). 
383. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
384. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 686 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (“Whether same-sex marriage is a 
good idea should be of no concern to us.  Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the 
law is, not what it should be.”). 
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sex marriage, especially by judicial decree, was deeply troubling to a 
significant segment of the public, the decision did not in itself significantly 
threaten the Court’s legitimacy, partially because many states had been 
moving in the direction of the result anyway.385  Moreover, like Bush v. Gore, 
it may have been an issue that the public simply wanted to be resolved and 
removed from the political agenda.  Although the decision may not have 
eroded public support for the Court, it was almost certainly one that played 
a role in a large portion of the voting public in 2016 that a change in the 
Court’s analytical approach, as well as its results, was warranted. 
Donald Trump made the Supreme Court an issue in the 2016 presidential 
campaign by publishing a list of names from which he would choose future 
nominees to fill the vacancy created by the death of Justice Scalia, as well as 
to fill future vacancies should they occur.386  In February 2016, 
Justice Scalia had died unexpectedly.  Senate leader Mitch McConnell took 
an extreme risk in holding a Supreme Court seat open to be filled by the 
winner of the presidential election, given that it was widely assumed that 
Hillary Clinton would win the election and hence be in a position to fill the 
vacant seat on the Court.  President Obama nominated respected circuit 
Judge Merrick Garland; however, McConnell refused to hold a hearing on 
the nomination.   
This qualifies as what Professor Mark Tushnet characterizes as 
“constitutional hardball.”387  Hillary Clinton had every opportunity to 
campaign on filling the seat as vigorously as Donald Trump.  But the voters 
heard Donald Trump’s proclamation to nominate conservative judges, and 
while the Supreme Court was hardly the only issue that affected the election, 
it was certainly a significant issue.388  It appears for those who considered 
the Supreme Court a reason to vote, the nomination of a conservative 
justice, from a list provided to Trump by the Federalist Society, carried more 
influence in the voting booth than the prospective nomination of a 
 
 
385. See McCarthy, supra note 380 (reporting sixty percent of Americans being in outright 
support of same-sex marriages). 
386. HULSE, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
387. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 534–36 (2004) 
(describing “constitutional hardball” as practices which fall within the boundaries of existing 
constitutional doctrine but are in tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings). 
388. See Tessa Berenson, Donald Trump Offers Conservatives a Deal on Supreme Court, TIME (Mar. 21, 
2016), https://time.com/4266700/donald-trump-supreme-court-nominations [https://perma.cc/ 
YHV3-HGDV] (“Trump . . . is offering conservatives a pretty sweet [deal]: He’ll give up some of the 
independence that a president normally has on judicial nominations if they’ll stay on his side.”). 
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moderate, liberal, or progressive nominee by Hillary Clinton.389 
That strategy succeeded in attracting voters.390  There is a general 
agreement that Trump would not have won the election had he not taken 
the bold and controversial step of publishing the list.391  For at least a 
quarter of Trump’s voters, it was the primary reason they supported him.392  
When vacancies did occur, including the opportunity to fill the seat of 
Justice Scalia held open from the previous year, President Trump chose two 
nominees from the list as augmented, both of whom were confirmed and 
now sit on the Court.  Now, President Trump has named another nominee 
from an approved list who has likewise been confirmed.  The election of 
President Trump was the latest example of how the constitutional 
appointment process responds to a degree of public dissatisfaction with the 
Court and thereby tempering any question about the Court’s legitimacy. 
I. The Reconstituted Roberts Court 
So far, at least three cases have been the focus of controversy by the 
President Trump’s opponents.  The first was Trump v. Hawaii 393 decided in 
2018.  The Court upheld President Trump’s travel ban by a 5–4 majority 
with respect to entry from eight countries that the United States had 
concluded did not satisfy sufficient security-vetting processes.  Several 
district courts had enjoined the Executive Order.  The majority held that the 
Order fell within the authority delegated to the President by Congress.394  
The majority also rejected the claim that the Order was intended to 
discriminate against Muslims.395  Although President Trump’s opponents 
howled at the decision, there is no reason to believe the decision 
 
389. Citizens exercised their rights to vote for the person they believed would best uphold and 
implement their ideals and values.  See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 358, at 1102 (“[E]ach party has 
the political ‘right’ to entrench its vision of the Constitution in the judiciary if it wins a sufficient number 
of elections.  If others don’t like the constitutional vision that results, they have the equal right to go 
out and win some elections of their own.”); see also Baum & Devins, supra note 37, at 1522 (“The 
appointments and confirmation process is the most direct way that elected officials put their 
imprimatur on Court decision making.”). 
390. See CHARLES HURT, STILL WINNING: WHY AMERICA WENT ALL IN ON DONALD 
TRUMP—AND WHY WE MUST DO IT AGAIN 163 (2019) (indicating the list “prove[d] to be one of 
the biggest issues that got Trump elected”); HULSE, supra note 2, at 289 (“Trump would almost 
certainly not have won the presidency without that open court seat.”).  
391. HULSE, supra note 2, at 1, 56, 147, 152–53. 
392. HEMINGWAY & SEVERINO, supra note 2, at 59. 
393. Trump v. Hawaii,138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
394. Id. at 2408. 
395. Id. at 2421. 
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undermined the Court’s credibility with the public.  Trump had campaigned 
vigorously on the need for a travel ban.  Indeed, many of his statements in 
the campaign became an issue in the case.  Since the result in the case, 
upholding the travel ban was consistent with Trump’s position during his 
successful presidential campaign, it is unlikely that the decision would 
undermine the Court’s reputation with a significant swath of the public 
despite its unpopularity with Trump’s partisan opponents. 
In 2019, the Court decided two politically controversial cases on the final 
day of its term.  In Rucho v. Common Cause,396 the Court finally held that legal 
challenges to partisan gerrymandering of legislative districts constituted 
political questions beyond the scope of federal judicial authority due to the 
absence of judicially manageable standards.  A four-vote plurality had 
endorsed that approach in Vieth v. Jubelirer.397  Justice Kavanaugh, replacing 
Justice Kennedy, provided the crucial fifth vote.  Democrats complained, 
but the public at large did not seem to care.  Evaluating partisan 
gerrymandering legally presented a classic political question due to the 
absence of judicially manageable standards, even more so than 
reapportionment.  There remains hope that Rucho will reinvigorate the 
political question doctrine after it was unduly diminished in Baker v. Carr. 
In Department of Commerce v. New York,398 the other case decided on the 
final day of the term, a 5–4 majority held that the Secretary of Commerce 
could not add a question for the recipient’s citizenship to the short form of 
the census because the Secretary’s explanation for the addition was 
pretextual.  A media campaign followed the decision, arguing that a decision 
in favor of the Secretary (and hence President Trump) would threaten the 
legitimacy of the Court.399  The Court prevented the Secretary from adding 
the question.  Since the issue was quite technical, the public probably would 
not have cared much one way or the other.  The “legitimacy” argument is 
beginning to lose its punch if it ever had any.  
 
396. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
397. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004). 
398. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
399. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1743 (2020) (“[T]hese cases involve . . . 
straightforward application of legal terms . . . .  For . . . discriminat[ion] against employees for being 
homosexual or transgender . . . discriminate[s] against individual men and women in part because of 
sex.  That has always been prohibited by Title VII’s plain terms . . . .”). 
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V.    DOES THE COURT CURRENTLY HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS? 
On several occasions, the Court has gotten out of step with the public.  
The Court’s diffuse support permits it to decide cases against the grain of 
public opinion for some time.  However, when the public becomes too 
dissatisfied with the Court and its decisions, the political check of 
nomination and confirmation of new Justices will change its direction.  This 
occurred over dissatisfaction with the Marshall Court’s federalism decisions, 
the Taney Court’s Dred Scott decision, the Lochner era decisions of the first 
third of the twentieth century, and the Warren Court’s aggressive decisions 
in civil rights.  In each instance, the newly constituted Court changed 
directions trimming back the jurisprudence of the prior Court.  Given life 
tenure for the Justices, the likelihood of strategic retirements, and the 
probability of sporadic vacancies on the Court, replacement of Justices will 
often occur unpredictably.  Nevertheless, given human mortality, vacancies 
on the Court will occur.  If the public is sufficiently dissatisfied with the 
Court over a lengthy period of time, a President and Senate will eventually 
be in place to appoint Justices who will alter the Court’s direction.  It may 
seem like happenstance, however, that the appointment of Justices has 
resolved potential legitimacy crises short of more powerful options 
including defiance, court packing, limitation of jurisdiction, impeachment, 
or partial elimination of the Court. 
A lack of a political consensus in favor of altering the Court’s direction 
should not matter.  In most political choices, the majority rules.  Just as there 
will be political forces favoring change, there almost certainly will be 
counterforces favoring the status quo.  If the forces favoring a change in the 
Court’s direction prevail politically, they have the constitutional right to 
nominate and confirm Justices likely to move the Court in a new or different 
direction. 
Arguably, that is what has happened over the past few years.  Nominating 
textualist/originalist judges from a published list was a crucial piece of 
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign.  That proposal appealed to a 
significant swath of the electorate.  Hillary Clinton responded with her 
approach, proclaiming that she would appoint Justices who would preserve 
Roe v. Wade and reject Citizens United.400  It seems that Court appointments 
resonates to a greater extent with Republican and conservative voters than 
 
400. HULSE, supra note 2, at 148. 
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with Democratic and liberal voters.401  Perhaps this is because conservative 
voters perceive some of the Court’s decisions to be hostile to their basic 
values, particularly cultural and religious issues.402  To some extent, 
abortion and Roe v. Wade serve as a proxy for broader cultural issues.  
Conservatives are more likely to disagree with the Court’s resolution of 
these issues and are more likely to question whether deciding these cases is 
any of the Court’s business.  Conservative voters are also likely to be more 
receptive to arguments claiming the Constitution should be interpreted 
according to the original understanding of the text and not based on judicial 
assumptions of wise policy.  This was the approach that candidate Trump 
took, and it seemed to resonate with enough voters to lead to his election.   
As has often been the case, the public avoided a true legitimacy crisis with 
respect to the Court by electing a President and Senate committed to using 
the appointment and confirmation process to alter the Court’s direction.403  
This entails altering interpretive approaches and specific results, as has 
happened on several occasions in the past.  The appointment and 
confirmation process assumes that the President, with the Senate’s 
concurrence, may alter the direction of the Court.  If precedent restricted 
the Justices to interpret the law precisely as it had always been interpreted 
in the past, judicial confirmation hearings would be far simpler.  Senators 
would simply need assurance from the nominee that the Justice would 
continue to decide cases exactly as the Court had done in the past.  Under 
such an approach, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. New York, and Betts v. Brady 
would still be the law.  Precedent matters.  It constrains without controlling 
for all time.  The Court can change directions, and it is entirely appropriate 
for the President and Senate to nudge it in the direction of change.  Those 
 
401. Haglin et al., supra note 44, at 30–31; see TOOBIN, supra note 360, at 338 (indicating 
conservatives “cared more about the Court than their liberal counterparts”).  Ronald Reagan had also 
employed the prospect of conservative judicial appointments to increase political support.  Robert C. 
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
373, 381 (2007). 
402. See NELSON & TUCKER, supra note 84, at 30 (showing a 2015 poll by Pew indicated that 
68% of conservative Republicans considered the Roberts Court liberal); Fontana & Braman, supra 
note 85, at 765–76 (stating conservatives are more motivated to vote than liberals based on Court 
decisions that either support or conflict with their values); TOOBIN, supra note 360, at 86 (stating 
evangelical Christens were activated by Supreme Court decisions secularizing constitutional law); 
Eskridge Jr., supra note 313, at 1312 (“Not only did Roe energize the pro-life movement and accelerate 
the infusion of sectarian religion into American politics, but it also radicalized many traditionalists.”).  
403. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 358, at 1083 (“It is perfectly normal for Presidents to 
entrench members of their party in the judiciary as a means of shaping constitutional interpretation.  
That is the way most constitutional change occurs.”). 
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who resist such change will cry “illegitimacy,” but this will be a political 
argument tested in the political process.  
Does the Court presently have a legitimacy crisis?  Probably not.  Diffuse 
support for the Court remains strong despite anguished cries of illegitimacy 
from those disappointed with changes in the Court’s membership and those 
anxious about the Court’s future direction.404  History indicates that 
controversial decisions that affect persons classified as elite do not 
negatively impact public respect for the Court.  However, there cannot be 
multiple decisions over a relatively short period.  The strength of that diffuse 
support is illustrated by the fact that most of the public rejects many 
significant constitutional doctrines and decisions of the Court over the past 
several decades.  The rejected decisions of the Court include protection of 
abortion rights beyond the first trimester,405 the use of racial preferences in 
college admissions to achieve diversity in the student body,406 expanded 
protection for criminal defendants,407 the prohibition of prayer in the 
public schools,408 protection of flag burning under the 
First Amendment,409 judicially imposed limitations on the death 
penalty,410 and the ability of municipalities to take private property and 
convey it to a private developer.411  Even more significantly, the fact Bush 
v. Gore, criticized by elites as one of the most illegitimate decisions of all 
time, had no long-term impact on diffuse support for the Court is testimony 
 
404. A 2003 survey found that “[n]early all Americans believe the Court is doing at least a pretty 
good job, and most believe its policy positions are about right.”  James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira 
& Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. OF POL. 
SCI. 354, 359 (2003); see also NELSON & TUCKER, supra note 84, at 30 (noting that despite polls 
indicating a decline in support for the Court, empirical research shows that despite controversial 
decisions on the Affordable Care Act, same-sex marriage, and affirmative action, diffuse support for 
the Court remains strong). 
405. SAMANTHA LUKS & MICHAEL SALAMONE, ABORTION, in PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 80 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan ed. 2008). 
406. LOAN LEE & JACK CITRIN, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, in PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 162, 181 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008). 
407. AMY E. LERMAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, in PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 41, 56 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008). 
408. ALISON GASH & ANGELO GONZALEZ, SCHOOL PRAYER, in PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 62, 77 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds.  2008). 
409. PETER HANSON, FLAG BURNING, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 184, 199 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008). 
410. JOHN HANLEY, THE DEATH PENALTY, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 108, 135 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds.  2008). 
411. JANICE NADLER ET AL., GOVERNMENT TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, in PUBLIC 
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 286, 304 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008). 
86
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 2
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/2
  
2021] “LAWYERS’ WORK”: DOES THE COURT HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS? 371 
to the depth of that support.  Indeed, the Court seems to be all but 
bulletproof.  All this suggests is current cries of illegitimacy are unlikely to 
shake public support for the Court.  There is some research suggesting that, 
at least with respect to salient decisions inconsistent with public attitudes, 
backlash against the decisions will fade over time resulting in public 
acceptance.412  The extent the public remains in disagreement with so many 
major decisions from the nineteen fifties, sixties, and seventies would seem 
to undermine this thesis.  This will especially be true with respect to 
technical legal decisions of little interest to the general public. 
The remedy for illegitimacy, defined as deep and widespread general 
dissatisfaction with the Court, is political and exercised through the 
appointment and confirmation power.  No matter how intensely a particular 
minority of citizens may disapprove of the direction of the Court, the claims 
of illegitimacy will have no impact unless they can translate that disapproval 
into viable political action capable of affecting presidential or senatorial 
elections, or at least at the appointment and confirmation stage. 
Was Justice Scalia correct?  Would the Court’s failure to decide cases by 
doing “lawyers’ work” seriously undermine public respect for the Court?  
Considering the past instances in which the Court strayed too far from the 
public’s views and values, he was partially correct.  Most of the time, the 
public is unaware of the Court’s decisions, much less its reasoning.  As such, 
there is slight prospect of negative public reaction against the Court.  
However, every so often a judicial decision resonates with the public, as was 
the case with abortion in Roe v. Wade, slavery in the territories in Dred Scott, 
or regulation of economic affairs in the Lochner era.  When that happens, 
and when the public is paying attention, the Court is at grave risk—as 
Justice Scalia argued—if it is deciding such crucial questions through the 
transparent application of judicial value judgments rather than through the 
traditional interpretive approaches that lawyers are trained to apply.  In all 
three instances cited above, the Court relied on the dubious device of 
substantive due process.  Even the uninitiated lay person can understand 
that there is little legal substance to this concept and in fact it is simply a 
facade for the imposition of value judgments rather than pre-existing legal 
principles.  Justice Scalia is surely correct in concluding that decisions based 
 
412. Joseph Daniel Ura, Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to Supreme Court 
Decisions, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 110, 119 (2013) (“[T]he data indicate this initial backlash response 
eventually decays and is ultimately replaced by public mood’s movement toward the ideological 
direction of Supreme Court decisions.”). 
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on substantive due process are likely to lead to trouble for the Court, as has 
often been the case. 
However, history has suggested the Court can seriously undermine its 
public support even when it seems to be doing “lawyers’ work” by 
attempting to resolve troubling questions that are simply incapable of 
judicial resolution, even by the best application the lawyer’s craft has to 
offer.  M’Culloch v. Maryland provides an example.  Marshall’s opinion in 
M’Culloch is a masterpiece of legal reasoning.  However, it attempted to 
definitively resolve the proper relationship between the federal government 
and the states, which was simply too big and divisive to be resolved by 
judicial degree at that time.  The political backlash against the M’Culloch 
opinion and the Marshall Court demonstrated Marshall attempted a task 
beyond the Court’s competence.  Perhaps it took the Civil War to ultimately 
resolve the question.  Perhaps, a more nuanced approach than Marshall was 
willing to take would have brought less fury and outrage upon the Court.  
In any event, the reaction to M’Culloch indicates that sometimes lawyers’ 
work, even brilliant lawyers’ work, is not enough.  The Court must 
understand some seemingly legal issues are sometimes incapable of final 
judicial resolution.   
The Dred Scott opinion may be the premier example of that principle.  
Apparently, the Court believed that it could provide a definitive resolution 
to the question of slavery in the territories that was tearing the country apart.  
This was not simply a case of judicial arrogance.  Political institutions invited 
the Court to intervene and resolve the issue.  However, reflection should 
have indicated that an issue so fundamental and so intense could not be 
settled by judicial decree regardless of the outcome.  There was nothing the 
Court could say to appease the losing side.  Unlike Marshall in M’Culloch, 
Chief Justice Taney did not succeed in supporting his decision with 
plausible legal argument.413  Further, for the first time in the Court’s history, 
Justice Taney characterized the decision as politics rather than law.  But 
whether the decision was legally justifiable—and some believe that it was—
was not the only difficulty.  The primary difficulty was the Court attempting 
to settle an issue that could not be judicially resolved.  Dred Scott is perhaps 
the most glaring example of the real limits of judicial power.  As it turned 
out, only a catastrophic civil war could provide an answer. 
 
413. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 451 (1857) (attempting to project the Constitution as 
making no distinguishment between a slave as property and other property of a citizen). 
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The Lochner era is another instance in which the Court seems to have lost 
legitimacy with the public.  It may have initially self-corrected, but the 
ultimate correction came through the appointment and confirmation 
process.  The Lochner era is shorthand for a thirty-year period in which the 
Court sporadically rejected both federal and state efforts to regulate 
economic matters on constitutional grounds.  With respect to the 
invalidation of state legislation, the reliance on substantive due process can 
be challenged as transparently value oriented as with Dred Scott and 
Roe v. Wade.  However, both the narrow construction of the Commerce 
Clause in the federal regulatory cases and the expansive conception of the 
substantive due process liberty of contract can be defended as incorrect but 
at least plausible legal arguments.  The primary problem with the Lochner era 
cases was not that the Court was failing to do “lawyers’ work;” rather, it was 
attempting to resolve an issue beyond the scope of judicial competence, 
which is the role of the government in regulating the economy.  Individually, 
the issues presented in the Lochner era cases—whether a particular piece of 
federal legislation was within the congressional commerce power, or 
whether state legislation was inconsistent with substantive due process—
seemed justiciable.  However, taken together these cases raised a larger 
question pertaining to the judicial role in supervising federal and state 
regulatory power over economic affairs.  In his classic dissent in Lochner, 
Justice Holmes criticized the majority both for its doctrine and for deciding 
an issue which was inappropriate for judicial resolution.414  Justice Harlan’s 
dissent concentrated primarily on the latter ground.415  The Lochner era 
cases can be criticized as doctrinally incorrect or overly value oriented.  
However, the best understanding as to why the public, through the 
appointments process, ultimately eliminated this line of cases is that for a 
period of almost forty years, the Court had attempted to address and resolve 
an issue beyond its legitimate authority.  As with McCulloch and Dred Scott, 
the problem was not so much the Court was failing to do “lawyer’s work,” 
but rather it was attempting to answer questions beyond competence of 
lawyers’ work to answer.  
Yet another instance in which the Court grew out of synch with the public 
and was disciplined through the appointment process involved the 
Warren Court.  There was no single decision that led to an effective political 
backlash, but rather an aggregation of decisions in several areas of law.  
 
414. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
415. Id. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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However, one area that stands out as marshaling political forces against the 
Court is constitutional criminal procedure, as best exemplified by the 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona.416  Perhaps the Warren Court’s most 
enduringly unpopular decisions were the school prayer cases.  The problem 
with the Warren Court decisions was not lack of plausible legal justification, 
although professional critics both in dissent and law reviews dispute the 
Court’s inattention to legal craft.  Rather, the political backlash against the 
Warren Court was more attributable to the sense that a majority of the Court 
was employing the legal process to radically alter settled expectations in 
every area of the law.  As such, it was tagged with the epithets of “judicial 
activism” or “legislating from the bench.”   
The Court could be faulted for its interpretive doctrinal analysis, but the 
general public was almost certainly unaware of that and could not care less.  
Rather, the backlash against the Warren Court was motivated by the results 
of the decisions.  Not of any particular decision, but rather the aggregation 
of opinions suggesting a large-scale pattern of change inconsistent with 
public opinion.  The backlash against the Warren Court tends to confirm 
the theory of judicial legitimacy.  That is, the Court has a relatively deep 
reservoir of diffuse support, permitting it to render decisions from time to 
time that go against the grain of public opinion.   
However, that support is not unlimited.  If the Court clashes with deeply 
held public values too frequently in a brief period of time, the Court’s 
goodwill may be exhausted, and the Court may pay a political price.  
Arguably, that it is what happened at the end of the Warren Court.  The 
President and the Senate used the appointment and confirmation process to 
alter the direction of the Court not because the Justices were not doing 
“lawyers’ work” but rather because of the revolutionary nature of so many 
of the Court’s decisions.  In a sense, the reaction against the Warren Court 
bears similarities to the backlash against the Marshall Court and McCulloch.  
In each instance, the Court attempted to move the public too far and too 
fast in a direction it was not prepared to go. 
That brings us to the Burger Court and Roe v. Wade.  To the extent that 
recent changes in the Court’s membership can be attributable to political 
backlash, Roe would seem to be at the center of the storm.  Roe led to a 
 
416. See Aaron J. Ley & Gordie Verhovek, The Political Foundations of Miranda v. Arizona and the 
Quarles Public Safety Exception, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 206, 228 (“Congress’s response to Miranda v. 
Arizona was forceful.  Blaming Miranda and the Supreme Court for the increase of crime in the United 
States became a popular pastime among legislators.”). 
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backlash against the Court for a variety of reasons.  As Justice Scalia argued 
in his Planned Parenthood dissent, the decision seemed to be the product of a 
judicial value judgment as opposed to “lawyers’ work.”417  That charge can 
be made to a greater extent against Roe than any prior case that has led to a 
political reaction against the Court, although some critiques of Dred Scott are 
similar.  Second, the decision was at war with the deeply held beliefs and 
values of a significant segment of the public.  It matters little, whether at any 
given time, a slight majority approves or disapproves of the decision. 
Contrary to other historically controversial decisions such as Brown v. 
Board of Education or Miranda v. Arizona, time does not serve to dissipate 
disapproval of Roe.  It is almost fifty-years since the Court decided Roe and 
the political backlash against the case seems to be stronger than ever.  The 
primary problem with Roe however, as identified in Justice White’s dissent 
and in Professor Ely’s early critique, is that the political issue of whether a 
fetus is a human being constitutionally protected by law was none of the 
Court’s business.418  Rather it could only decide the matter by judicial fiat 
which it did. 
However, by initially attempting to resolve the issue, the Court painted 
itself into a corner from which there is no easy escape.  There will virtually 
always be a significant constituency that cares ever deeply about the right to 
life and will continue to seek to overturn Roe, especially through the 
appointment process.  By recognizing a constitutional right to abortion in 
Roe, the Court created a significant constituency devoted to Roe and equally 
determined to employ all means, including the appointment process to 
preserve the abortion right.  As such there is no way out for the Court.  
Whatever it does in future abortion cases, it will almost certainly make one 
side or the other very angry.  It is unusual for the Court to find itself in such 
a no-win situation especially over an extended period of time.  Normally, 
the public grows accustomed to Supreme Court decisions and would not be 
particularly upset by either their retention or rejection.  Not so with Roe.  It 
is expected by some and feared by others that the present Court will limit, 
if not totally reject the abortion right.  A failure to do anything will certainly 
anger the significant segment of the public that supported President Trump 
and his three Supreme Court appointments in hope that Roe would be 
rejected.  On the other hand, the overruling of Roe or a further significant 
 
417. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981–82 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
418. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).  See generally Ely, supra note 
83 (providing an overview of where the Court’s majority opinion went askew). 
91
Bloom: “Lawyers’ Work”: Does the Court Have a Legitimacy Crisis?
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021
  
376 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:285 
narrowing will enrage the substantial segment of the public that highly 
treasure the decision and the right it created.  Almost by definition, a 
decision that places the Court in such a continuing bind should never have 
been decided in the first place.  As Justice Scalia and many others have 
observed, Roe has had an extraordinary deleterious impact on the judicial 
confirmation process, turning the confirmation of any justice who might 
vote to alter into all out political war. 
There are many reasons that the Supreme Court appointments became a 
crucial issue in the 2016 presidential election, including decisions with 
respect to freedom of religion and same-sex marriage.  But, at the very center 
of the controversy was Roe v. Wade.  The prospect of a Supreme Court 
majority narrowing or overruling Roe almost certainly played a significant 
role in the election of Donald Trump.  In that sense, this was one more 
example of the political process counter-attacking the Court’s direction.  As 
such, it is simply a further instance of constitutionally based checks on the 
Court in action. 
If the Justices are concerned with public support, they may attempt to 
thread the needle by applying Casey’s undue burden standard to uphold some 
abortion regulation while invalidating others.  On the other hand, some or 
all of the Justices may ignore public opinion and simply decide the matter 
by applicable legal principles.  In that event, the Justices will need to focus 
on whether a decision that some believe to have been incorrectly decided 
from the outset should now be rejected.   
The counterargument will be stare decisis.  By definition, that doctrine 
assumes that incorrect decisions should generally be allowed to stand as 
precedent.  That would be especially true with respect to a decision like Roe, 
which is close to fifty-years old and has been relied on by the Court on 
countless occasions.  Moreover, the Court explicitly addressed overruling 
Roe in Casey twenty-five years ago, and while narrowing it, upheld its essence.  
Accordingly, as a matter of stare decisis, the case against overruling Roe is 
formidable.  It is most likely that a majority of the Court will apply the Casey 
undue burden standard in a manner more sympathetic to abortion 
regulation.  However, one cannot predict with any accuracy what the Court 
is likely to do given the Justices themselves are likely to be very divided in 
their approaches.  Whatever the Court does in the abortion area, it can 
expect a deluge of public criticism. 
Much of the criticism of the present Court alleges it behaves in a partisan 
manner by rubber stamping constitutionally dubious actions taken by 
President Trump.  This critique presents several complicated questions.  
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First, this argument is usually made by partisan critics of President Trump 
who may be attempting to intimidate the Justices and to lower respect for 
the Court in view of its perceived conservative tilt.  If so, it may be the critics 
who are attempting to politicize the Court instead of the Justices themselves.  
Moreover, if it appears certain district judges are employing their injunctive 
power to aid the resistance to the President and his policies, Supreme Court 
intervention might well constitute appropriate intervention against a 
politicized use of the judicial process. 
Nevertheless, empirical research tends to indicate that the public has 
traditionally accorded the Court greater approval than other governmental 
institutions because it considers the Court different in that it has been 
perceived as principled, fair, and non-partisan.  If the public does come to 
view the Court as simply doing the President’s bidding in high profile cases 
involving presidential policy, its traditional high approval could suffer.  
Whether that happens depends on how many of such cases the Court 
decides, how they are decided, whether they are highly publicized, and 
ultimately whether the public cares about the results.  So far, cases involving 
the President and his policies, though highly publicized, have constituted a 
minuscule portion of the Court’s docket.  However, there is a risk that if the 
Court decides too many important and controversial cases in favor of the 
President, the Court’s image as neutral and non-partisan might suffer.  
However, in a highly polarized polity, it is likely that partisan disapproval 
may be cancelled out to a large extent by partisan approval.  In addition, 
based on past experience, public disapproval of the Court based on 
disagreement with specific decisions tends to dissipate fairly quickly.   
One way in which the Court could attempt to minimize threats to its 
public support is to decide fewer controversial cases of concern to the 
public, especially cases raising hotly contested cultural issues.  This would 
require the Court to engage in strategic decisions with respect to docket 
management, which it almost certainly does in any event given the volume 
of certiorari petitions presented.  As noted earlier, due largely to the public 
invisibility of this process, it would be unlikely to have an adverse impact on 
the Court’s reputation.  The overwhelming amount of the Court’s docket is 
composed of technical legal questions of little interest to the public.  The 
cases of public salience, to use the jargon of political science, tend to come 
in two varieties.  There are those questions presented under specific 
constitutional provisions which the Court is expected and accustomed to 
interpret.  Many of the Court’s most controversial decisions fall in this 
category.  Does First Amendment freedom of speech prohibit legislation 
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prohibiting burning of the American flag or criminalizing categorically 
defined hate speech?  Does the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment prohibit legislation establishing vouchers that can be used 
to pay tuition at religious schools or does it prohibit school-sponsored 
prayers at public school graduations?  Does the Commerce Clause authorize 
Congress to impose a mandate requiring private individuals to purchase 
health insurance?  These cases raise publicly controversial issues, but they 
also clearly implicate specific constitutional provisions the Court is expected 
to interpret, at least when raised in otherwise justiciable cases presented for 
review. 
Arguably, the question is qualitatively different when the Court is asked 
to rule that the concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause must be 
interpreted to recognize a right to obtain an abortion, or the right to assisted 
suicide or the right to same-sex marriage.  In these cases, the Court is being 
asked to substitute a judicial value judgment for the conclusions of elected 
legislatures.  It is these substantive due process cases in which the Court 
strays farthest from traditional lawyers’ work, entering the political domain 
and, as Justice Scalia charged, inevitably taking sides in a culture war.  It is 
the likelihood that the Court will disengage from deciding these types of 
cases that has fueled the battle over Supreme Court confirmations in recent 
years. 
The Court cannot avoid all controversy, nor should it.  Many of the most 
contentious issues in contemporary society end up in litigation, implicating 
specific constitutional provisions.  Most legal issues, including many of the 
most controversial, are ultimately resolved by the lower federal courts.  The 
Supreme Court does not have the time or resources to address every cutting-
edge issue of constitutional law.  Still, the Court sits atop the federal judicial 
system and plays a significant supervisory role.  If the Court concludes the 
lower federal courts have made serious errors with respect to the 
interpretation of the constitution or federal law, or that the circuits are split 
on an important interpretive question, the Supreme Court may have to 
intervene regardless of the politically controversial nature of the issue.  The 
Court has control of its docket, but within limits.  The Court must decide 
certain cases it might otherwise choose to avoid if it is to perform its job as 
head of the federal judiciary. 
Another strategy to protect the Court’s moral capital is constitutional 
minimalism.  Professor Bickel endorsed the approach to an extent in The 
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Least Dangerous Branch.419  Professor Sunstein wrote a book describing and 
recommending that approach,420 though, as a progressive confronting a 
conservative leaning Court, his arguments may be somewhat 
disingenuous.421  Chief Justice Roberts seems to have adopted a minimalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation.  Minimalism consists of deciding 
cases on the narrowest grounds reasonably presented.  It is consistent with 
a restrained approach to the judicial role, emphasizing that courts are better 
equipped to appreciate factual particulars than abstract principles.  
Minimalism is derived from the traditional approach to common law 
adjudication.  It assumes that courts are incapable of understanding the big 
picture and hence derive general principles only after working through 
several specific cases, which in the aggregate will help illuminate the larger 
themes of the law.  Minimalism is a device designed to protect against 
judicial error.  The narrower the decision, the less likely the Court will 
stumble into incorrect principle.  In addition, narrow decisions are easier to 
correct or at least distinguish.  Likewise, if there is a fear of public 
disapproval, the narrower the decision, the lower the risk, unless of course 
the relevant public was expecting a broad and definitive resolution.  Judicial 
minimalism is a means through which, over time, the Court can recalibrate 
the public perception of the appropriate role of the Court from that of an 
all-purpose problem solver to that of a body obligated to adjudicate properly 
presented disputes between parties before the Court with respect for the 
decisions of more democratic institutions.   
Minimalism is also a means by which Justices who agree on a particular 
result, but for very different reasons, can be persuaded to join a narrow 
factually particular decision.  Sometimes, minimalism will be a deliberate 
strategy by the majority to decide a case in the narrowest possible manner.  
On other occasions, it will be a necessity thrust upon the Court in an attempt 
to construct a majority opinion when there is significant disagreement 
among the Justices joining that opinion.  In either event, judicial minimalism 
 
419. See generally BICKEL, supra note 17 (discussing the idea of the Court deciding cases on 
narrower grounds when able as opposed deciding them on substantive grounds). 
420. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT ix (1999) (“My goal in this book is to identify and defend a distinctive form of judicial 
decision-making, which I call ‘minimalism.’”); see also Eskridge Jr., supra note 313, at 1283 (discussing 
similar suggestions). 
421. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 358, at 1087 (observing “liberal and left-wing scholars 
have embraced procedural arguments about the [C]ourt’s proper role as a way of combating changes 
in constitutional doctrine” while also noting “Sunstein’s embrace of constitutional minimalism”). 
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has advantages.  Returning the Court to a more restrained role should over 
time bolster its reputation with the public.  However, in the short run there 
will be disappointment by those who have been conditioned to believe the 
appropriate role of the Court is to ultimately resolve societal conflicts that 
political institutions have been unable to settle.   
Based on historical experience and long-term public polling, there is little 
reason to believe the Court faces a legitimacy crisis based on a decline in 
public support.  The Court’s public support appears to be sufficiently deep 
to protect against public disappointment with particular decisions.  Indeed, 
many of the Court’s signature precedents including the prohibition of 
school prayer, the approval of limited racial preferences in educational 
admissions, and expanding the protection of criminal defendants, have not 
even to this day evoked majoritarian support from the public and yet the 
Court as an institution remains well respected.  This illustrates the Court has 
a relatively broad protected zone in which to operate.  Perhaps the wild card 
is abortion, where the Court has worked itself into a position in which a 
decisive decision in either direction might well imperil its reputation with a 
significant segment of the public.  As such, the Court appears to be on a 
tight rope.  Roe should offer caution with respect to future constitutional 
adjudication.  First, it illustrates—as should have been apparent from both 
Dred Scott and Lochner—that substantive due process is a very dangerous 
approach.  It is dangerous in that it is transparently value oriented and 
appears political.  Likewise, unlike other accepted methods of interpretation, 
there are no guard rails.  Despite Justice Harlan’s classic dissent in 
Poe v. Ullman, there is little that the Justices can rely on aside from their own 
preferences or their perceptions of the public’s preferences.  Sometimes, 
that may not lead to trouble but often it has and will.  Most importantly, this 
is not the application of law but rather simply thinly disguised politics.  As 
such, as Justice Scalia recognized in his Casey dissent, it is unworthy of public 
respect. 
Perhaps, the most important lesson the Court should learn from Roe and 
from prior instances in which the Court got significantly off-track with 
public opinion is that there are some issues which may seem to involve a 
legal question (i.e., whether Jane Roe was constitutionally entitled to receive 
an abortion in Texas) but that may not be answered in a principled manner 
by the Supreme Court.  The questions are either too big and divisive or law 
lacks the tools of resolution.  When in such an instance and the Court 
nevertheless presses ahead and tries to impose a judicial resolution, the 
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attempt will fail, and constitutionally based appointment and confirmation 
processes will provide some correction for judicial overreaching.   
There is another lesson Roe teaches.  Before entering a conflict, the 
military attempts to ensure that there is an exit strategy.  There must be a 
means to assure that the conflict is not interminable.  The same strategy 
should apply to judicial ventures.  The Court should not embark on a line 
of precedent that may become problematic and from which there is no easy 
escape.  There is every reason to believe Roe was the product of gross 
miscalculation.  At the time Roe was decided, the Court had been on a roll.  
It had ordered the desegregation of the public schools, imposed majoritarian 
democracy in the face of longstanding practice to the contrary, moved the 
country’s position on the death penalty, prohibited prayer in public schools, 
reformed the criminal process, and had seemingly carried it all off with little 
threat to the Court’s legitimacy.  The fact Richard Nixon had been elected 
on an anti-Court platform in 1968 should have suggested that all was not 
well, but the Justices failed to notice.  Indeed, two years after Roe, the Court 
effectively ushered Nixon out of office.   
The Court indicated in Roe it understood it was deciding a deeply 
controversial issue, but there is no reason to believe it understood how 
deeply divisive its decision was, how long the conflict would rage, the degree 
to which it would envelop the appointment and confirmation process, and 
the difficulty the Court would face in extricating itself from the abortion 
conflict.  As with Dred Scott, the Court seemed to walk into a buzz saw with 
little awareness of what lay ahead.  Foresight is difficult—perhaps 
impossible.  That is all the more reason for the Court to tread cautiously in 
new areas of adjudication.  The Justices seemed to believe they were engaged 
in a careful balancing of interests.  But the decision, when combined with 
the companion case of Doe v. Bolton and as subsequently and somewhat 
stridently interpreted by the Court, was extremely broad and one-sided.  The 
wise decision would have been for the Court to abstain completely.  
However, if the Court was determined to wade into the question of the 
constitutionality of abortion regulation, it would have been a perfect 
instance for the exercise of minimalism, deciding no more than what was 
absolutely required, as some have suggested.  The Court may be unable to 
predict accurately at the time of its decisions whether trouble is lurking 
ahead, but it should be able to decide cases in a manner that minimizes the 
risks.   
Justice Scalia was correct in insisting the public will generally leave the 
Court alone as long as it believes the Court is deciding cases through 
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application of the tools of the lawyer’s craft.  The Court has built up a 
sufficient cushion of support to permit it to decide cases in opposition to 
public opinion without sacrificing its legitimacy.  However, there are limits.  
If at some point the public concludes the Court is attempting to resolve 
conflicts beyond its competence, the appointment and confirmation process 
will be used, as it has been used in the past, to alter the Court’s direction.  It 
may be a slow-moving check, but it provides the ultimate and effective 
answer to charges of illegitimacy. 
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